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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis endeavours to answer the following question: is there a viable and 
workable model for regulating workplace grievances and disciplinary action 
(EDG), the end objective of which is enhanced business competitiveness by 
encouraging partnerships at work, or greater levels of organisational 
commitment behaviour?   This thesis argues that the answer to that question 
may be yes, if the regulation applied can encourage employers to deal with 
EDG in a way that employees are likely to perceive as fair. 
 
This is a challenging objective for law makers.   Current regulation of EDG 
does not and probably cannot achieve the high levels of fairness perception 
that the partnership model requires.  This thesis argues that, in order to rectify 
this problem, there must be a shift away from formulating employment 
regulation with a blinkered eye on worker protection, and towards a more 
sophisticated model which views worker protection against unfair treatment as 
beneficial in-so-far as it promotes fairness perceptions, and the resulting 
benefits of a productive and innovative workforce.  This recalibration of the 
regulatory compass calls for a legal framework which allows the parties to 
formulate a reflexive and self-regulating approach to EDG; a framework 
according to which the parties will work to prevent and resolve disputes in a 
manner which accounts for their particular working environment, and the 
unique circumstances of each dispute or grievance.   
 
The new regulatory model that is proposed in this thesis will provide 
employers with the opportunity to be immune from the tribunals‘ jurisdiction 
relating to EDG.  Immunity will apply where the employer can demonstrate 
that they have in place and follow certain methods and practices for managing 
EDG which are likely to lead to fairness at work, and therefore a higher degree 
of fairness perceptions.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis endeavours to answer the following question: is there a viable 
model for regulating how employers and employees deal with workplace 
grievances and disciplinary action (EDG), the end objective of which is not 
employment protection, but is instead enhanced business competitiveness by 
encouraging partnerships at work or greater levels of organisational 
commitment behaviour?   This thesis argues that the answer to that question 
may be yes, if the regulation can encourage employer‘s to respond to the 
demands of EDG in a way that employees are likely to perceive as fair. 
 
1.1 Re-directing employment protection regulation 
 
Labour law has traditionally focused on regulating the employment relation 
for the purpose of protecting the interests of employees.  Those who pioneered 
labour law did so in large part because they perceived an imbalance of 
economic power between the parties to the employment relationship that 
heavily favoured the employer.  This power imbalance left the employee 
exposed to exploitation by the employer whose perceived primary concern lay 
in the generation of profits for the benefit of its owners, rather than in the fair 
treatment of its workforce.  This understanding of the labour market continues 
to pervade much of labour regulation, although it is arguable that the market 
conditions in which labour law currently functions are such that the focus of 
labour law may, in certain areas of employment protection, be justifiably 
adjusted.   
 
This thesis argues that in countries including Britain the demands upon labour 
have shifted from traditional methods of production to new ways of working 
that reflect the highly competitive and interdependent global market in which 
commercial organisations do business.  Particular emphasis is now placed on 
the need for British businesses to respond to the demands of the ‗knowledge 
driven economy‘ as an essential ingredient in Britain‘s recipe for remaining 
competitive in the face of globalisation and the current economic downturn.  
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For many if not most employers these changing and challenging economic 
conditions necessitate the development and maintenance of a workforce that is 
motivated to function beyond the strict obligations of their employment 
agreements.  Such employers desire their workforce to be highly productive, 
even innovative, as a key aspect of commercial success.  Of course 
governments also identify the value in such productive employment 
relationships.  The macro-economic demands and associated political 
challenges of the modern global market, encourages governments to find ways 
of achieving higher levels of business competitiveness within and outside of 
their geographical and economic boundaries. 
 
1.2 The central argument – regulating for competitiveness 
 
This thesis does not challenge the continued potential value of labour law as a 
mechanism for protecting the interests of some employees from exploitation at 
the hands of the economically more powerful employer.  This thesis does, 
however, argue that law makers should, given the economic conditions just 
described, consider a new end-game for employment protection regulation.  In 
particular, it is mooted that labour regulation can have as its end goal higher 
levels of business competitiveness and economic well-being which are 
achieved through laws that encourage a more productive employment 
relationship.  Such a shift in regulatory emphasis will not mean that employees 
are exposed to greater levels of exploitation as a result of a weakening in the 
protections afforded them by law.  In fact, the contrary is true and employment 
protection would continue to be an important element of the reconfigured 
regulatory approach.  What this thesis argues, however, is that employment 
protection should cease to be the overriding objective of labour law, and 
should become instead a means to the new final end of labour law which is 
greater competitiveness. 
 
1.3 The centrality of fairness and EDG 
 
The argument in favour of a new or alternative direction for labour law 
focuses its attention on the importance of fairness at work.  This thesis argues 
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that employees are more likely to work in a manner that exceeds their 
contractual obligations, and be highly productive and innovative, if they 
perceive that their employer will treat them fairly and, in particular, handle 
their concerns and disciplinary matters (or EDG) in a manner that is fair.  The 
corollary is of course that employees who perceive that their employer is 
unfair are not likely to be productive and may in fact, for reasons that are 
explored later, be destructive or counter-productive in response to their 
perceptions of unfairness.  To help frame the discussion this thesis picks-up on 
the previous Labour Government‘s conception of partnership between 
employers and employees as a means of achieving greater levels of business 
competitiveness.  It suggests that the previous Government‘s notion of 
partnership articulates a formula for an employment relationship that can 
effectively respond to the demands of the modern global economy, but this 
thesis also identifies the significance of fairness perceptions as a precondition 
(as well as a potential outcome) of successful partnerships at work.      
 
For some (perhaps most) employers, fair treatment and a concern for fairness 
is an objective for their workplace environment.  Those enlightened employers 
recognise the value of fairness as a mechanism for achieving higher levels of 
worker productivity or, at least, avoiding the negative outcomes that can flow 
from unfairness.  But this thesis argues that it is not enough for lawmakers to 
leave all employers alone to realise the benefits of fairness.  It is highly 
unlikely that fairness, employee perceptions of fairness, and the subsequent 
achievement of partnership at work will be universally realised in all 
workplaces given the traditional ‗them and us‘ construct of the employment 
relationship; a relationship that has historically been based on subordination of 
the employee and their interests to the demands and interests of the employer.  
Even for those employers who articulate and purport to demonstrate an 
enlightened view of the employment relationship, it may be necessary for the 
law to set a directing framework of better behaviour that will help maximise 
fairness at work. 
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1.4 The regulatory challenge of generating fairness perceptions 
 
The challenge for regulators posed by the alternative regulatory objective that 
this thesis propounds is apparent.  Whereas regulation of employee 
disciplinary and grievance related matters, or EDG, that maintains employee 
protection as its primary objective, might achieve that objective by relatively 
unsophisticated rules backed by robust enforcement, regulation to achieve 
greater levels of fairness perceptions amongst employees is arguably a much 
greater challenge which calls for a more sophisticated regulatory approach.  
Where the regulatory objective is employee protection, the law typically 
places the parties in potential conflict as a device for preventing, by negative 
incentive, disputes about EDG (e.g. if you break the rules I will bring legal 
action against you, so do not break the rules).  But such a regulatory device is, 
or so this thesis argues, unlikely to promote a belief in the employee that their 
employer is fair.  This traditional or common form of employment protection 
regulation tends, it is argued, to pitch the parties to the employment 
relationship against each other, which in turn perpetuates the ‗them and us‘ 
employment relationship.  Further, the discussion which follows suggests that 
it is more than just the content of current regulation that prevents it from 
promoting fairness perceptions and partnerships.  The challenges set in its way 
are fundamental and touch on the nature of the regulatory approach and, 
significantly, its means of enforcement (i.e. the tribunals and the Courts).  A 
new radical approach to regulating EDG is necessary if an end goal of greater 
competitiveness is to be realised.      
 
1.5 Thesis summary 
 
This thesis sets out to find a model for the regulation of EDG that is likely to 
achieve partnership at work, increased worker productivity and enhanced 
competiveness.  It begins this search in Chapter 2 by exploring the previous 
Government‘s conception of partnership at work.  The second chapter 
describes the economic conditions that promote the search for a mechanism 
for greater workplace productively and competitiveness, including the rise of 
globalisation and the knowledge driven economy.  These economic drivers 
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encouraged the former Labour Government to develop its notion of 
partnership at work as a policy basis for new regulation of the labour market.  
That new regulation would, according to the previous Government, promote 
greater business competiveness and fairness at work (as this thesis progresses 
we shall see that there was and remains a substantial distance between the 
policy rhetoric and the legislation that purported to support the policy).   
 
The second chapter moves on to identify the Labour Government‘s model of 
partnership amongst a number of alternative models and to describe its 
essential characteristics.  In short the previous Government‘s conception of 
partnership at work was focused on ‗mutual gains‘ which is consistent with the 
view that partnerships should promote fairness at work.  This view of 
partnership resembles (in form and desired outcome) the model of 
Organisation Commitment Behaviour (OCB) which Daniel Katz described as 
being an essential characteristic of a successful business.  This thesis explores 
Katz‘s idea of OCB and articulates its essential features as being an important 
embellishment of the Labour Government‘s partnership model.  In short it is 
argued that the partnership model is given greater and clearer meaning if it is 
understood to include OCB.  But achieving effective partnership at work and 
OCB was and remains a significant challenge.  Essential to the realisation of 
partnerships and OCB is a high level of trust but, it is argued, such a high level 
of trust may be elusive given that the employment relationship is historically 
based on notions of command and control, subordination and, arguably, low 
trust (this immediately suggests the potential for regulatory intervention to 
help circumvent the barriers to partnership).  Remembering that this thesis is 
focused on regulating EDG, the second chapter also describes the significance 
of EDG as an element in the building or destruction of trust and perceptions of 
fairness.  An employer who is committed to treating its employees fairly in the 
context of EDG is more likely to be considered fair and to be trusted by those 
employees who are essential to its competitive performance.  A fair and 
trusted employer will be more likely to realise the competitiveness enhancing 
benefits that flow from OCB and partnership.   
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In Chapter 3 this thesis asks what does it mean to be ‗fair‘ in the context of 
EDG?  More specifically the chapter explores the circumstances in which 
employees are likely to judge that their employer is fair or unfair.  In the final 
analysis a regulatory model which aims to increase fairness perceptions to 
achieve OCB, will need to reflect a rational and fact based assessment of what 
it means to be fair and how employees form fairness judgements.  To this end 
the thesis calls upon the large amount of research into fairness that has been 
undertaken in the area of organisational justice.  We discover that there are 
three relevant types of fairness: distributive fairness, procedural fairness and 
interactional fairness.  Distributive fairness concerns the perceived fairness of 
outcome allocations; procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the 
allocation process; interactional justice accounts for fairness perceptions based 
on the interpersonal treatment an employee receives from others.  Here it is 
important to recognise that these three constructs, while distinct, are closely 
related.  In other words it is likely that an employee‘s belief about whether or 
not in any particular set of circumstances they have been treated fairly, will be 
based on a combination of distributive, procedural and interactional factors.  
This chapter goes on to explore and apply several theoretical models for 
predicting how employees process fairness information to reach fairness 
judgements.  In particular, we investigate how fairness judgements can impact 
on the realisation of partnership and the elements of OCB that were discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
 
In Chapter 4 we move on to form some initial thoughts about the essential 
elements of a regulatory model that might support the achievement of fairness 
at work, partnership and OCB.  That discussion is preceded with a recap of the 
key barriers to fairness at work which must be overcome if fairness 
perceptions are to thrive.  In this chapter we introduce the notion of reflexive 
self regulation as a likely key ingredient in the final regulatory model.  The 
argument to take forward is that a law, which aims to influence the actions of 
employers in a manner that positively impacts the mental perceptions of 
employees, must be adaptable to the workplace in which those judgements are 
formed, and to the specific instances of EDG to which the law will apply.  In 
other words, the likely regulatory model will provide a framework of 
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acceptable behaviour which is, at the same time, clear and specific, but 
adaptable enough to encourage behaviour that will drive realisation of the 
regulatory objective.  Further, any such regulatory model must take into 
account the point made in Chapter 3 that fairness perceptions involve a 
complex interaction of distributive, procedural and interactional justice.  It is 
wrong to suggest that any one element of fairness is predictably more 
important than another in any instance of EDG. 
 
In Chapter 5 this thesis begins a discussion about current regulation of EDG.  
We consider the extent to which existing laws do or can positively influence 
fairness perceptions.  Chapter 5 focuses on the law of Unfair Dismissal and 
draws comparisons with the New Zealand law of Unjustifiable Dismissal.  We 
refer to the law in New Zealand because it is, perhaps more so than any other 
common law jurisdiction, similar enough to the British regulation to make it a 
valuable source of comparison.  The first conclusion is that the current 
application of the law of Unfair Dismissal is unlikely to support the goal of 
fairness perceptions and OCB.  In particular, the judicial application of the 
range of reasonable responses test to the law of Unfair Dismissal appears to 
impede the law being a support for greater fairness perceptions.  That is in part 
because the test, by providing employers with significant leeway in relation to 
distributive fairness, fails to reflect the relationship discussed in chapter 4 
between fairness perceptions and the three areas of fairness (distributive, 
procedural and interactional).  The current application of the law places its 
primary emphasis on procedural fairness and, it is argued, this preoccupation 
with procedural fairness has the potential to negatively impact overall fairness 
perceptions.  That is partly because a regulatory focus on procedure results in 
employers following procedural rules and guidance to avoid the consequences 
of non-compliance, with little or no regard to the substantive outcomes of the 
process.  This approach can leave an impression in the mind of the employee 
that their employer is simply going through the procedural motions without 
genuine regard for the employee‘s interests.  Such a perception is the 
antithesis of regulation aimed at building trust and fairness perceptions. 
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But Chapter 5 also identifies a dilemma.  It may be possible to draft legislation 
which instructs the tribunals to holistically focus more robustly on all aspects 
of fairness (i.e. procedural, distributive and interactional) and to put aside the 
range of reasonable responses test, but can the tribunals effectively translate 
that instruction into decisions which provide clear guidance to employers 
about the meaning of fairness - guidance that will engender employer 
behaviour which leads to a greater level of fairness perceptions?  This thesis 
suggests that setting such an objective for the legislation and the tribunals may 
be asking too much of both.  In short it is not possible for a law to articulate 
clear and universally applicable guidance on what it means to be fair in each 
and every instance of EDG.  There are too many variables at play from 
instance to instance for the law to come anywhere near a precise standard.  It 
is, therefore, inevitable that any such law will be non-specific in setting 
standards against which fairness is judged (e.g. the Unfair Dismissal 
regulation calls for an assessment of fairness based on standards of 
―reasonableness‖).  But such a non-specific standard is subject to broad 
interpretation by the tribunals in each claim for Unfair Dismissal, and by 
employers who are contemplating dismissal.  Those interpretations will be 
formed based on a party‘s own prejudices and self-interest.  In other words 
such regulation is unlikely to result in a convergence of views about what it 
means to be fair in every case of EDG, which in turn means that the regulation 
is unlikely to significantly encourage greater levels of fairness perception for 
reasons that we explore in some detail.     
 
Further, it is argued that a weakness of the current law of Unfair Dismissal as 
a means of maximising fairness perceptions goes beyond the challenges 
associated with substantive and procedural fairness judgements.  This is 
apparent when we recall that the conflict continuum, which predicts that a 
significant proportion of disciplinary action, including dismissal, sits at the 
end of the continuum, but is rooted in earlier unresolved perceptions of 
unfairness that the employee has internalised or responded to by retaliation. 
The employee‘s response manifests itself in, for example, a dip in 
performance or some form of misconduct.  The dip in performance or 
misconduct may have been the direct and immediate cause of the dismissal, 
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but its genesis can be far more complex.  If we accept this we must recognise 
that the law of Unfair Dismissal is too focused at the end of the conflict 
spectrum to have any real chance of minimising conflict and maximising 
employee judgements that the employer is fair and trustworthy.  The law of 
Unfair Dismissal is framed in a way that turns the employer‘s attention to the 
issue of process in particular when they are considering disciplinary sanctions 
and the possibility of dismissal and not before, but by that stage the attitudes 
of the parties towards each other have almost certainly deteriorated such that 
the likelihood of re-establishing mutual trust may be limited.   
 
In Chapter 6 we continue our discussion of current regulation by focusing on 
how the law treats employee grievances or actions short of dismissal.  As with 
the law of Unfair Dismissal, we find that the regulatory focus is on procedural 
fairness rather than distributive and interactional fairness, thereby limiting the 
extent to which the law can effectively influence the employer to take action 
that might be judged as fair by its employees.  Further, this thesis argues that 
regulation of employee grievances about perceived unfair behaviour provides 
aggrieved employees with limited options for legal recourse beyond 
resignation and taking their chances with a claim for constructive dismissal.  
But such a claim is drastic and likely to be taken by the employee with great 
reluctance.  Arguably, the unlikely prospect of having to defend such a claim 
will not tend to positively influence employer behaviour.   Further, by the time 
an employee is contemplating such action the odds of maintaining a 
productive relationship with their employer are low and, therefore, even if, in 
that instance of EDG, the employer did turn their mind to the employee‘s view 
of fairness, it is likely to be too little too late.   
 
But would regulation which provides a meaningful remedy for unfairness at 
work make any real difference to the level of positive fairness perceptions?  
Such remedies exist in New Zealand but, it is argued, they are unlikely to 
substantially influence greater levels of fairness.  That is in large part because 
assessing fairness continues to be based on non-specific standards which are 
unlikely to result in a common view of what it means to be fair in every 
instance of EDG.  Further, it is a significant and bold step to litigate against 
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your current employer and employees will, it is argued, be reluctant to take 
such action.  Some employers know this and are not, therefore, likely to be 
heavily influenced by the potential for such claims in a way that drives 
employer behaviour which will influence fairness perceptions. 
 
In Chapter 7 we ask whether the tribunals and the Courts are best placed to 
encourage fairness at work.  We assert that the institutions which are tasked 
with enforcing regulation that aims to encourage fairness must be, as a 
minimum, easily accessible to employees in particular; in fact they must 
encourage access where a genuine complaint exists.  In other words employees 
should not be inclined to ―lump‖ their grievances and complaints because they 
view the process of pursuing their claims as too difficult or intimidating.  But, 
it is argued, such an ambition may be difficult to achieve.  While the tribunals 
and tribunal procedure are meant to be relatively informal, a significant and 
inevitable level of procedural formality exists which is likely to dissuade 
employees from filing and pursuing tribunal claims.  Moreover, not only must 
the tribunals be easy to access, they must be willing to make fairness 
judgements which involve treading the line of what is and is not legitimate 
managerial prerogative.  This thesis argues that the tribunals are, for reasons 
that we shall explore, extremely reluctant to make decisions which come down 
against the employer‘s assessment of substantive fairness.   
 
Further, the tribunals are hamstrung to an important degree from assessing and 
passing judgements on fairness at work by the limits of their jurisdiction and 
the regulation which they enforce.  Specifically, this thesis suggests that the 
law does not provide a broad and general claim of unfairness.  Rather it 
presents employees with limited rights (e.g. Unfair Dismissal and rights not be 
unlawfully discriminated against) which do not necessarily address every 
genuine complaint about unfair treatment.  The closest the law comes to a 
general prohibition on unfairness is the implied term of trust and confidence.  
But that implied term regulates extreme behaviour (i.e. behaviour that is 
calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust between employer and employee).  As such it does not 
capture less extreme behaviour which may still have significant negative 
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effects on employee perceptions of fairness.  Employees can therefore be left 
in a position where the tribunals cannot address their genuine concerns which 
is contrary to the objective of regulation encouraging fairness at work.   
 
Chapter 8 attempts to establish a theoretical basis for explaining the inability 
of current regulation to promote greater levels of fairness perceptions and 
OCB, whilst establishing the foundations for a model of regulation that is 
more likely to realise such an ambition.  To this end we consider the work of 
Teubner on the subject of juridification and the limitations of direct regulation 
in the arena of complex social relationships.  This chapter observes that any 
law which attempts to mould individual fairness perceptions in the context of 
the employment relationship is unlikely to be successful unless it recognises 
the limits of direct regulation as a mechanism for achieving fairness 
perceptions.  This reflects earlier discussions concerning the challenges which 
prevent direct regulation, such as the law of Unfair Dismissal, from being a 
catalyst for greater fairness perceptions and OCB.  It is argued that all the law 
can hope to achieve is a framework of indirect regulation that encourages the 
parties to self-regulate EDG in a manner which is reflexive and flexible 
enough to adequately account for the particular circumstances that attach to 
each instance of EDG.  Any such indirect regulation must encourage a 
reflexive approach to EDG which focuses on the total concept of fairness (i.e. 
procedural, distributive and interactional) and does not limit its regulatory 
interest to procedural fairness only.   
 
Further, and perhaps most significantly, this thesis argues that it may not be 
prudent to enforce any indirect regulatory framework via the traditional 
mechanism presented by the tribunals and the Courts.  That is because, we 
argue, the tribunals and the Courts do not want to, and are not able to, 
effectively assess substantive fairness in a manner that is likely to be perceived 
as fair by both parties.   
 
The purpose of the Chapter 9 is to explore an alternative regulatory model for 
EDG that takes the tribunals and the Courts out of play for the most part, and 
provides the parties with the necessary incentives to behave in a manner that 
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will promote fairness perceptions and greater competitiveness. This chapter 
suggests a new and radical model for the regulation of EDG.  It draws upon 
the arguments made in earlier chapters about the shortcomings of current 
regulation as a vehicle for greater fairness perceptions, and the suggestion 
made about a suitable regulatory approach.  The proposed model adapts the 
―safe-harbour‖ approach to regulation which applies in other areas of law.  In 
short this thesis suggests an approach to regulation of EDG which reduces or 
eliminates the employer‘s liability in relation to EDG if they can acquire 
accreditation from an agency based on set criteria.  An employer will only 
gain accreditation if they can in essence demonstrate that they have certain 
methods and practices in place for managing EDG; methods and practices that 
accord with certain substantive requirements and principles which, if 
followed, are likely to lead to fairness at work, and therefore a higher degree 
of fairness perceptions.  These requirements and principles will permit the 
parties considerable scope to find a way of complying with the accreditation 
criteria that best suits them.  If the employer achieves accreditation it will not 
thereafter be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals and the Courts in 
relation to most potential claims concerning the broad issue of EDG.  That is 
the carrot of the regulation.  If they do not achieve the requirements of 
accreditation they will be subject to a more stringent set of employment rights 
that are more rigorously enforced by the employment tribunals.  That is the 
stick of the regulation. 
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CHAPTER 2: ACHIEVEING ORGANISATION COMMITMENT 
BEHAVIOUR BY PARTNERSHIPS AND FAIRNESS 
 
This thesis sets out to find a model for the regulation of EDG that is likely to 
achieve partnership at work and increased worker productivity and 
competiveness.  It begins this search in the current chapter by exploring the 
previous Government‘s model of partnership at work and linking that model to 
the key concepts of fairness and trust that, for reasons which will hopefully 
become clear as this discussion progresses, must underpin and guide the 
eventual regulatory model.   
 
This chapter commences with a description of the economic conditions that 
promote the search for a mechanism (like partnership at work) to achieve 
greater workplace productively and competitiveness.  Those conditions 
include the rise of globalisation and the knowledge driven economy.  We 
move on to identify the Labour Government‘s model of partnership amongst a 
number of alternative models and to describe its essential characteristics.  That 
model of partnership resembles (in form and desired outcome) the model of 
Organisation Commitment Behaviour (OCB) which Daniel Katz described as 
being an essential characteristic of a successful business.  This chapter also 
explores Katz‘s idea of OCB and articulates its essential features as being an 
important embellishment of the Labour Government‘s partnership model.  In 
short it is argued that the partnership model is given greater and clearer 
meaning if it is understood to include OCB.   
 
This chapter moves to acknowledge that achieving effective partnership at 
work and OCB was and remains a significant challenge for regulators.  That is 
in large part because the realisation of partnerships and OCB presumes a high 
level of trust between the parties to the employment relationship.  But, it is 
argued, such a high level of trust may be elusive given that the employment 
relationship is historically based on notions of command and control, 
subordination and, arguably, low trust.  This chapter suggests that how an 
employer deals with EDG is a particularly important element in the building or 
destruction of trust.  An employer who is committed to treating its employees 
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fairly in the context of EDG is more likely to be considered fair and, 
consequentially, to be trusted by those employees who are essential to its 
competitive performance.  A fair and trusted employer will be more likely to 
realise the competitiveness enhancing benefits that flow from OCB and 
partnership.   
 
2.1 The challenges of Globalisation and the knowledge driven economy 
 
The previous Labour Government adopted the metaphor of partnership to 
describe the type of employment relationship which it believed was most 
likely to achieve its two key objectives for the labour market: fairness at work 
and efficiency.
1
  Put another way, the previous Government considered 
fairness and efficiency, generated by partnerships between employers and their 
staff, to be at the heart of the ideal labour market; it argued that a labour 
market which achieves this ideal will become a vital engine for economic 
growth, business output and the enhancement of business competitiveness in 
Britain.
2
  This ideal of creating greater business efficiency and productivity is 
at least as valid an objective for labour law reform now, given the current 
economic climate, as it was when Labour came to power in 1997.    
 
It was not surprising that the previous Government took an interest in the 
competitiveness of British businesses.  After all, the wealth of nations depends 
to a significant extent on the attraction of inward investment, exports and the 
servicing of markets worldwide by businesses that reside within each nation‘s 
geographical boundaries.
3
  There has, however, been a relatively recent and 
significant escalation in the importance to governments of business 
competitiveness, which is a symptom of the economic system commonly 
referred to as globalisation.  Globalisation has in turn caused policy-makers to 
consider afresh what type of labour market is best suited to respond to the 
challenges of today‘s global marketplace. 
 
                                                  
1
 Fairness at Work (London: HMSO, 1998) 1.8 and 1.11. 
2
 Ibid, 2.12 and 2.15. 
3
 H. Collins, ‗Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness‘ (2001) 30 ILJ 15, 17. 
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The term ―globalisation‖ identifies in part, at least, the increased mobility 
across national, regional and international borders of not only goods and 
services, but also of capital, knowledge and people.
4
  This enhanced mobility 
is due to a rapid expansion in the available means of and methods for 
achieving fast and cost-effective communication and transportation and the 
effectiveness of international policies aimed at bringing down barriers to free 
trade and the integration of capital markets.
5
  In order to survive in this 
increasingly competitive environment in which, for example, a company in 
Britain may be competing with a rival in South Africa that enjoys lower labour 
costs and a favourable exchange rate, businesses must be able to adapt their 
labour force to new business methods and technology, and to do so 
expeditiously.  To flourish in such an environment, businesses and their 
employees must be innovative and be able to seamlessly change their ways of 
operating without negatively impacting on production.  It follows that the 
partnership approach, with its emphasis on increased co-operation and 
efficiency on the part of employees, is bound to be attractive to governments 
that are attempting to marshal their nations‘ economies in the midst of 
globalisation.  This attraction is enhanced in the current global economic 
environment.     
   
There is a further feature of the modern economy that is linked to globalisation 
and which provides another incentive for governments to encourage 
businesses to adopt the partnership model as their guide to labour and 
employment relations: the knowledge driven economy.  It has of course been 
recognised for some time by many employers that a business will not achieve 
its potential to generate output and profits, unless it is able to harness the 
                                                  
4
 J. Stiglitz, ‗Globalisation and Development‘, in D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds), 
Taming Globalisation, Frontiers of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003) 47-67, 51; C. 
Crouch, ‗The Globalized Economy: An End to the Age of Industrial Citizenship?‘, in T. 
Wilthagen (ed) Advancing Theory in Labour Law and Industrial Relations in a Global 
Context (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1998) 151, 151-152; and P. Beaumont, Change in 
Industrial Relations (London: Routledge, 1991) 232. 
5
 D. Schiek, ‗Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Economic Law‘ (unpublished draft of paper completed at LSE, 2004) 11.  See also A. Supiot, 
‗The transformation of work and the future of labour law in Europe: A multidisciplinary 
perspective‘ (1999) 138 International Labour Review 31, 33-4. 
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knowledge and skill potential of its workforce.
6
  What has changed, however, 
is the nature of the economies in which businesses now function and with that 
employers have been forced to reassess the importance of exploiting the 
intellectual capabilities of their workforce. It is no longer the case that the 
large economies of the world are based on the exploitation of natural resources 
or the manufacture of products by methods of mass production.  It is more 
accurate to say that we live in a ―knowledge driven economy‖7 in which the 
key to economic success belongs to those businesses that, with the help of 
their workforce, adopt or generate technological advancements and innovation 
to achieve a competitive advantage in national, transnational and international 
markets.
8
    
 
2.2 Responding to the challenges of the modern economy: the goal of 
partnership 
 
A key ingredient in the achievement of enhanced business competitiveness in 
the midst of globalisation and a growing knowledge driven economy is a 
workforce that is flexible and co-operative.  Employees must be willing to 
undertake new tasks that may be foreign to them and are necessary if the 
employer is to adapt to rapidly changing methods of production, technology 
and competition.
9
  In addition, employees must be dedicated to being efficient 
                                                  
6
 H. Collins, Employment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 23; concepts such as 
Human Resources Management (HRM) and Total Quality Management (TQM) are similar in 
many respects to the former Government‘s notion of partnership (they recognise the benefits 
of joint decision-making, autonomy, flexibility etc) (see, for example, R. Storey, New 
Perspectives on Human Resources Management (London: Routledge, 1987).  Many argue that 
partnership has its origins in the concept of HRM that has been in existence for several 
decades (see S. Wood, ‗From voluntarism to partnership: A third way overview of the public 
policy debate in British industrial relations‘, in H. Collins, P. Davies and R. Rideout (eds), 
Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000); 
see also P. Taylor and H. Ramsay, ‗Unions, Partnership and HRM: Sleeping with the Enemy?‘ 
(1998) 6 International Journal of Employment Studies 117).   
7
 Supra at note 3, 19. 
8
 Ibid, 20. 
9
 See W. Streeck, ‗On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production‘, in E. 
Matzner and W. Streeck (eds), Beyond Keynesianism.  The Socio-Economics of Production 
and Full Employment (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1991) 21-61.  This form of flexibility is 
referred to as ‗functional flexibility‘.  An employer may also attempt to achieve flexibility by 
changing the quantity of its labour in response to changes in the market.  But this type of 
flexibility attacks the job security of employees and, as we shall see, is unlikely to breed the 
levels of trust that are necessary for a successful partnership (see J. Atkinson, ‗Flexibility: 
Planning for an Uncertain Future‘ [1985] Manpower Policy and Practice 26). 
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and productive in what they do, to provide good quality customer service and 
to complete work that is of the highest standard.  But more than that, in a 
knowledge driven economy it is imperative that employees are encouraged 
and given incentives to proactively share with their employer their particular 
skill and knowledge about the employer‘s business and the industry in which 
that business functions.  That knowledge and skill is learned partly on the job 
and will be enhanced naturally as time in the job passes, but to expedite and 
heighten that enhancement, employees must be willing to take steps, with their 
employer‘s support, to improve their skills and knowledge by training or by 
other forms of education.  A workforce that has acquired ―broad and high 
skills‖ has the potential to be more flexible, and their employer is ―able to 
respond more effectively to changing market demands and uncertainty‖.10  
Further still, a highly skilled and knowledgeable workforce has greater 
potential to be innovative and able to devise new and valuable products, ideas, 
services and marketing techniques, all of which are of considerable value to a 
business
11
.   
 
How do businesses achieve this level of co-operation and commitment from 
their workforce?  This task is made more difficult, and more important, in a 
knowledge driven economy, where it is the intellectual capacity of the 
employee and not their physical ability that the employer is most concerned to 
exploit.  The challenge is greater because it is easier to monitor whether an 
employee is working to their physical limits than it is to assess whether that 
worker is using all of their knowledge and intellectual capacity when carrying 
out their job.  No employer is a mind reader with the ability to gauge whether 
an employee is holding back when it comes to thinking up new ideas that will 
help the business.  It follows that, in the end, a high level of intellectual 
performance is most likely to eventuate on a voluntary basis, it will be difficult 
to coerce directly.   
 
                                                  
10
 J. Knell, ‗Partnership at Work‘, Employment Relations Research Series No. 7 (London: 
DTI, 1999) 11. 
11
 Supra at note 6, 3. 
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Here then is the importance of fairness as a key ingredient in the former 
Government‘s ideal labour market.  The previous Government believed that 
fairness and efficiency go hand in hand, that the latter follows the former
12
.  It 
may have been right.  Common sense suggests that an employee who believes 
their employer treats them fairly by, for example, sympathetically and 
promptly resolving their grievances or by rewarding them equitably for hard 
work, is more likely to work harder, more productively, co-operatively and 
innovatively for their employer, than an employee who feels that their 
employer treats them unfairly.  The previous Government believed this 
competitiveness enhancing relationship between a commitment on the part of 
the employer to fairness, and a willingness on the part of the employee to be 
co-operative and innovative in response, can be achieved by the development 
of strong partnerships at work.  There is some evidence to suggest that the 
former Government‘s assessment is accurate.  In a study carried out on behalf 
of what was the DTI, John Knell explains that all of the firms examined (each 
of which declared a commitment to a partnership-like approach to employee 
relations) believed the partnership approach had helped them achieve 
enhanced competitive performance by focusing on certain values such as fair 
reward and open management.
13
   
 
2.3 What was the previous Government‟s approach to partnership? 
 
There is, therefore, some evidence to suggest that partnership at work can aid 
the goals of competitiveness underpinned by fairness. This paper has 
identified some aspects of the nature of partnership, but can we be more 
specific?  For example, what type of principles and practices can we expect to 
see adopted in workplaces committed to the previous Government‘s ideal of 
partnership at work?  The answer to that question is complicated by the fact 
that there is no universally applicable definition or concept of partnership.
14
  
That said, according to Guest and Peccei, most approaches to partnership can 
                                                  
12
 Supra at note 1, 1.11. 
13
 Supra at note 10, 29; see also A. Marks, P. Findlay, J. Hine, A. McKinlay and P. Thompson, 
‗The Politics of Partnership? Innovation in Employment Relations in the Scottish Spirits 
Industry‘ (1998) 36 British Journal of Industrial Relations 209. 
14
 D. Guest and R. Peccei, ‗Partnership at Work: Mutuality and the Balance of Advantage‘ 
(2001) 39 British Journal of Industrial Relations 207, 208. 
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be labelled as either pluralist, unitarist or a hybrid model of the two previous 
conceptions.   We shall consider each of these in turn, starting with the 
pluralist model.   
 
The pluralist model is firmly rooted in the concept of industrial democracy.
15
  
This immediately suggests we will not identify the former Labour 
Government‘s notion of fair and efficient workplaces by partnership, with its 
intellectual roots in the Third Way, within this category.  The pluralist 
perspective
16
 acknowledges the different interests of management and labour 
and recognises that capital will seek to limit the power of labour if that power 
is likely to lead to the redistribution of surplus value.
17
  The legislative 
reaction to this is the development of a legal framework that encourages or 
mandates co-determination rights for workers.
18
  Not surprisingly, the pluralist 
approach relies heavily on the indirect participation of individual workers in 
workplace decision-making by preferring the use of representatives systems 
over direct dialogue between the employee and management as the best means 
of providing an employee voice in the workplace.  That representation is 
frequently, but not always, provided by a trade union.
19
  Again, this suggests a 
divergence from the notion of partnership put forward by the previous 
Government.  While, as part of its legislative agenda, the former Government 
made provision for collective representation by trade unions
20
, it is clear that it 
did not see trade unions or any other representative grouping of workers as 
essential to partnership.  Its notion of partnership was a relationship between 
the employer and individual employees.  As Tony Blair explained in the 
Foreword to Fairness at Work, the former Government‘s approach to the 
                                                  
15
 Ibid, 208. 
16
 Typical of this perspective is the approach taken by the IDE, see: Industrial Democracy in 
Europe Group, Industrial Democracy in Europe Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993). 
17
 Supra at note 14, 208-209. 
18
 Ibid, 209.  As Guest and Peccei point, out the most developed form of this type of 
partnership exists in Germany where legislation provides clear rights for workers of co-
determination, consultation and communication. 
19
 J. Rogers and W. Streek (eds), Works Councils: Consultation, Representation and 
Cooperation in Industrial Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) referred to 
by Guest and Peccei (supra at note 14, 209). 
20
 See Recognition Procedure in Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992. 
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employment relationship was based on the ―the rights of the individual‖.21  
The employee can choose to be represented by a trade union or other 
collective grouping of workers, but that is a choice that he or she must make 
and the government will not impose that decision upon them.
22
 
 
The second approach to partnership identified by Guest and Peccei is what 
they refer to as the unitarist approach.
23
  As the label suggests, this approach 
seeks to assimilate the interests of management and employees, while at the 
same time maximizing employee involvement and commitment to the 
business.
24
  This approach can be divided into several strands, the first of 
which focuses on creating financial incentives for employees to align 
themselves more closely with the goals and objectives of their employer (one 
such incentive is employee share ownership).
25
  The second strand centres 
around direct employee participation in decisions that impact on their job.  
Guest and Peccei point out that within this strand employers are willing to 
allow their employees greater autonomy, but only where doing so maximises 
the employee‘s contribution to the business and provided that that approach 
functions in tandem with a system of communicating to employees the 
business‘s goals and values in a manner designed to encourage the employees 
to adopt those as his or her own.
26
  In this way, partnerships at work reflect an 
employer that has little trust in their workforce and for this reason it risks 
becoming one-sided and ineffective.
27
  A final strand to the unitarist approach 
focuses on maximising each employee‘s ―psychic stake‖ in the business.28  
Central to this approach is the use of a wide range of sophisticated human 
                                                  
21
 Supra at note 1, the Foreward. 
22
 Ibid.  The Prime Minister stated: ―[the white paper] is based on the rights of the individual, 
whether exercised on their own, or with others, as a matter of their choice.‖ (emphasis added).  
For a critical perspective on this individualistic view of the employment relationship see: T. 
Novitz and P. Skidmore, Fairness at Work: A Critical Analysis of the Employment Relations 
Act 1999 and its Treatment of Collective Rights (Oxford; Portland: Hart, 2001)13-17. 
23
 Supra at note 14, 209. 
24
 ibid. 
25
 Ibid; M. Conte and J. Svejnar , ‗The Performance Effects of Employee Share Ownership‘, 
in A. Blinder (ed), Paying for Productivity: a Look at the Evidence (Washington D. C.: 
Brookings Institute, 1990) 143-181. 
26
 Supra at note 14, 210; see also P. Ackers and J. Payne, ‗British Trade Unions and Social 
Partnership: Rhetoric, reality and strategy‘ (1998) 9 International Journal of Human 
Resources Management 529. 
27
 Supra at note 14, 210. 
28
 Ibid. 
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resources techniques and methods, such as job design, rewards and appraisals, 
utilised in an effort to create high levels of job satisfaction and commitment 
amongst employees.
29
   
 
As is the case with the pluralist model of partnership, the unitarist approach 
does not match the previous Government‘s apparent notion of partnership at 
work.  The unitarist model reserves no role for indirect representation in the 
employment relationship.  This is inconsistent with the former Government‘s 
approach to partnership which, while not embracing the idea of collective 
representation as having some universally applicable inherent value that it 
must promote, does argue that the choice of workers to be represented should 
they so select is something which must be protected.
30
  In Fairness at Work 
the previous Government acknowledged that ―individual contracts are not 
always contracts between equal partners… Collective representation of 
individuals at work can be the best method of ensuring that employees are 
treated fairly, and it is often the preferred option of both employers and 
employees.‖31 
 
The final approach to partnership identified by Guest and Peccei is their 
hybrid model.
32
  Of the three models of partnership it was the hybrid model 
that the previous Government appeared to adopt.  This approach draws on the 
other two conceptions of partnership by recognising a role for representative 
systems while at the same time acknowledging the importance of direct 
employee participation in decisions that affect them, and employees and 
management working together for the good of the enterprise.  As Guest and 
Peccei point out, this hybrid approach is most closely aligned with the mutual 
gains model suggested by academics including Kochan and Osterman
33
.  That 
model places a great deal of emphasis on the importance of management and 
                                                  
29
 See M. Beer, B. Spector, P. Lawrence, D. Quinn Mills and R. Walton, Human resources 
Management: A General Manager’s Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1985); and, J. 
Pfeffer, The Human Equation (Boston: Harvard Business School Press). 
30
 Supra at note 1, 1.9. 
31
 Ibid, 4.2. 
32
 Supra at note 14, 210. 
33
 Ibid: Guest and Peccei referring to T. Kochan and P. Osterman, Mutual Gains Bargaining 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press). 
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labour co-operating to achieve the mutual gains of job security, increased 
flexibility and productivity.   
 
It is apparent that this hybrid approach is more reflective of the Labour 
Government‘s notion of partnership than the pluralist or unitarist models.  
That argument gains support from Fairness at Work and the previous 
Government‘s recognition that ―the best modern companies, whether large or 
small, have some things in common [including]… a recognition that 
everybody involved in the business has an interest [or you might say mutual 
interest] in its success‖34.  In addition, the DTI (as it was) described 
partnership at work as being about ―developing better employment relations at 
all levels, helping to build trust in the workplace, the sharing of information 
and working together to solve business problems.  Where partnership is 
successful, employers and employees both recognise the importance of their 
relationship and positively work towards developing this further for mutual 
reward.‖35   It is also worth noting that central to this mutual gains model is a 
belief that partnerships of this kind require some form of joint governance 
system.
36
  As Guest and Peccei point out, ―implicit in this perspective, 
therefore, is the belief that formalized representative arrangements are 
necessary both to sustain key elements and processes and (perhaps) to prevent 
exploitation by management‖37.  It follows from this statement that if the 
mutual gains model is to function effectively and in a manner that promotes 
and protects the objective of fairness at work, it may require a willingness on 
the part of the government of the day to accept a greater role for collective 
representation than it has hitherto explicitly shown itself prepared to 
recognise.  This is a point that we shall return to in due course and one that is 
particularly relevant to the issue of labour law concerning EDG. 
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 Supra at note 1, 2.2. 
35
 DTI, ‗What is Partnership at Work?‘ at http://www.dti.gov.uk/partnershipfund/index.html. 
36
 Supra at note 14, Guest and Peccei referring to J. Cutcher-Gershenfeld and A. Verma, ‗Joint 
Governance in North American Workplaces‘ (1994) 5 International Journal of Human 
Resources Management 547; and, R. Blatt and E. Applebaum, Workers Participation in 
Diverse Settings: Does Form Effect the Outcome, and if so, Who Benefits?‘ (1995) 33 British 
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37
 Supra at note 14, 211. 
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If we accept that the Labour Government‘s notion of partnership followed the 
mutual gains or hybrid approach, it becomes possible to add some further flesh 
to the bones of that notion of partnership.  So far we have spoken about 
different models of partnership as falling within certain broad categories. 
However, if we are to chart a legislative course for labour law that is in 
keeping with the objective of partnership at work, we need to understand more 
precisely what elements are essential to a successful partnership of the kind 
envisaged by the former Government.  But where can we find these elements?  
The most systematic attempts to define partnership at work in Britain have 
almost certainly been made by the Involvement and Participation Association 
(IPA).  Their description of the constituent elements of a successful 
partnership reflect the mutual gains model of partnership and the Labour 
Government‘s apparent approach to partnership.  What is more, when 
approached about the meaning of the previous Government‘s conception of 
partnership, the DTI referred senior academics to the IPA‘s framework on 
partnership.
38
  It is, therefore, to that framework that we now turn in an effort 
to obtain a better understanding of the Labour Government‘s policy of 
achieving partnerships at work. 
 
In their 1998 report for the IPA
39, Guest and Peccei developed the IPA‘s 
definition of partnership in the following terms.  The definition has three 
components: a set of values or principles; a set of practices; and a promise of 
benefits.  The principles are defined as the ―values underlying partnership 
which prescribe appropriate forms of behaviour and practice in 
organisations‖.40  The main principles are specifically identified as: good 
treatment of employees now and in the future; creating opportunities for 
employee contribution (or what might be referred to as employee 
empowerment); employee rights and benefits; and employee responsibilities.  
As Knell has pointed out, these principles underline the importance of 
                                                  
38
 See S. Wood above, supra at note 7, 131-132.  Wood recounts that in an attempt to find a 
link between the Government‘s notion of partnership and HRM, the DTI official responsible 
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mutuality and the reciprocal rights of management and their staff, which 
distinguishes the partnership model of employment relations from the 
traditional view of the employment relationship as one of command and 
control.
41
  Having adopted the principle of partnership an organisation must 
decide how to go about implementing those principles in practice to create 
actual partnerships.  Guest and Peccei have compiled a list of practices that an 
organisation pursuing partnerships at work is likely to adopt.  They include: 
direct and indirect (i.e. representative) participation by employees in decisions 
about their own work and employment issues in general; flexible job design 
and a focus on quality; performance management; and communication, 
harmonisation and employment security.
42
  Finally, Guest and Peccei identify 
three key areas in which the outcomes of a partnership approach are likely to 
be beneficial.  They are: the positive commitment and contribution of 
employees to the business (in this category we can identify the level of 
flexibility and innovation the previous Government hoped partnerships would 
achieve); a reduction in poor labour relations including reduced conflict, 
absence and turnover; and an improvement in business productivity, overall 
innovation, sales and profits.
43
   
 
It is worth making the point here that the establishment of a successful 
partnership at work will almost certainly require more from the employer than 
just a willingness to put in place measures which they believe are in keeping 
with the partnership approach outlined above.  Before a successful partnership 
will take root those steps must be perceived by the workforce to be genuine 
and not based on management self interest, and they must be carried out 
faithfully by both employers and employees.  This perception and the 
willingness to faithfully follow the partnership model will, to a large degree, 
depend on the extent to which the employee and employer trust each other.  It 
is this issue of trust that we now turn to explore. 
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2.4 Trust in partnership: an elusive necessity 
 
There are, of course, different degrees to which an organisation might achieve 
the positive outcomes envisaged by the model of partnership outlined above, 
however, from the previous Government‘s point of view the objective was to 
achieve as wide an adherence to the most successful forms of partnership at 
work as could be achieved.  In other words the former Government‘s policy 
was to maximise the level of employee commitment and contribution to the 
business, to eliminate conflict in the workplace and to increase innovation and 
profits in British businesses such that the British economy becomes as 
competitive as it can be.  This begs the question what aspects of the 
partnership model require particular attention if this ideal of widespread 
successful partnerships at work is to be achieved?  This paper suggests that the 
focus of policy-makers should be on the interrelated factors of trust and 
mutuality.  And when speaking of trust in this context we are not referring to 
the ―trust and confidence‖ that is said to be an essential feature of the 
employment relationship.
44
  That concept is traditionally identified as giving 
rise to negative obligations on employers and employees to refrain from acting 
in a manner that destroys their relationship.  The trust necessary for successful 
partnerships is much more than that; it is a higher form of trust which requires 
each party to have faith that the other will act in the best interests of both 
parties and their partnership. 
 
The significance of trust in the establishment of successful partnerships at 
work becomes apparent when we recognise that employers and employees are 
unlikely to commit themselves to partnership, unless they each trust that the 
other party to the relationship will use their best endeavours to reciprocate and 
live up to their end of the partnership arrangement. A failure to achieve that 
level of trust will almost certainly manifest itself in the following downward 
spiral of negative responses: if employees do not trust that their employer will 
meet its partnership commitments to, for example, the good treatment of 
workers and allowing workers to equitably share in the fruits of their 
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successful labours, the employer will not receive from its workforce the 
degree of commitment, loyalty, innovative performance and intellectual as 
well as physical endeavour that is necessary to maximise quality output.  Yet 
without such commitment, endeavour and loyalty on the part of its employees, 
the employer is unlikely to reciprocate with those rewards and other forms of 
treatment that are beneficial and a motivating factor for the employee.
45
  No 
successful partnership can evolve and continue to exist in such an 
environment.   
 
But the objective of achieving the levels of trust necessary for successful 
partnerships is made increasingly difficult by several factors.  First, we should 
recognise that any attempt to put in place and adhere to those measures which 
characterise the previous Government‘s approach to partnership, requires a 
leap of faith on the part of employers and employees.  This is partly ―because 
the benefits of co-operation are unlikely to accrue immediately‖46 and, in-fact, 
they may never accrue given the fluctuating fortunes of businesses in the 
modern marketplace.  Moreover, partnership requires employees to be 
flexible, to undertake different and unfamiliar tasks.  In this way adherence to 
the partnership approach involves employees actively participating in the 
mutation of their work and job functions that in turn may well result in their 
positions becoming redundant.  It could therefore be considered counter-
intuitive for employees to believe their employer‘s promise that a willingness 
on the part of employees to be flexible, and to follow the partnership 
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approach, will eventually result in a more profitable business from which 
those employees will receive enhanced benefits and rewards.    
 
Secondly, there are certain other features of the modern labour market which 
might be construed as challenging the credibility of any promise that an 
employee‘s commitment to the partnership approach will benefit them in the 
long run.  Those features include the decline of internal labour markets; the 
increase in outsourcing; the ―casualisation‖ of employment; and the growth in 
the less secure or ―peripheral‖ workforce.47  These economic developments 
are particularly evident in the large economies of Britain and the United 
States
48
 and they have, when taken as a whole, led to an increased insecurity 
for particular groups of workers: ―As a consequence, the forging of 
partnership arrangements with these progressively disadvantaged and 
peripheral sections of the workforce may prove problematic.  The reality of 
their employment and job experiences is likely to make them sceptical about 
the likely longevity of any partnership arrangement they enter into.‖49    
 
Thirdly, the road to partnership is made rockier still given that the reluctance 
to trust is not unique to employees.  A major obstacle to the uptake of 
partnership mechanisms (including methods of direct employee participation 
in decision making) is ―the reluctance of management in many organisations 
to shift from traditional forms of work organisation‖50.  One reason for this 
reluctance is almost certainly the perception amongst a large number of 
managers that many if not most employees are inherently untrustworthy.  One 
well-known corporate executive was recently heard to say: ―most employees 
will take any chance they can to screw you‖.  No employer who harbours such 
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feelings of mistrust will allow its employees the additional discretion and 
responsibility that is characteristic of the partnership approach.    
 
Finally, and central to this thesis, is the extent to which achieving the high 
levels of trust necessary for the attainment of successful partnerships is 
inhibited by the authoritarian nature of the traditional employment relationship 
and the role of disciplinary sanctions as a cornerstone of that relationship.  
This will be explained in the discussion that follows.  Collins argues that, 
―[t]he paradigm of an employment contract… contains an authority structure 
at its heart.  In return for the payment of wages, the employer bargains for the 
right to direct the workforce to perform in the most productive way.  An 
employee consents to obey these instructions, and so enters into a relation of 
subordination.‖51  That statement emphasises that a vital feature of the 
authority structure is obedience by the employee to the commands of the 
employer.  Without that obedience the authority structure breaks down and, 
not surprisingly, avoiding that break-down has become an important feature of 
management practice.   
 
To ensure that the authority structure remains intact, the employer retains and 
advertises in handbooks and manuals their willingness to sanction the 
disobedient employee.  As Collins points out, the most visible sign of the 
authority structure is the employer‘s use of disciplinary measures, such as 
demotion or dismissal, as its primary means of achieving employee 
compliance with the employer‘s instructions and commands.52  And because 
the employer places such importance on its power to take disciplinary action 
against the disobedient employee, it is inevitable that the spectre of 
disciplinary sanctions will sit close to the forefront of the employment 
relationship.  It is not surprising, therefore, that employees and their 
representatives often become concerned that management might exercise their 
power to discipline workers in a harsh and unfair manner.  This concern 
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results in wariness on the part of employees towards their employer
53
, and for 
some employees that concern escalates to become an anxiety about the long 
term security of their livelihood.  It is always going to be difficult to achieve 
the level of trust necessary for a successful partnership out of a relationship 
that places such importance on ―discretionary power laced with disciplinary 
sanctions‖54.   
 
2.5 The significance of EDG in the establishment of partnerships at work 
 
It follows that one specific aspect of the employment relationship in respect of 
which an employer‘s trustworthiness is very much under the spotlight, and 
where its commitment to the principle of good treatment of staff must be 
credible if the goal of partnership at work is to be realised, is in the area of 
EDG.  At the heart of that suggestion is the argument that only when the 
parties approach this area of the employment relationship in a fashion which 
departs from the practices of the past, will they be positioned to overcome the 
lack of trust that is likely to flow from placing ―discretionary power laced with 
sanctions‖ at the forefront of the employment relation.  Moreover, an 
employer who displays little or no real concern for the grievances of their 
employees, or who disciplines or threatens to discipline its staff in a seemingly 
unfair or irrational manner, is unlikely to successfully nurture and preserve the 
feelings of trust and security that are necessary for the maintenance of a co-
operative relationship of partnership between employers and employees.  And 
no employee is likely to go that extra mile for his or her employer if they have 
been subject to what they perceive as an unjustified warning, or where their 
employer has failed to address their concerns that a colleague is behaving 
towards them in an inappropriate and de-motivating manner.  In fact when an 
employer exercises their discretionary power to discipline staff in a harsh 
manner, or when it fails to adequately address the grievances of its staff, not 
only will their employees refuse to cooperate with them in the fashion required 
by the partnership approach, they may also resign, thereby costing the 
                                                  
53
 As Fox argued, it is difficult for employers to build trust amongst their employees when 
workers are ―permanently weary of management and its practices‖ (A. Fox, Beyond Contract 
Work, Power and Trust Relations (London: Faber, 1974) 115. 
54
 Supra at note 6, 11. 
 38 
employer the training investment it has made in those staff, the money to 
recruit a replacement and, perhaps, the expense of defending a claim for 
constructive Unfair Dismissal.   
 
So while we can agree on the need to generate high trust in the employment 
relationship before we can hope to see the strongest forms of partnerships 
develop in British workplaces, the question remains how do we go about that 
task, particularly in relation to EDG?  One of the difficulties we face is that the 
former Government‘s notion of partnership did not suggest the mechanisms 
and institutions necessary to achieve the resolution of EDG in a manner that is 
consistent with the goal of partnership at work.  In particular the previous 
Government did not make it clear what role the law would play in the 
achievement of that goal.   
 
2.6 Achieving partnership: might regulation play a role? 
 
What is apparent from the white paper Fairness at Work is that the former 
Government‘s preferred route to successful partnerships at work was a 
voluntary one: ―the Government believes that each business should choose the 
form of relationship that suits it best.‖55  This approach is not surprising 
because it goes without saying that the most effective forms of partnership will 
involve employers and their employees freely establishing, through 
consultation and experimentation, and with reflection upon the peculiarities of 
their particular workplace, mechanisms for resolving issues and disputes that 
are fair and that result in just outcomes which promote the kind of high trust 
that is so essential for successful partnerships.  This discussion must pause, 
therefore, to ask whether employers and employees can be made to adopt and 
achieve the model of successful partnerships by little more than Government 
encouragement and a message that such an approach to employment relations 
is the best way for a business to succeed?   
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The answer must be no.  It is highly unlikely that employers and employees, 
who have traditionally come together in a low trust relationship of 
subordination, will suddenly, freely, effectively and without exception grasp 
and run with the concept of partnership.  Such a change would involve a 
dramatic shift in the culture of many if not most workplaces.  What is more, 
the empirical evidence suggests that even in workplaces that purport to favour 
a partnership approach to employment relations, there is a reluctance on the 
part of those employers to put in place rules and practices that provide mutual 
gains for employees and employers and that generate the high levels of trust 
necessary for a business to maximise the benefits that might be achieved by 
partnership at work.   
 
In a study carried out by Stuff and Williams of Borg Warner, a company that 
has for some time now declared its commitment to a partnership approach to 
employment relations, the authors found that according to management and 
unions the formal partnership arrangements that had been put in place were a 
great success and had led to improved company performance.
56
  The 
employees‘ view of Borg Warner‘s approach to partnership was, however, 
considerably more complicated.  While the employees questioned endorsed 
the partnership model and were able to identify certain benefits to them 
brought about by that approach (such as better communications from 
management), it was apparent from their responses that the Borg Warner 
approach to partnership fell well short of the genuine mutuality that we have 
identified is a key element of the former Government‘s approach to 
partnership.  For example, while mechanisms for two-way communication had 
improved the flow of information between employer and employees, 
employees continued to feel that they had little ability to influence the 
organisational decisions that impacted upon them and their colleagues.
57
  
Specifically in relation to the key issue of trust, while the partnership approach 
had increased the degree of trust employees felt towards their employer, a 
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climate of distrust continued to prevail.
58
  This problem of continuing distrust 
is apparent from other studies that consider the effectiveness of partnership at 
work.
59
 
 
It is not enough, therefore, for the Government to leave the adoption of 
partnership at work to employers and employees themselves.  To do so would 
result in at best a failure to achieve the high levels of trust and mutuality that 
are necessary for a successful partnership, or at worst a refusal on the part of 
employers to take any steps away from the traditional employment 
relationship of subordination towards one of partnership.  This suggests a role 
for regulation in the drive for successful partnerships based on high trust 
relations between employers and employees.  But can regulation help in this 
regard and if it can, and specifically in relation to EDG, what type of 
regulation is most likely to achieve that goal?  The answer to that question lies 
at the heart of this thesis and is explored in detail in later chapters.     
 
2.7 Katz‟s motivational basis of organizational behaviour 
 
We have so far discussed the significance of employee co-operation, 
flexibility, innovation and ―beyond contract‖ performance as features of 
partnership in the context of globalisation and the knowledge driven economy, 
but it would be wrong to conclude that recognising the role that such 
employee behaviour can play in enhancing the competitiveness of businesses 
is something new
60
. It would be wrong also to assess that these types of 
employee behaviour are the only behavioural features of a successful (i.e. 
business competitiveness enhancing) modern employment relationship. 
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As long ago as 1964 Daniel Katz was concerned with the question of how 
people are tied into an organisation (such as a business) so that they become 
effective functional units in that organisation.
61
  In particular Katz identified 3 
categories of employee behaviour that he considered essential for 
organisational effectiveness: (1) employees must be induced to enter and 
remain in employment; (2) as employees they must carry out their role 
assignments in a dependable fashion; and (3) employees must engage in 
innovative and spontaneous activity that goes beyond their role specifications 
or job descriptions.
62
  Smith, Organ and Near labelled Katz‘s final category of 
employee behaviour as ‗Employee Organizational Behaviour‘ or 
‗Organizational Commitment Behaviour‘ (OCB).63 
 
2.7.1 Understanding OCB 
 
According to Katz, OCB supports, complements, and enhances the tasks and 
objectives that are demanded of employees by their employer and which are 
recorded or authorised formally in employment contracts, job descriptions and 
rule books.  OCB does these things by acknowledging what Katz refers to as 
the ‗great paradox‘ at the heart of any social organization, of which the 
employment relation is one example:  to be effective and achieve its goals an 
organization must not only limit human variability so as to ensure reliable role 
performance, it must also provide space for some level of variability and in 
fact it must actively encourage it.
64
  OCB is important to the effective 
functioning of any organisation because no organisation can foresee all 
contingencies within its operations, or anticipate with perfect accuracy all 
environmental and market changes, or control or identify perfectly all human 
variability (including the extent to which some employees can do more than is 
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expected of them).  As Katz put it: ―the resources of people in innovation, in 
spontaneous co-operation, in protective and creative behaviour, are thus vital 
to organizational survival and effectiveness.  An organization which depends 
solely upon its blueprints of prescribed behaviour is a very fragile social 
system.‖65 
 
Katz proceeded to extrapolate OCB into certain sub-categories, including the 
sub-category of ‗constructive ideas‘.  By constructive ideas Katz meant 
creative suggestions for the improvement of methods of production and 
maintenance.  Katz acknowledged that formulating creative ideas and 
expressing them to management is not the typical or traditional role of the 
employee, but an organisation which is able to motivate its workforce to seek 
out and contribute innovative thinking is likely to be a more effective 
organisation than those that do not.  That is so for the reasons we have already 
discussed in relation to the importance of innovation in the context of 
globalisation and the knowledge driven economy: ―people who are close to 
operating problems can often furnish informative suggestions about such 
operations.  The system which does not have this stream of contributions from 
its members is not using its potential resources effectively.‖66 
 
Other sub-categories of OCB identified by Katz include the following.  First, 
there is what Katz referred to as ‗Protection‘, or the behavioural manifestation 
of the willingness of employees go beyond their contractual obligations to 
protect the organisation from negative, even disastrous outcomes.
67
  For 
example, an employee committed to OCB who becomes aware that their 
employer‘s largest customer is being courted by the competition, will bring 
that fact to the attention of their employer regardless of whether or not they are 
under an obligation to do so.  Secondly, Katz recognised that the willingness 
of employees to self-train or self educate themselves with a view to becoming 
better and more able workers, is an important aspect of an effectively 
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functioning business.
68
  Thirdly, Katz postulated that employees can 
contribute to the effective operation of their employer‘s business by aiding in 
the creation of a favourable climate for that business in the community, or 
communities, that surround it and upon which it depends for certain things 
including new staff and sales.  For example, employees may converse with 
people who they are close to about the excellent or the poor qualities of the 
company for whom they work.  Favourable references may help with the 
employer‘s sales and recruitment, while negative comments may have the 
opposite effect.
69
  Fourthly, Katz identified the role of co-operation as a vital 
factor in the success of any organisation.  By co-operation he meant more than 
the mere adherence to rules and orders: 
 
Within every work group … there are countless acts of co-operation without which the system 
would break down.  We take these everyday acts for granted, and few, if any, of them form 
the role prescriptions for any job.  One man will call the attention of his companion on the 
next machine to some indication that his machine is getting jammed, or will pass along some 
tool that his companion needs, or will borrow some bit of machinery he is short of.  Or men 
will come to the aid of a fellow who is behind on his quota… [we] recognise the need for co-
operative relationships by raising this specific question when a man is considered for a job.  
How well does he relate to his fellows, is he a good team man, will he fit in?
70
 
 
2.7.2 Staff retention and dependable performance 
 
You will recall that we pointed to OCB as one of the categories of employee 
behaviour that Katz and others have viewed as vital for organisational 
effectiveness.  The first of the other categories concerns the attraction and 
retention of staff.  Katz highlighted the obvious point that sufficient employees 
must be kept within the organisation if it is to maintain its essential functions.  
That being the case, people must be induced to take up offers of employment 
at a sufficiently rapid rate to counteract the level of defection.  And while they 
are employed in the business, workers must validate their position in the 
organisation by constant attendance at work.  By attendance Katz meant 
psychological as well as physical attendance: an employee may be punctual 
and regular in their attendance at work, but spend their entire time during work 
hours with their mind on other things.  Such employees are unlikely to be 
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functioning in accordance with the minimum requirements of their job, let 
alone in an innovative and beyond contract manner consistent with OCB.   
 
One factor that Katz failed to discuss in this context was the inadequacy of 
merely replacing defecting employees as a means of achieving the goal of 
maximum organisational effectiveness or competitiveness.  Of course an 
employer will have invested time and resources in training a departing 
employee that will be lost upon the employee‘s eventual departure, and 
duplicated upon the arrival of their replacement.  But more than that, an 
effective organisation that has managed to motivate its workforce to act 
innovatively and otherwise in accordance with Katz‘s model of essential 
employee behaviour, will lose the benefits that flow from such employee 
performance in terms of greater productivity and profitability and, what is 
more, they may lose them to a competitor who becomes the departed 
employee‘s new employer.  That commitment to OCB may not be duplicated 
in the performance of the replacement worker, or if it is, it is unlikely to re-
occur immediately.  At best it will take time for the new employee to develop 
the necessary commitment to the employer‘s business that was exhibited by 
the departed employee.  That commitment may evolve, but only once the new 
employee has had the opportunity to make certain judgements about their 
treatment by the employer and other factors.  This is an issue we shall return to 
in some detail in subsequent discussions on fairness. 
 
The last of the three categories of employee behaviour described by Katz as 
being essential to an organisation‘s effective performance is the willingness of 
employees to carry out their role requirements in a dependable fashion.  In 
other words, Katz explained, employees must carry out their assigned roles so 
as to meet some minimum level of quality and quantity of performance.
71
  
That minimum level of performance is likely to be established by contractual 
or other express or implied notices to the employee.  What Katz did not 
expressly consider is the notion of intentional poor performance or 
counterproductive work behaviour (including what we might commonly 
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understand as misconduct).  In this category we can place behaviour such as 
pilfering, disclosing confidential information and trade secrets and other 
similarly negative and intentional employee misbehaviour. Both types of poor 
or undependable performance are potentially very damaging to the employer‘s 
business and where they are common practice amongst the workforce they are 
likely to be disastrous for the business‘s survival. 
 
2.8 Partnership as an antecedent of essential employee behaviour 
 
The question is: how can we replicate the behaviour that is essential for 
effective organisational functioning, in particularly OCB, in all British 
businesses?  If that tough assignment were to be achieved, Britain would be 
well on its way to becoming as competitive as it can be in the global 
marketplace.  The Labour Government and others were and are of the opinion 
that the development of ―partnerships‖ at work between employees and 
employers is a significant step in the right direction; they believe that 
partnerships lead directly to the co-operative, flexible, innovative and beyond 
contract performance which the likes of Katz consider is vital if a business is 
to perform to its fullest potential: 
 
[T]he returns from effective partnership to the business and its employees are real whether it 
operates in local or global markets: 
 
 Where they have an understanding of the business, employees recognise the 
importance of responding quickly to changing customer and market 
requirements; 
 Where they are taken seriously, employees at every level come forward with 
ways to help the business innovate, for example by developing new products; 
and 
 Where they are well prepared for change, employees can help the company to 
introduce and operate new technologies and processes, helping to secure 
employment within the business.
72
 
 
It is worth repeating what we mean by partnership at work.  In their 1998 
report for the IPA
73, Guest and Peccei developed the IPA‘s definition of 
partnership in the following terms.  The definition has three components: a set 
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of values or principles; a set of practices; and a promise of benefits.  The 
principles are defined as the ―values underlying partnership which prescribe 
appropriate forms of behaviour and practice in organisations‖.74  The main 
principles are specifically identified as: good treatment of employees now and 
in the future; creating opportunities for employee contribution (or what might 
be referred to as employee empowerment); employee rights and benefits; and 
employee responsibilities.  As Knell has pointed out, these principles 
underline the importance of mutuality and the reciprocal rights of management 
and their staff, which distinguishes the partnership model of employment 
relations from the traditional view of the employment relationship as one of 
command and control.
75
  Having adopted the principle of partnership an 
organisation must decide how to go about implementing those principles in 
practice to create actual partnerships.  Guest and Peccei have compiled a list of 
practices that an organisation pursuing partnerships at work is likely to adopt.  
They include: direct and indirect (i.e. representative) participation by 
employees in decisions about their own work and employment issues in 
general; flexible job design and a focus on quality; performance management; 
and communication, harmonisation and employment security.
76
  Finally, Guest 
and Peccei identify three key areas in which the outcomes of a partnership 
approach are likely to be beneficial.  They are: the positive commitment and 
contribution of employees to the business (in this category we can identify the 
level of flexibility and innovation the Government hopes partnerships will 
achieve); a reduction in poor labour relations including reduced conflict, 
absence and turnover; and an improvement in business productivity, overall 
innovation, sales and profits.
77
   
 
2.9 Refining our understanding of partnership – the centrality of fairness 
 
Having spent some time understanding the principles, practices and outcomes 
that characterise the concept of partnership at work, we are in a position to 
refine our definition of partnership.  Doing so will help us to better 
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understand, (a) whether partnership can achieve the benefits that its 
proponents claim it can, and (b) how best to set about striving for those 
benefits.  To this end it is important not to lose sight of the Labour 
Government‘s overriding objective for the labour market as expressed in 
Fairness at Work: to foster a culture of fairness at work which will underpin 
enhanced competitiveness.
78
  Partnership is the metaphor used to describe the 
employment relationship that is most likely to achieve that objective.  Put 
another way, it is possible to understand the concept of partnership in this 
context as describing, in part at least, an employment relationship in which the 
parties treat each other fairly and justly.  If they do so they will, or so the story 
goes, achieve the competitiveness enhancing benefits that are described by 
Guest and Peccei as the outcomes of a partnership approach: employee 
commitment to the organisation, innovation, reduced turnover, increased 
productivity, reduced conflict etc.  Or, to hark back to our discussion of Katz‘s 
three categories of essential employee behaviour, fairness through partnership 
should result in dependable performance by employees of their specific role 
requirements, a commitment to join and to remain with the employer, and 
OCB.  This understanding of partnership – that it is a metaphor for a 
relationship based on fairness - seems to gain support when we reconsider the 
principles and practices that Guest and Peccei have identified are characteristic 
of a partnership approach to the employment relationship.  Fair treatment, 
employee voice, ensuring employee rights and responsibilities, employment 
security, are all types of behaviour that we might intuitively expect from an 
employer who is committed to treating its staff justly and fairly.  Moreover, 
these forms of behaviour have long been considered antecedents of fairness by 
academics and researchers in the field of organisational justice.
79
 
 
So it is possible to restate the partnership model for the purposes of this thesis.  
A partnership based employment relationship has the potential to obtain the 
previous Government‘s labour market objectives of fairness at work and 
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efficiency.  These objectives if achieved should drive enhanced business 
competitiveness partly, it is argued, through the achievement of OCB.  But 
partnerships cannot develop, as we have discussed at length, without the pre-
existing foundations of trust; successful partnership is in fact conditional upon 
the parties to the employment relationship trusting each other in such a way 
that each of them has faith that the other will act in the best interests of both 
parties and their partnership.  But how does trust develop when the parties 
have traditionally come together in a low trust relationship of subordination?  
Here again we see the importance of fairness (particularly in the context of 
EDG), but this time it is a key ingredient in the creation of partnerships as 
opposed to being an output or outcome of partnerships.  If employers treat 
their employees fairly their employees are more likely to trust them and from 
that point the creation of effective partnerships becomes possible, and the 
likelihood of achieving OCB increases.  In fact it may be possible to link the 
two functions of fairness in the following cumulative and constantly 
improving sense: fairness builds trust which leads to partnership which in turn 
enhances perceptions of fairness which strengthens the partnership and so on.        
 
The question that remains unanswered is whether in fact fair treatment of staff 
can in fact do what the partnership model predicts; can it provide the 
competitiveness enhancing benefits that drive the former Government‘s 
enthusiasm for the concept?  In other words, can fairness build trust such that 
partnership at work and OCB will evolve?  Fairness at Work makes a massive 
assumption that it can, but to what extent is that assumption accurate?  To 
answer that question it is essential to understand more about what it means to 
be fair, how employees in particularly form judgements about whether they 
have been treated fairly, and how they react based on their formulated 
perceptions.  At this stage it is worth stressing that it is the employee‘s 
perception of their treatment or the treatment of another that is vital.  An 
employee will not respond to treatment by the employer in the manner 
predicted by the partnership approach unless the employee perceives that 
treatment to be fair; the fact that the employer considers their behaviour to be 
fair will not by itself influence the reaction of the employee.  These issues 
have for some time now been considered important and explored by 
 49 
researchers in organisational justice, and it is to the material emanating from 
that area of study that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3:  FAIRNESS AT WORK – WHAT IS IT AND WHAT ARE 
ITS EFFECTS?  
 
In this chapter we ask what does it mean to be ‗fair‘ in the context of EDG?  
More specifically this chapter explores the circumstances in which employees 
are likely to judge that their employer is fair or unfair.  In the final analysis it 
is proposed that a regulatory model which aims to increase fairness 
perceptions to achieve partnership and OCB, will need to reflect a rational and 
fact based assessment of what it means to be fair and how employees form 
fairness judgements.  To this end we call upon the large amount of research 
into fairness that has been undertaken in the area of organisational justice.  We 
discover that there are three relevant types of fairness: distributive fairness, 
procedural fairness and interactional fairness.  We emphasise the importance 
of realising that these three types of fairness, while distinct, are closely related 
and no one type is predictably more important to an employee in any 
particular instance of EDG.  This chapter goes on to explore and apply several 
theoretical models for predicting how employees process fairness information 
to reach fairness judgements.  In particular we investigate how fairness 
judgements can impact on the realisation of partnership and the elements of 
OCB that were discussed in this chapter. 
 
3.1 The three types of fairness perception 
 
Most researchers in the field of organisational justice appear to divide fairness 
perceptions by employees into at least two types – distributive justice and 
procedural justice.
80
  Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of 
outcome allocations, whereas procedural justice refers to the perceived 
fairness of the allocation process.  There is however a body of research that 
recognises a third category of fairness perceptions; what is generally referred 
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to as interactional justice.
81
  Interactional justice accounts for fairness 
perceptions based on the interpersonal treatment an employee receives from 
others.  Here it is important to recognise that these three constructs, while 
distinct, are closely related.
82
  In other words it is likely that an employee‘s 
belief as to whether or not in any particular set of circumstances they have 
been treated fairly, will be based on a combination of distributive, procedural 
and interactional factors.  At the same time it is inevitable that the significance 
of any one of those three categories of fairness perceptions in any given 
instance will, as we shall see, depend on a variety of factors including the 
nature of the treatment that is being subject to a calculation of fairness by the 
employee.  For example, and without prejudging the subsequent discussion, it 
may be that in a particular case procedural justice plays a larger role than 
distributive justice in determining in the mind of an employee that their pay 
increase was unfair.  With those introductory points made we turn to consider 
in more detail the different categories of fairness perceptions and how they act 
and interact in the mind of the employee as he or she forms an overall 
judgement as to whether they have been treated fairly.  
 
3.2 Distributive justice and Equity Theory 
 
The notion and significance of distributive justice (and indeed the origins of 
organisational justice and academic interest in the importance of fairness in 
organisations) can be traced back to the work of Adams and the development 
of his Equity Theory.
83
  Adams expressed the employment relationship as an 
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exchange relationship in which employees furnish inputs (for example, 
education, work experience, effort and training) and receive outcomes in 
return.  The most important outcome in research on equity has been pay, 
although outcomes can include a variety of things (for example, recognition, 
praise by a supervisor, promotion and status).
84
  According to Equity Theory, 
the more an employee puts in to the employment relationship, the more they 
expect to receive in return.  So, for example, if an individual inputs a high 
level of performance he or she may expect one or more of the following 
outcomes in return: a large pay increase, a promotion, praise or some other 
form of recognition.
85
  This expectation was expressed by Adams as a ratio of 
outputs over inputs.  He proposed that an employee forms a judgement as to 
whether or not they have been treated fairly in relation to the outcome they 
received by comparing their ratio to the ratio of some similar other.  That other 
or comparator might be a co-worker engaged in a similar or the same role as 
the employee, or they may be the person who previously filled, or will occupy, 
a similar or the same role as the employee.
86
  It is also possible that the other 
or comparator will be the employee themselves.
87
  The vital point is that, 
according to Equity Theory, people arrive at a judgement about whether the 
outcomes they have received are fair by a process of social comparison.  
Equity or fairness is perceived to exist where the employee believes that their 
ratio of outcomes to inputs equals the ratio of the comparator‘s or other‘s 
outcomes to inputs.  Perceived inequity or unfairness will exist whenever the 
two ratios are unequal.
88
   But that is not all.  The relative weight to be 
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afforded any input or outcome will depend upon the importance of those 
inputs to the individual employee.  For example, a lawyer with only 4 years 
post qualification experience (PQE) who is applying for a promotion to a more 
senior position may place less importance on experience, and more on 
technical ability, than a different applicant with 15 years PQE.   
 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the conditions necessary to 
produce feelings of inequity and unfairness are based on the individual 
employee‘s perception of the fairness of the outcomes they receive, and not 
necessarily the objective characteristics of the situation.  Nonetheless, Adams 
was of the view that most people tend to react to what they receive in a 
manner that reflects the objective comparative reality of their position.  But 
subsequent research suggests that this may not always be the case.  Summers 
and De Nisi conducted a study of restaurant managers and their perceptions of 
the fairness or unfairness of the levels of pay they received from their 
employer.
89
  They found that 65% of the managers sampled reported feeling 
that they had been unfairly remunerated, even though an objective salary 
survey reported that they generally received higher levels of pay than 
comparable managers in other restaurants.  This points to one of the 
challenges for the employer who is seeking to get the most out of their staff by 
providing them with what the employer hopes their employees will perceive as 
fair outcomes.  A commitment to providing fair outcomes is unlikely to 
eliminate perceived inequity, because it goes without saying that people can 
have, and often do have, wildly inflated estimates of the value of their inputs 
or performance.
90
  Even when those perceptions are not so exaggerated, it may 
be that the employee fails to perceive receipt of a fair ratio of outcomes to 
inputs because the employer and the employee have an irreconcilable, albeit 
equally reasonable and defendable, understanding of what a fair and equitable 
exchange actually is in the circumstances. 
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Adam‘s Equity Theory spawned a considerable amount of research into the 
impact of justice perceptions on the behaviour of employees, some of which 
identified certain flaws in Adam‘s theory.  Most of those perceived flaws are 
based upon the argument that Equity Theory is too narrow an explanation of 
how employees form judgements about whether or not they have been treated 
fairly.  Several of those flaws warrant particular attention as part of the present 
discussion.  First, Adam‘s theory states that fairness is based, at least in part, 
on employees being rewarded for their performance; an employee that 
performs to a high standard can expect to be paid a higher level of pay than a 
comparator whose performance is not as good.  If that expectation is met the 
employee will consider that they have treated fairly  But this fails to recognise 
that there are other allocative systems available to employers, including, for 
example, those that split the desired outcome evenly (the ‗equality rule‘)91 and 
those that assign outcomes based on individual need
92
.  Perceptions of fairness 
may also be achieved where the employer adheres to the rules of equality or 
need, rather than equity.  Which approach is preferred will depend on a variety 
of circumstances, including the cultural characteristics of the parties.  For 
example, an equity system is more likely to be considered fair where the 
emphasis is on maximising group performance.  On the other hand, an equality 
rule is likely to be preferred where the primary focus is on group harmony, or 
when performance is largely determined by uncontrollable factors.
93
  A related 
problem with Equity Theory is that it only considers the outcomes people 
receive, which are typically material or economic in nature, when explaining 
why people make certain justice judgements.  The theory fails to take in to 
account that people often become involved in decision processes for socio-
emotional reasons.
94
  An employee‘s perception of justice in relation to any 
given outcome may also be affected by that employee‘s moral code or set of 
moral principles and emotional sensitivities, but Equity Theory fails to 
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account for the extent to which these factors might impact on fairness 
judgements.
95
  In a similar sense, Equity Theory fails to recognise that a third 
party may feel a sense of injustice or unfairness by perceiving that another (for 
example, a work colleague and friend, or even someone they don‘t know) has 
been treated unjustly. 
 
3.3 Procedural justice 
 
The next major flaw in Equity Theory is its preoccupation with outcomes and 
its failure to address the role of the allocation process in employee perceptions 
of fairness.  Such an approach is like saying that people are only concerned 
with what they get and have little or no interest in how they get it or how they 
are treated; but this seems contrary to our everyday experiences and cannot be 
right.
96
  This problem with Equity Theory was highlighted as research in the 
area of organisation justice began to gather empirical support for the idea that 
the perceived fairness of the process by which outcomes are achieved is an 
important and in some cases the most important, determinant of perceived 
fairness and justice.
97
  In the midst of this research scholars developed rules to 
explain when procedural justice exists.  It is generally accepted amongst 
organisational justice researchers that procedural justice can be found when 
procedures embody certain types of normatively accepted principles.  For 
example, according to Leventhal‘s conceptualisation98, there are six rules that, 
when followed, yield procedures that are likely to be perceived as fair: (a) the 
consistency rule, which states that allocation procedures should be consistent 
across persons and over time; (b) the bias suppression rule, which concerns 
preventing the personal self-interests of decision makers from influencing the 
allocation process; (c) the accuracy rule, which refers to the quality of the 
information used in the allocation process; (d) the correctability rule, which 
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deals with the existence of opportunities to change an unfair decision (for 
example, a right to appeal); (e) the representativeness rule, that emphasises 
that the needs, values and outlooks of all the parties involved should be 
represented in the decision making process; and (f) the ethicality rule, which 
points to the importance of ensuring that the allocation process must be in 
keeping with the fundamental moral and ethical values of the perceiver.   
 
It is generally accepted amongst researchers that process control (or voice) is 
the factor which more than any other enhances judgements of procedural 
justice.
99
  The debate in this area has tended to focus on why voice has such an 
important bearing on an employee‘s perception of whether or not they have 
been treated fairly.  Some researchers have argued that voice is important to 
employees because they place certain value on being given the opportunity to 
state their case irrespective of whether their input has any bearing on the final 
outcome (put another way they have a value expressive perspective of the 
importance of voice).
100
  Others have argued that employees value voice 
because being able to have their say affords them the opportunity to influence 
the outcome of the process (according to this argument employees have an 
instrumental perspective of the importance of voice).
101
  Shapiro argues that in 
the end most employees see little value in voice for voice‘s sake, but at the 
same time where the outcome goes against them (i.e. where they don‘t have 
outcome control) that does not by itself lead employees to conclude that there 
was no point in them having their say.  Shapiro suggests that employees are 
unlikely to perceive procedural fairness unless their participation in that 
procedure has the potential to influence the outcome and they won‘t perceive 
that potential exists unless they are convinced that the decision maker is 
considering and, when the decision is reached, has considered their statements.  
This assessment of whether the employee‘s views are being taken into account 
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or considered will be formed based on the presence or absence of certain 
factors including the decision-maker‘s perceived interpersonal responsiveness 
to what the employee has said (e.g. are they taking notes, do they maintain eye 
contact, do they ask questions or make comments that reflect what the 
employee has said?).  This approach unites the value-expressive and 
instrumental perspectives of the importance of voice.  As Shapiro explains: 
 
[T]he non-instrumental aspects of process control (e.g. the desire to be ―heard‖) will probably 
be perceived … as a means to instrumental ends (e.g. being heard will enhance the chance of 
possibly changing the listener‘s/decision maker‘s thinking). … For example, the present 
author has been to Court, and has valued the opportunity to appeal a traffic fine – despite my 
failure to ―win‖ a favourable decision.  The current literature would classify my persistent 
affinity for process control as evidence that I value my voice opportunity for value-expressive 
reasons.  However, I chose to visit Court because I had hoped that presenting my case would 
result in a reduced, or cancelled, fine; that is, I saw potential instrumentality in doing so.  
Having failed, I still valued the privilege to appeal an unfavourable decision (i.e. fine) because 
it gave me a chance to modify it. … It seems to me now, as it seemed to me then, that it is 
better to have voiced and lost than never to have voiced at all.
102
 
 
3.4 Interactional justice 
 
Equity Theory also fails to account for the effects of interpersonal treatment or 
interactional justice on perceptions of fairness.  Bies and Moag concluded that 
individuals frequently make justice appraisals based on the quality of the 
interpersonal treatment they receive from management.
103
  Bies and Moag 
referred to this as the ―communication criteria of fairness‖.104  Bies found that 
there were four attributes of interpersonally fair procedures: truthfulness, 
respect, propriety of questions, and justification.
105
  The first attribute can be 
divided into two parts: deception and candidness.  Employees who 
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participated in Bies‘s study could not abide being deceived, and Bies reported 
that deception was one of the most commonly expressed explanations for 
perceived unfairness.  But he also recognised from his data that employers had 
to do better than simply telling the truth if they wanted to be perceived as fair.  
Employees also expected to be treated in a forthright manner; they wanted to 
be presented with a realistic and accurate description of the circumstances 
under which they will be working.  Bies and Moags second attribute 
concerned employees‘ expectations that they be treated politely and 
respectfully as opposed to rudely and insultingly.
106
  The third attribute 
concerning the propriety of questions can also be divided in two.  First, some 
questions are by their very nature considered improper.  Bies and Moag 
argued that a question about a woman‘s future plans to have children falls 
within this category.  Secondly, questions concerning race, sexual orientation 
and other questions that involve prejudicial statements are likely to be 
considered improper.  The final attribute, justification, becomes relevant 
following a negative outcome or unfair treatment.  It suggests that perceptions 
of unfairness may be reversed or healed by the expression of an adequate 
justification.
107
  Bies argued that a sense of anger over perceived unfairness 
can be reduced or extinguished by providing the effected employee with a 
social account (that is, an explanation or an apology).
108
 
 
3.5 The different impact of different fairness perceptions 
 
It is helpful at this stage to make some preliminary points concerning the 
different impact these varying forms of justice perception have on the 
attitudes, emotions and behaviour of the perceiver.  We will expand on these 
points in the discussion that follows.  To start with, because it focuses on the 
outcomes people receive distributive justice is predicted to be related mainly 
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to cognitive, affective and behavioural reactions to particular outcomes.
109
  
The position is predictably different in relation to procedural justice.  The 
procedures adopted by an employer represent the way that the employer 
allocates resources and therefore procedural justice appears to relate to the 
employee‘s cognitive, affective and behavioural reactions toward their 
employer‘s organisation as a whole.110  For example, when an employee 
considers that a process leading to a particular outcome is unfair, the 
employee‘s reaction to that unfairness is thought to impact upon that 
employee‘s commitment to their employer.111  The situation is different again 
in relation to perceptions of interactional justice.  You will recall that 
interactional justice is concerned with the way management (or whoever it is 
that controls rewards and resources) behaves toward employees (are they 
polite or rude etc).  Because interactional justice perceptions are determined 
by the personal interaction of management or supervisors and employees, it is 
generally considered amongst researchers to relate to cognitive, affective and 
behavioural attitudes towards those management and supervisors.  Thus, when 
an employee perceives interactional injustice, rather than reacting negatively 
towards the employer‘s organisation as a whole, as predicted by the procedural 
justice model, or towards the particular outcome, as anticipated by the 
procedural justice model, they are expected to feel dissatisfied and negative 
towards their direct manager.
112
 
 
3.6 Integrative theories of fairness: how employees make fairness 
judgements 
 
Having taken stock of the flaws in Equity Theory, research in the area of 
organisational justice began to search for an integrative theoretical approach to 
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understanding how people make fairness judgements; one which accounted for 
those factors that Adam‘s theory did not (including, different allocative 
systems and rules, socio-emotional outcomes, moral principles, procedural 
justice, interpersonal treatment or interactional justice).  To this end Folger 
and Cropanzano proposed Fairness Theory.
113
  Fairness Theory suggests that 
perceptions of unfairness occur when an individual is able to hold another 
responsible for a situation in which their material or psychological well-being 
has been threatened.
114
  According to this theory there are three conditions that 
must be satisfied before a situation will be interpreted as unfair or unjust.  
First, the individual must imagine alternative situations that could have arisen 
that would have resulted in less adversity than was caused by what actually 
occurred.  Importantly, the easier it is for the individual to imagine a positive 
alternative, the more likely it is that the actual event will cause a sense of 
unfairness.  Moreover, the degree of discrepancy between the actual event and 
the perceived alternative will impact upon the strength of the individual‘s 
response to the situation.  Notably and unlike Equity Theory, the generation of 
alternatives, and the process of comparing those alternatives to the actual 
event, can involve both material/economic, socio-emotional and relational 
considerations.
115
  Secondly, the individual must determine whether the person 
responsible or accountable for their adversity could have acted differently.  
Research in this area has shown that the social account provided to the 
individual for the action taken often mitigates this condition.
116
  In other 
words, when it is explained to the individual why it was that a particular action 
had to be taken, perceivers are less likely to envisage an alternative to what 
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actual happened.
117
  For instance, ―[i]f the target admits that things could have 
been better, but the circumstances were unavoidable due to situational 
constraints, the individual facing the negative situation may not interpret it as 
unfair.  This is because if the target could have acted differently, they would 
have, and this meets only one of the requirements for perceiving a situation as 
unfair.‖118  The third condition that is necessary for injustice to be perceived is 
the should component.  This involves the perceiver undertaking a moral 
judgement as to whether, in the circumstances, the responsible party should 
have acted differently.  A situation is not perceived as being unjust unless the 
perceiver considers that it violates some moral code or set of principles.  
Importantly, and unlike Equity Theory, this should component explains why 
we often collectively respond to unfair situations faced by others with whom 
we may or may not have any personal connection.
119
 
 
While Fairness Theory seems to address many of the shortcomings of Equity 
Theory, it is yet to gain much empirical support; nor does it adequately explain 
why so many studies conclude that employee evaluations of procedures are 
often more relevant than employee evaluations of outcomes in the making of 
overall fairness judgements.  Assistance in this area is provided by a further 
theory developed by Lind and others and referred to as Fairness Heuristic 
Theory (FHT).
120
  Significantly, FHT differs from Fairness Theory in that it 
focuses ―on the cognitive limitations involved in processing relational 
information and explains how fairness information serves as an aid in making 
sense of the plethora of interpersonal stimuli we must face in our daily 
lives.‖121 
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FHT proposes that employees use fairness information to simplify these large 
processing demands.  The theory identifies three stages by which fairness and 
justice judgements are formed.  The first is the pre-formation stage.  At this 
stage the employee collects information about whether or not the employer 
and/or management can be trusted.  But explicit trustworthiness evidence will 
often be unavailable, or at least not readily available, in which case the 
employee will use fairness information as a heuristic substitute in making this 
evaluation.  The second stage of FHT is the formation stage.  The employee 
proceeds at this second stage to reach a judgement about whether or not in the 
particular instance they have been treated fairly and justly.  Here the employee 
will search for information about their inclusion in or exclusion from their 
relevant social unit.  Given that procedures (such as employee voice, 
representation, access and respect etc) are particularly informative about an 
employee‘s level of inclusion, fairness judgements will, at this point, 
communicate to the employee their value to the group with which they are 
associated.
122
  The third stage of FHT is the post-information stage.  This stage 
explains how the employee‘s initial fairness judgement will guide their 
behaviour and their future fairness evaluations. 
 
As suggested above, there is considerable empirical evidence to support the 
accuracy and utility of FHT as a model for understanding how employees 
make and use fairness judgements.  These studies identify several important 
characteristics of employee fairness evaluations that are particularly relevant 
to the ongoing discussion.  First, it appears that people, including employees, 
tend to give more weight to the information that they receive first, than they 
do to information that comes later.
123
  This is significant for several reasons.  
To start with, it suggests that fairness judgements tend to perpetuate 
themselves and that once an employee forms an initial or first impression 
about whether or not their employer is fair, that impression will be difficult for 
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the employer to displace.
124
  This suggests it is important for employers to 
provide employees with fair procedures at the beginning of any decision 
process and the relationship in general.  That is because it is these early 
demonstrations of an employer‘s commitment to fair treatment that are likely 
to have an ongoing and strong effect on the employee‘s subsequent reactions 
to the outcomes they receive and their calculations as to how much their 
employer can be trusted.  Secondly, studies show how difficult it can be for 
employees to assess the fairness of outcomes or distributive justice.  That is 
because such an evaluation will usually require information about outcomes 
received by others with whom the employee can compare themselves and that 
information is often hard, if not impossible to come by.
125
  For example, it will 
be difficult for an employee to determine whether they are being paid fairly if 
they do not have access to information about the level of pay being received 
by those in positions that are the same or similar to theirs.  The more this 
information is available the more likely the employee will be able to make a 
properly informed evaluation of whether or not they have been treated fairly.  
Where that information is not available employees will tend to substitute 
information about outcomes for information about processes in making their 
fairness judgements.
126
  But using procedural fairness information as a 
heuristic substitute for information that is unavailable, inevitably means that 
fairness perceptions or judgements can be inaccurate and unwarranted and that 
may cause an employee to form a view about their employer or to behave in a 
manner that is not justified or that is contrary to how they would have behaved 
had they been accurately informed.  
 
3.7 The effects of fairness perceptions on employee behaviour 
 
To this point we have considered how employees make judgements about 
whether or not they have been treated fairly, but it remains to assess how, if at 
all, such judgements influence employee behaviour.  More precisely, we want 
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to know whether employee perceptions that they have been treated fairly will 
cause them to act in a manner consistent with the predictions of the 
partnership approach and Katz‘s model of employee behaviour essential for 
effective organisational functioning.   The short response is that there is 
considerable evidence that an employee who perceives they are being treated 
fairly by their employer will respond in a positive fashion that can have a 
beneficial impact on the employer‘s business.  Conversely, research suggests 
that perceptions of unfair treatment can lead to negative reactions that have a 
corresponding detrimental impact on the employer‘s business.  To help us 
understand in more detail the effects of justice perceptions on employee 
behaviour this thesis will divide the following discussion into sections that 
correspond with the types of employee behaviour that Katz and the partnership 
approach are particularly focused on.  They are: work performance and 
counterproductive work behaviour; OCB; organisational commitment; and 
conflict.  In other words we will investigate how perceptions of fairness or 
unfairness (distributive, procedural and interactional) are likely to influence 
employee behaviour under these headings.  
 
3.7.1 Work performance and counterproductive behaviour 
 
Equity Theory provided specific hypotheses regarding the impact of perceived 
distributive justice on work performance.
127
  Adams predicted that perceived 
inequity creates tension, stress, anger and resentment in the employee which is 
proportional to the magnitude of the perceived distributive unfairness.  Those 
feelings and emotions will in turn motivate the employee to heal or reduce the 
inequity and the strength of that motivation will reflect the level to which the 
employee perceives they have been unfairly treated.  The methods that 
employees adopt to heal the perceived inequity are what Adam‘s labelled 
inequity reduction strategies and depending on which strategy the employee 
chooses to adopt, an attempt to do something about their sense of inequity can 
have a negative impact on their quantity and quality of performance.  For 
example, an employee may choose to reduce their inputs as an inequity 
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reduction strategy (perhaps by lowering their levels of performance).  It is also 
possible for an employee to perform a comparison of ratios and discover that 
they are being over-rewarded by their employer (that is, they are receiving 
relatively more outcomes than their comparator).  In this over-reward position 
an employee should not feel anger or resentment but they should experience a 
sense of guilt, shame or remorse.
128
  These emotions are negative and 
therefore Equity Theory predicts that the employee will take steps to right the 
imbalance.  Because people are not inclined to forego positive outcomes, 
employees in this situation are likely to respond by increasing inputs (perhaps 
by increasing their levels of performance).
129
  These predictions have been 
tested in a number of field experiments.  In a 1988 study by Greenberg a 
sample of employees were randomly assigned to temporary offices that were 
of a higher, lower or equal status to the employees‘ normal positions.  
Consistent with Equity Theory, those employees assigned to a higher status 
position showed improved levels of performance, while those assigned to the 
lower status positions showed the opposite.
130
  In an earlier experiment 
Greenberg and Ornstein randomly provided a group of employees with a 
mixture of high and low status job titles and required them to carry out the 
same type of work.  Those with the higher status titles showed higher levels of 
performance than their lower status colleagues.
131
   
 
As I have already explained, Equity Theory had nothing to say about the 
impact of procedural justice on the fairness and justice perceptions of 
employees, but subsequent research showed this to be a significant flaw in the 
theory.  Studies have since demonstrated a strong correlation between 
procedural justice and employee behaviour, including work performance.  For 
example, Cohen-Charsash and others carried out a meta-analysis of 190 field 
and laboratory studies into the perceived justice of outcomes and 
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procedures.
132
  Their analysis suggested that, in fact, work performance is 
strongly related to procedural justice, but not to distributive or interactional 
justice.  This tended to contradict earlier work that considered there was a link 
between distributive justice and performance, including Equity Theory.  It 
seems however that this finding can be explained on the basis that where 
employees believe that outcomes have been unfairly distributed, they will 
examine the allocation process to determine whether it is fair
133
 and only if 
they feel that the procedure was unfair, will they withhold performance as a 
means of restoring equity.
134
  This is consistent with the earlier discussion of 
the could component of Fairness Theory and the idea that an employee is 
unlikely to feel that they should have been treated differently if the reason for 
their treatment is adequately explained to them.   
 
It is possible to take this discussion further.  You will recall during the 
explanation of Katz‘s model of essential employee behaviour that we 
mentioned the dangers to the employer of an employee who is willing not only 
to work beneath their full capacity, but to be counterproductive, to commit 
misconduct (including pilfering, giving up proprietary information and trade 
secrets, absenteeism etc).  Equity Theory and other models of distributive 
justice predict this type of behaviour as one potential employee response to 
perceived distributive injustice or inequitable outcomes.  It is possible 
therefore to argue that an employee who commits misconduct or 
counterproductive behaviour is doing so because they believe that hurting their 
employer is the appropriate strategy to ensure their outcome to input ratio is 
adjusted back to the equilibrium.
135
  For example, in legal practice the writer 
was involved in a case in which an employee was dismissed for constantly 
leaving work early.  At a mediation convened to resolve his claim that the 
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dismissal had been unlawful, he admitted leaving early without authorisation 
but justified doing so on the basis that he had spent a number of months prior 
to his spell of early departures working far beyond his contracted hours for no 
reward, and leaving early was his way of getting what he felt he was owed.  
Explained in terms of Equity Theory, the employee felt his level of inputs 
exceeded his level of outcomes and working fewer hours was his way of 
adjusting his inputs so as to restore the balance. Of course re-establishing 
equal ratios of outcomes to inputs is not the only explanation for counter-
productive behaviour and misconduct (for example, the employee in the 
example just given may have been leaving work early not because he was 
concerned with restoring equity, but because he had another job to attend, or a 
regular social engagement that he did not want to miss) but it may explain a 
significant proportion of such behaviour.   
 
From a procedural justice perspective, we can predict that perceived 
unfairness will lead to negative perceptions about the employer‘s organisation 
as a whole and, hence, to counterproductive behaviours that will hurt the 
organisation: ―to the extent employees perceive their organization to be unfair 
because it uses unfair procedures for resource allocations, employees will 
develop negative attitudes toward the organization (e.g. lower trust and 
commitment and greater anger).  Negative attitudes and emotions lead to 
employees not having incentives to work in favour of the organization.  
Moreover, they might lead employees to act against the organization‖.136 An 
example of this theory in action may have been explained in a recent New 
Zealand newspaper article.  A female employee had made a formal written 
request to her employer for flexible working hours to look after her young son.  
She had been with the employer for 20 consecutive years and by all reports 
she was an excellent performer.  The employer failed to respond to the request 
and after a period of waiting the employee re-sent her letter.  She eventually 
received a response that stated simply that her request was denied; the 
response contained no explanation as to why the request had been denied.  
Having been notified of the employer‘s decision the employee proceeded to 
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take regular time off work anyway (often leaving at 2 and 3 in the afternoon; 
the same time her son‘s school finished for the day) each time complaining 
that she was suffering from some ailment.  She was very shortly thereafter 
dismissed for misconduct and the employer lost a long serving and previously 
productive worker.  She brought a claim against her employer for 
Unjustifiable Dismissal
137
 and during her hearing she admitted that she had 
not been sick, but that she had lost so much respect for her employer because 
it had dismissed her request out of hand without explanation and without 
giving her an opportunity to fully explain her reasons for making the request, 
that she did not care that taking the time off was a breach of her employment 
contract. 
 
The category of fairness perceptions that we have not yet mentioned under this 
heading is interactional justice.  It is conceivable that interpersonal treatment 
of an employee by their manager or supervisor will have a direct impact on 
that employee‘s work performance: if a manager treats their staff with respect 
and Courtesy those staff may reciprocate with better performance; but if a 
manager is rude and discourteous to staff those people may respond negatively 
by poor performance or misconduct.
138
  This proposition, and indeed the 
argument that procedural justice perceptions can influence work performance, 
seems at first glance to contradict a long standing view in economics that 
people are exclusively self-interested and that they are concerned with justice 
only because, in the long run, they are more likely to profit from a fair system 
than from an unfair one.
139
  In other words people are not interested in fairness 
for fairness sake.  But this view of human behaviour has been challenged by 
several academics in a manner that is directly relevant to the present 
discussion.  Fehr and Gachter postulated that people will deviate from purely 
self-interested behaviour in a reciprocal manner: ―[r]eciprocity means that in 
response to friendly actions, people are much nicer and much more co-
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operative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to 
hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal. … People 
repay gifts and take revenge even in interactions with complete strangers and 
even if it is costly for them and yields neither present nor future material 
gains‖.140  Clearly this contention has significant implications in the context of 
interpersonal interaction between managers and their staff.  It suggests that an 
employee who is confronted with discourteous and rude behaviour (i.e. 
interactional injustice or unfairness) may well react in a devious and 
destructive fashion albeit that their reaction nets them zero or negative 
economic benefit.  The opposite may also be true and a supervisor who treats 
their workers with dignity and respect may be rewarded by an increase in 
worker productivity.  Although the employees have nothing material to gain 
(at least not in the short term) from their extra effort, they are motivated to act 
in this manner as a way of repaying the treatment afforded to them by their 
supervisor.  It is also possible to view reciprocity as a predictor of a downward 
spiral of negative responses to rude and discourteous behaviour on both sides 
of the employment relationship.  In simple terms we mean that a supervisor‘s 
disrespectful and rude treatment of an employee may be met with similarly 
negative behaviour by the employee, to which the supervisor will respond in a 
negative fashion, and so on and so forth until, presumably, the relationship 
breaks down entirely and the employee quits or is dismissed.   
 
3.7.2 Organisational citizenship behaviour 
 
You will recall that a key ingredient in a successful business is, according to 
Katz and others, the willingness of its employees to function innovatively and 
beyond the call of duty.  More specifically this form of behaviour or OCB is, 
as we have discussed, an essential feature of a successful business in the 
rapidly evolving global market and the  knowledge driven economy.  Organ 
described OCB as ―organizationally beneficial behaviours and gestures that 
can neither be enforced on the basis of formal role obligations nor elicited by 
contractual guarantees of recompense.  OCB consists of informal contributions 
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that participants can choose to proffer or withhold…‖.141  The question for us 
is, to what extent if at all is that decision to proffer or withhold OCB 
influenced by employee perceptions of fairness?  In short there is considerable 
research supporting the hypothesis that perceived procedural and interactional 
justice are major predictors of OCB.
142
  And it is no surprise that procedural 
and interactional justice is, theoretically, more closely tied to OCB than 
distributive justice.  That is because it is those two forms of organisational 
justice that are most likely to develop trust in a social exchange relationship 
(of which the employment relation is, in part at least, one example) and it is 
trust that is most likely to lead to OCB.   
 
But we are getting ahead of ourselves and this proposition requires a more 
detailed explanation.  The first part of that explanation is to distinguish 
between a social exchange relationship and an economic exchange 
relationship.  Among the first people to draw this distinction was Peter 
Blau.
143
  Blau understood social exchange relationships as being essentially 
characterised by a number of unspecified future obligations.  He also 
recognised that, like economic exchange relationships, social exchange 
relationships give rise to an expectation of some future return for 
contributions, but, unlike economic exchange relationships, the exact nature of 
the return on one‘s contribution in a social exchange is unspecified.  In 
addition Blau noted that social exchange does not occur on a carefully 
measured or calculated basis; while economic exchange is based upon 
transactions and expectation of short term fairness, social exchange 
relationships are founded on each party to the exchange trusting that the other 
party will fairly discharge their obligations over the long term.
144
  The 
characteristic of trust is vital for the health of social exchange relationships, 
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especially in the short run, when some temporary or perceived asymmetries 
may exist between a party‘s inducements (i.e. the benefits they receive in 
return for their contribution to the social exchange relationship) and their 
contributions.  Trust is particularly vital in the context of any attempt to elicit 
OCB and this certainly rings true when we consider the predicted benefits of 
OCB under the partnership model.  An employer may immediately reap the 
benefit of, for example, increased profitability that flows from the beyond 
contract performance of its staff, but it may not simultaneously reward its staff 
for their hard work.  Those rewards may be predicted for the future and they 
may not be monetary (they may include greater job security that stems from 
the enhanced competitiveness of the business, greater responsibility and other 
benefits).  However, it is unlikely that the employees will provide beyond 
contract effort in the first place unless they trust that the employer will look 
after them in the long run and that those benefits will eventually ensue.   
 
But how does this level of trust develop within the employment relationship?  
Konovsky and Pugh have argued that trust requires ―evidence of self-sacrifice 
and responsiveness to another person‘s needs‖.145  Such evidence may exist in 
the procedures an employer adopts to reach decisions that impact upon 
employees; in other words one source of trust in the employment relationship 
is procedural fairness.
146
  As Konovsky and Pugh have explained: ― the use of 
procedurally fair … practices affects high order issues such as employees‘ 
commitment to a system and trust in its authorities because the use of fair 
procedures demonstrates an authority‘s respect for the rights and dignity of 
individual employees.  This demonstrated respect indicates that an authority is 
devoted to the principles of procedurally fair treatment, thus resulting in the 
employees‘ trust in the long run fairness of the relationship.  Fair procedures 
may have symbolic meaning insofar as individuals are treated as ends rather 
than means‖.147  Similarly, Lind and Tyler predicted procedural justice to be 
―… a source of both satisfaction and positive evaluations of the 
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organization… [and to] make individuals more willing to subordinate their 
own short term individual interests to the interests of a group or 
organization.‖148  We might also predict that interactional justice will have an 
important bearing on the levels of trust necessary to motivate OCB from 
employees.  For instance, Organ argued that the fair interpersonal treatment of 
employees by their supervisors leads to employee citizenship because a social 
exchange relationship develops between employees and their supervisors.
149
  
When supervisors treat employees fairly, social exchange and norms of 
reciprocity that we discussed above in the context of work performance, 
dictate that employees reciprocate, and one avenue of reciprocation is OCB.
150
   
 
In contrast to procedural and interactional justice, distributive justice is the 
typical metric for assessing the fairness of economic exchange and is unlikely 
to have as significant an influence on the level of employee trust in an 
organisation that is essential for employee OCB.  As Konovsky and Pugh 
explain: ―a norm of distributive fairness implies that the parties to an exchange 
give benefits with the expectation of receiving comparable benefits in the 
short run.  When the conditionality of an exchange is salient, as it is when 
distributive justice and economic exchange characterise a situation, the 
expression of feelings like trust is undercut because sufficient extrinsic 
explanations for the parties‘ continued participation in the relationship exists.  
The conditionality of economic exchange also inhibits the development of 
trust because that development requires evidence of one party‘s self-sacrifice 
and responsiveness to another person‘s needs, which conditional exchanges do 
not provide. Transactional contracts and distributive justice are therefore less 
likely than relational contracts and procedural justice to produce attributes of 
trust.‖151  That is not to say that distributive justice cannot have any bearing on 
the creation of long term trust and OCB.  At a theoretical level this can be 
explained by recognising that the employment relationship is at the same time 
a social exchange relationship and an economic exchange relationship; in 
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other words it combines the long term uncertain outcome characteristics of 
social exchange with the short term identifiable benefits of economic 
exchange (the most easily identifiable aspect of the latter is the wage-work 
bargain).  These two features of the relationship are not mutually exclusive 
and where economic exchange intersects with social exchange the former can 
impact on the levels of trust that are so vital for social exchange and OCB.  
For example, an employer who reneges on a promise to reward an employee 
with additional remuneration in their next pay packet for working extra hours, 
or putting in extra effort, is likely to seriously damage, even destroy the trust 
that the employee might previously have felt towards the employer.  
Moreover, such behaviour on the employer‘s part is almost certainly going to 
dissuade the employee from putting in similar extra effort in the future. 
 
Finally under this heading, it is important to recognise that, just as OCB is 
influenced by the supervisors‘ and organisations‘ treatment of employees and 
procedural and distributive justice, OCB can also influence the behaviour of 
supervisors and organisations towards employees.
152
  The same observation 
can be made in relation to work performance.  For example, it is possible that 
an employee‘s preparedness to engage in OCB will cause the employer or the 
employer‘s manager to extend to the employee more considerate and 
respectful treatment.  This therefore creates a cyclic series of positive 
responses: the more an employee is treated fairly the more they are willing to 
work beyond contract and exhibit OCB, and the more employees are prepared 
to behave in this way the more employers and management are likely to 
reciprocate with fair treatment, and so on.  This perpetuating phenomenon is 
of course essential if OCB is to have a sustained beneficial impact on the 
competitiveness of the employer‘s business, but at the same time it is 
important to realise that the trust on which this interaction is based is fragile.  
Once the cycle of positive responses is broken, it may be difficult to repair and 
in the meantime the business is likely to lose ground on its competitors in the 
global market and knowledge driven economy that it may struggle to make up. 
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3.7.3 Staff Retention and reducing turnover 
 
You will recall that during our discussion of Katz‘s categories of essential 
employee behaviour we pointed to the importance of being able to retain staff 
and reduce turnover.  This is a particularly significant achievement in a 
modern business that has invested considerable time and resources in staff 
training.  An employer will want to retain staff so as to get the most out of 
their investment (while not having to duplicate that investment when a 
replacement is hired) and, in particular, it will want to retain its best staff (i.e. 
those staff who are technically the most proficient, are willing to go that extra 
mile and are prepared to be flexible).  But reducing turnover is likely to be 
particularly challenging in organisations with professional or technically 
skilled employees who have high job mobility.
153
  One way for an employer to 
retain staff and reduce turnover is to create amongst its employees a sense of 
affective commitment or emotional attachment to the organisation.  Such 
emotional commitment may be generated by a host of factors and some 
employees may be more susceptible to its influence than others due to their 
individual emotional and moral make-up.  Nevertheless it seems that one 
universally important ingredient in the evolution of affective commitment is 
the employee‘s perception that their employer is fair.  An employee who 
considers their employer to be fair may feel a sense of closeness to the 
employer; a feeling that the employer has a genuine interest in their wellbeing 
which in turn creates an emotional bond between the employer and the 
employee that the employee is reluctant to break.  This attachment is most 
likely where the employee has experienced first-hand the benefits of their 
employer‘s commitment to the fair treatment of its staff.  But it is also possible 
to view commitment to the employer as flowing less from an emotional 
attachment and more from a pragmatic assessment by the employee that there 
is value in remaining with an employer who is perceived to be fair, or more 
precisely, it is possible to view the employee‘s commitment as being based on 
a reluctance to quit rather than a positive endorsement of the employer.  
Cohen-Charash and Spector have explained that when an employee 
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understands its employer to have adopted fair procedures and treated that 
employee with respect, the employee will perceive themselves to have more 
investments in the organisation which they will be reluctant to relinquish by 
moving jobs.  Conversely, when the employee believes their treatment is 
unfair and disrespectful, the employee will feel they have little to lose in 
moving to a new employer.
154
 
 
Another example from the writer‘s legal practice may help to make the point.  
A large hotel had suffered a sustained period of poor room sales and as a result 
it had, for two years, been unable to reward its staff with anything above a 1% 
pay increase.  The hotel was paying considerably less than its competitors in 
all but a small number of positions and was, as a consequence, unable to retain 
many of it most valuable staff and overall turnover was extremely high.  In an 
effort to address the turnover problem the hotel decided to grant its staff a 5% 
pay-increase.  This level of pay increase did not bring the hotel‘s pay up to the 
level of its competitors, but it was sold to its staff as a reward for the 
commitment staff had demonstrated by staying with the hotel during the tough 
times.  As part of the process of selling the pay increase the hotel opened its 
books to the two unions that represented 80% of the hotel‘s workers.  The 
books showed that the pay increase was a significant short term strain on the 
business and they also explained that the Managing Director had taken a 
substantial pay-cut to off-set some of the additional money going to staff.  
These factors were outlined to staff in a letter written by the union to its 
members and in the year following the pay increase the level of turnover 
reduced to a negligible amount; a reduction which the hotel and the unions 
attributed to the pay increase and the manner in which it was explained to 
staff.   
 
It may be possible to understand the reduced turnover in this example as a 
manifestation of an emotional commitment that staff felt towards their 
employer as a result of the pay increase and the circumstances surrounding it.  
The pay increase and its explanation suggested to some staff that the employer 
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was committed to being fair which in turn may have engendered in staff a 
willingness to put aside their own narrow self-interest in moving to a better 
paid job in favour of showing loyalty to the organisation that had 
demonstrated loyalty and self sacrifice to them.    Alternatively, it may be that 
the reduction in turnover is attributable to an assessment on the part of 
employees that remaining with an employer who is overtly committed to 
fairness is likely to be in their long term interests, whereas moving to another 
employer who, while paying them a small amount extra on arrival, they know 
little about, may not be in their best interests.  In the end the reduction in 
turnover was probably attributable to a number of factors, including a 
combination of the two forms of commitment discussed above.  Some 
employees may have been reluctant to leave because they felt a bond with the 
employer in keeping with their perception (which may have been flawed) that 
the hotel was prepared to compromise its short-term financial interests for the 
good of their staff.  Others employees may have stayed because they felt better 
the devil you know. 
 
Before leaving the topic of organisational commitment and turnover it is worth 
making a point that may also be born-out in the hotel example above.  
Konovsky and Cropanzano argued that because affective or emotional 
commitment is generally aimed at the organisation as a whole, it is most likely 
to be related to procedural justice as opposed to distributive justice.
155
  This 
prediction was confirmed by Cohen-Charash and Spector‘s meta-analysis 
which showed affective commitment to be significantly more strongly related 
to procedural justice than to distributive justice or, for that matter, 
interactional justice.
156
  Similarly, it appears that organisation commitment 
based on a pragmatic assessment of the employee‘s own self interest in 
remaining with a fair employer, is also tied more closely to procedural justice 
than distributive justice.
157
  That is not to say of course that distributive justice 
can have nothing to do with turnover.  An employee who feels they are being 
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unfairly rewarded for the work they do is very likely to be tempted by an offer 
to move to an organisation that will pay them what they believe they should be 
paid to do the work they are currently undertaking.  The point worth making 
however is that the more the employee feels a commitment to the employer 
based on their perception that the employer uses fair processes in reaching 
decisions about pay outcomes and other matters, the more the new employer 
will be forced to offer to entice the employee away from their current role.  In 
other words the pragmatic employee places a premium or a value on their 
current employer‘s fairness that they are only willing to relinquish for a price.  
In addition, it is wrong to say that interactional justice can have no bearing on 
an employee‘s willingness to stay with or leave an organisation.  In the end an 
employee‘s desire to remain with their current employer will be based to a 
large extent on the degree to which they are or are not satisfied and 
comfortable with their everyday working environment.  Those feelings are 
likely to reflect in part the employee‘s everyday personal interaction with their 
work colleagues, including their line managers and supervisors.  An employee 
who is subjected everyday to negative, rude and disrespectful treatment by 
their immediate boss is more likely to be actively seeking and willing to 
accept alternative employment than someone who is happy in their work 
environment because, in part, they are treated by management in a respectful 
and Courteous manner. 
3.7.4 The significance of conflict 
The previous Government‘s partnership approach promised a reduction in 
work place conflict as one of the benefits to be had by businesses that embrace 
partnership at work.
158
  By conflict we take the Labour Government to have 
meant disagreements between employers and employees over any matter 
relating to the employment relation.  Interestingly, in his work on 
organisational behaviour Katz fails to identify a willingness not to conflict 
with their employer as an essential form of employee behaviour.  That is not 
surprising of course because Katz was focused on the positive forms of 
                                                  
158
 In Fairness at Work (supra at note 1) the Tony Blair begins his Prime Minister‘s Foreword 
by stating that ―this White Paper is part of the Government‘s programme to replace the notion 
of conflict between employers and employees with the promotion of partnership.‖ 
 78 
employee behaviour that would result in business being more, as opposed to 
less, effective.  In other words, where there is conflict we are less likely than 
we are when it is absent to find the behavioural requirements of organisational 
effectiveness.  In fact the opposite is likely to be true; where there is conflict 
we may well find the behavioural associates of organisational dysfunction.  In 
the parlance of organisation justice and fairness it is possible to view conflict 
as an outcome of perceived unfairness, whereas Katz‘s behavioural 
requirements (including OCB and organisational commitment) result in part at 
least from perceived fairness.  It is also possible, indeed vital in many 
instances, to view conflict as more than just an immediate reaction to 
perceived unfairness.  Conflict can often be understood as part of a continuum 
of unfairness judgements on both sides of the employment relation that 
become progressively more destructive.  Consider again the example of the 
employee who took unauthorised time off work following her employer‘s 
refusal to grant her time flexible working time so that she could care for her 
son.  The employee in that case considered the employer‘s refusal of her 
request and the manner of the refusal unfair and, therefore, she felt justified in 
lying to her employer about being ill and taking time off without permission.  
The employer in turn considered the employee‘s behaviour unjust and unfair 
and responded by dismissing her.  The continuum was extended by the 
employee reacting to the employer‘s decision to dismiss her by bringing a 
claim in the employment tribunal that her dismissal was unlawful.   
This example hints at a further important point about conflict.  It is possible to 
understand conflict in the employment relation as falling within one of three 
broad categories: externalised conflict, retaliatory conflict or internalised 
conflict.  The first category refers to a situation where an employee or 
employer perceives that they have been treated unfairly by the other party and 
their response is to address those specific concerns directly to that party or to a 
third party.  An employee for example may do that in a number of ways.  They 
may approach their supervisor on an informal basis to discuss what is 
bothering them.  Alternatively they may raise a formal grievance with their 
employer through the employer‘s formal grievance mechanism.  Finally, they 
may take legal action against the employer in the tribunals or Courts.  This 
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form of conflict may however be quickly and effectively resolved if the 
employer responds to the employee in a manner that the employee believes is 
fair.  As soon as the employer‘s response is perceived by the employee to be 
fair the conflict continuum is completed and the parties can proceed with a 
productive relationship.   
The second category of conflict captures those instances where an employee 
feels they have been treated unfairly but rather than raise their concerns 
directly with their employer they take retaliatory action instead.  Such action 
may take the form of misconduct or other counter-productive behaviour.  In 
those circumstances it is more difficult to close the continuum because the 
employer is not immediately aware of the motivation behind the employee‘s 
reaction and is unlikely to respond in a manner that remedies the employee‘s 
original feelings of unfairness.  Instead the employer is likely to perceive the 
employee‘s actions as unfair and react in what the employer considers, in their 
ignorance of the motive behind the employee‘s actions, to be justified.  In 
other words retaliatory conflict has a habit of perpetuating the conflict 
continuum.  The continuum may be broken once the employer is made aware 
of the employee‘s original concerns, but that is perhaps unlikely.  By the time 
the employer is made conversant with employee‘s original concerns the 
relationship between the parties is likely to have deteriorated to such an extent 
that neither party is inclined to treat the other fairly, or to view whatever 
treatment they receive or have received at the hands of the other as being fair.  
As we have already identified during our discussion of Fairness Heuristic 
Theory, once we make an initial fairness evaluation it is very difficult for the 
object of that judgement to alter that perception; we tend to get ―stuck‖ at the 
level of the original fairness judgement.   
A similar observation can be made in relation to the third category of conflict.  
Conflict in this category is initially internalised.  By that we mean one party to 
the relationship perceives that they have been treated unfairly but chooses to 
take no immediate action in response to that perception.  A number of studies 
have suggested that it is not uncommon for employees in particular to 
internalise feelings of anger and resentment that flow from perceived 
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unfairness.  For example, in a role-playing study carried out by Martin, 
Brickman and Murray, the authors of the study found that the extent to which 
participants in the experiment were underpaid for the work they undertook 
was entirely unrelated to their tendency to report their concerns about how 
they were treated to their employer.
159
  Not bringing their concerns to the 
attention of the employer has a number of negative consequences for the 
organisation and the employee.  The employee‘s feelings that flow from their 
perceptions of unfairness are likely to fester until the employee feels unable to 
bear them any longer and decides to act on those feelings by, as is very often 
the case, resigning and bringing a claim against their former employer for 
constructive dismissal.  Of course up until that point the employer‘s business 
may suffer because the employee is not motivated to be innovative, to assist 
their fellow employees and generally to exhibit OCB.  Moreover, particularly 
where the actions of the employer that are perceived to be unfair are ongoing, 
the feelings of resentment and anger that well-up unabated within the 
employee are unlikely to be quelled at some later stage once the reason for the 
perceived unfairness is finally discussed (assuming that they are ever disclosed 
to the employer) because by that stage the sense of unfairness has become 
entrenched in the employee‘s impression of the employer.  And it is not only 
employees who are susceptible to internalised conflict.  As Robert Baron 
points out, it is not unusual for managers to internalise feelings that their staff 
are underperforming or misbehaving.
160
  Failing to address staff about their 
concerns is often the preferred course for a number of reasons, not the least of 
which is that managers are reluctant to engage in the unpleasant interpersonal 
exchange which they anticipate will occur when they confront the offending 
employee.  But this approach can and often does have damaging 
consequences.  If the behavioural problem is not addressed it is likely to 
continue and over time become more of a problem (either because the 
cumulative effects of the behaviour are increasingly negative or because the 
                                                  
159
 J. Martin, P. Brickman, and A. Murray, ‗Moral outrage and pragmatism: Explanations for 
collective action‘ (1984) 20 Journal of Experimental Psychology 484. 
160
 R. A. Baron, ‗Criticism (informal negative feedback) as a source of perceived unfairness in 
organizations: Effects, mechanisms, and countermeasures‘, in Cropanzoa and Randell (supra 
at note 85). 
 81 
staff behaviour itself worsens as the staff member(s) identify that they can get 
away with more). 
Of course it is wrong to think that these categories of conflict are mutually 
exclusive.  They are very much intertwined and it is that relationship which 
explains the evolution of some of the most destructive instances of conflict.  
For example, an employee who has a grievance against their employer may 
choose the path of externalised conflict and pursue that grievance through the 
employer‘s internal grievance procedure.  During and at the end of the 
procedure they may reach the conclusion that the procedure was unfair, maybe 
because they employer did not give them sufficient opportunity to voice their 
case.  As a consequence the employee sees no value in the pursuing the 
grievance process any further.  Instead he chooses to retaliate against the 
employer‘s unfair treatment of him and his grievance by lowering his level of 
productivity or by refusing to work beyond his contracted hours.  That may in 
turn set the employee on a course to eventual resignation or dismissal.  
Similarly, a manager who perceives that his staff is treating him unfairly by 
refusing to properly abide by his instructions, but who delays in confronting 
them with his concerns will, as the problem intensifies, develop an increasing 
sense of frustration and resentment towards those employees.  Eventually the 
manager‘s level of restraint will be exceeded and he will be forced to stand up 
to the troublemakers.  But taking this stance at such a late stage is likely to 
have several negative consequences.  For instance, because the manager has 
developed an enhanced sense of frustration and anger towards the offending 
employees he is more likely to address them in what they may consider is a 
rude and disrespectful manner (i.e. an interactionally unfair manner).  This 
perception of interactional unfairness is all the more likely given that the 
behaviour the employees have been told is unacceptable has been continuing 
over a period of time.  The employees are likely to feel that if the behaviour 
was unacceptable it would not have been allowed to continue and the fact that 
it was has sent them a message that is was acceptable.  The employees will 
perceive that the manager is acting unfairly by rebuking them for behaviour 
that they were led to believe was acceptable.  The employee‘s may react to 
this treatment and perceived unfairness by reducing their level of co-operation 
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or by taking some other form of retaliatory action.  The manager may in 
response choose to externalise the conflict by disciplining the employees 
which may in the end lead to their dismissal.   
There are of course various permutations of conflict interaction but the 
important point which has already been made but is worth repeating is that 
unfairness tends to breed unfairness, and it is vital to recognise that the sources 
of conflict are complex and usually rooted in early perceptions of unfairness 
that have spiralled out of control.  The longer this conflict continuum is 
allowed to grow the more likely it is that it will lead to competitiveness 
damaging behaviour and eventually to complete relationship breakdown.  The 
seemingly obvious answer to the problem is to prevent the conflict continuum 
from extending to the point beyond which the relationship is doomed and to 
do that of course requires the parties to address the potential sources of 
conflict and perceptions of unfairness sooner rather than later.   
3.8 Partnership and matters to do with employee discipline and 
grievances  
 
It is possible at this stage to draw several important conclusions about 
partnership at work that we will take forward into the chapters that follow.  
The previous Government used partnership as a metaphor for an employment 
relation based in large part on each party to the relationship treating the other 
fairly.  The previous Government believed that fair treatment by each party of 
the other will lead to reductions in employee turnover, reduced workplace 
conflict, greater employee commitment to the employer‘s business, greater 
employee OCB and innovation and, as a result, greater sales and profitability.  
Our discussion of research on fairness and responses to fairness in the area of 
organisational justice suggests that the previous Government may be on to 
something and fairness can lead to enhanced business competitiveness.  The 
foregoing discussion indicates that employees in particular are likely to behave 
in the manner predicted by the partnership model where they perceive they 
have been treated fairly and, conversely, they are likely to act in a manner that 
is contrary to the development and maintenance of productive employment 
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relations where they perceive they have been treated unfairly.  This seems 
simple enough; all that the employer must do to ensure enhanced business 
competitiveness is to treat its staff fairly.  But of course it is not so simple and 
in the next chapter we consider why that is and what can be done to address 
that problem and we do so with particular reference to EDG.   
 
But why focus on EDG?  In part because EDG in the broadest sense is the 
aspect of the employment relation that more than any other has the potential to 
impact negatively and positively on perceptions of fairness and as such it 
stands to play a significant role in achieving the predicted benefits of 
partnership.  That is because, to begin with, the way in which an employer 
facilitates the resolution of grievances and disciplinary issues can either cure 
or cause a sense of unfairness and mistrust amongst employees.  For example, 
an employer who fails to provide a trusted and effective mechanism for 
employees to air their concerns and grievances is missing a chance to rectify 
employee feelings of dissatisfaction with their work and their work 
environment that could, if not checked, escalate into destructive retaliatory 
action followed by resignation or dismissal.  Furthermore, an employer who 
displays little or no real concern for the grievances of their employees, or who 
disciplines or threatens to discipline its staff in a seemingly unfair manner, is 
unlikely to successfully nurture and preserve the feelings of trust and security 
that are necessary for the maintenance of a co-operative long term relationship 
of partnership between employers and employees.  And no employee is likely 
to go that extra mile for his or her employer if, for example, they have been 
subject to what they perceive as an unfair warning, or where their employer 
has failed to address their concerns that a colleague is behaving towards them 
in an inappropriate and de-motivating manner.  This is not the fair and 
efficient labour market the Labour Government hoped would take root in this 
country.  Of course the opposite is true and EDG may positively and 
significantly influence employee perceptions that their employer can be 
trusted and is fair not only in relation to grievances and disciplinary action but 
generally.  For example, an employee might feel aggrieved that they have not 
received what they consider is a fair pay rise and may, as a result, be inclined 
to retaliate by reducing their level of effort or by absenting themselves from 
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work without good reason.  But that reaction might be avoided if they are 
presented by the employer with a means to channel their grievance; to have it 
heard and considered in what they judge to be a fair way.  If that employee 
perceives they have been treated fairly in relation to their grievance it is 
predictable that they will feel more inclined generally to trust their employer 
to look after their long term interests and hence they are more likely to exhibit 
the sort of behaviour that we have discussed is necessary if the benefits of 
partnership are to be realised.    
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CHAPTER 4: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A SUCCESSFULL 
REGULATORY APPROACH TO EDG? 
 
The preceding analysis suggests that employees who perceive that their 
employer is fair are more likely to exhibit greater commitment to the 
employer‘s business, greater innovation and OCB, and less destructive and 
unproductive behaviour, than those who perceive their employer to be unfair.  
The impact of this phenomenon will be an increase in profitability and an 
overall appreciation in the level of competitiveness amongst British 
businesses.  But, we have argued, employers and employees cannot be left 
alone to realise these benefits and there is, therefore, a role for regulation in 
encouraging the parties towards the essential foundation of partnership and 
OCB – fairness, and more particularly fairness perceptions.  In this chapter we 
reconsider this argument in favour of regulation as the catalyst of fairness 
perceptions and express some initial thoughts about the essential elements of a 
regulatory model that might assist to achieve fairness at work, partnership and 
OCB.  First, however, we explore some of the barriers to, and necessary 
features of, fairness perceptions.    
 
4.1 EDG fairness perceptions and the conflict continuum 
 
This thesis focuses on the importance of EDG, or the way that employers and 
employees seek to deal with and resolve conflict, as a factor relevant to 
fairness perceptions.  And when we talk about EDG we are referring to it in 
the broadest sense.  We are not only referring to those apparently discrete 
instances where an employee formally raises a grievance with their employer 
under the terms of the employer‘s grievance procedure, or where an employer 
takes formal disciplinary action against an employee because that employee 
has committed what appears at first glance to be an isolated instance of 
misconduct.  To focus so narrowly on what some might consider are discrete 
EDG events is to miss the opportunity to understand the underlying causes of 
many of those events, which is vital if we are to understand how employers 
can set about maximising fairness perceptions on the part of their staff and 
thereby limit the negative effects of conflict.  In other words formal grievance 
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or disciplinary action may well have its roots in some previous decision that 
was subject to a negative fairness perception on the part of the employee (e.g. 
an employee is aggrieved about missing out on a promotion and performs 
poorly as a result) and which could have been avoided had that earlier decision 
been dealt with, if not substantively, then at least procedurally in a manner 
more likely to procure from the employee a judgement that they have been 
treated fairly.  If that had been achieved the chances of resolving the conflict 
or dispute before it was too late, and in a manner that may well have a positive 
bearing on the each party‘s perception of the other, is far greater than if the 
issue was left until it transitions to a later part of the conflict spectrum.  By 
that later stage the earlier perceptions of unfairness on the part of both parties 
are likely to have escalated such that there is no way back and in those 
circumstances the grievance or disciplinary process is simply delaying the 
inevitable and probably bitter termination of the employment relationship.   
 
So when we refer to EDG we are concerned not only with how the parties deal 
with those grievances and instances of disciplinary action that take place 
towards the end of the conflict spectrum, we are also talking about the earlier 
perceptions of unfairness that may have eventually led to the formal grievance 
or disciplinary action and how the parties to the employment relationship deal 
with those.   The importance of EDG to fairness perceptions is inescapable 
because, in large part, every perception of unfairness is a potential grievance 
or the early stages of conflict that may indeed escalate into something 
significantly more destructive and contrary to the wellbeing of the employer‘s 
business.   
 
All this is not to say that every formal grievance or disciplinary action 
originates from some earlier perception of unfairness that starts out small and 
evolves into an ever more serious negative and destructive sense of anger and 
resentment, because of course the reasons why employers take disciplinary 
action or employees perform poorly or commit misconduct are many and 
varied.  But even in relation to instances of misconduct for example that are 
discrete and uncharacteristic of the employee in question, and which do not 
have their origins in earlier perceptions of unfairness, the manner in which the 
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employer deals with those instances can influence the way employees perceive 
the employer which will impact on trust development in the mind of not only 
the employees in question, but their colleagues looking on, and which will 
have importance for the future performance of their employment relationship. 
In other words it is possible to view discrete instances of misconduct or poor 
performance and the manner in which they are dealt with as having the 
potential to sit at the beginning of a conflict spectrum which if dealt with in a 
manner perceived by the workforce to be fair are likely to bolster trust 
development, whereas if they are handled in manner considered to be unfair 
they are likely to engender the opposite reaction.  Such trust development is, 
as we have discussed, likely to establish a commitment on the part of the 
employee to their employer that will act as a bulwark against the possibility of 
future misconduct or poor behaviour, and that will encourage OCB and greater 
levels of productivity. 
 
This thesis proposes that a successful approach to EDG is one that is able to 
avoid these early perceptions of unfairness or, where that is not possible, has 
in place mechanisms that will prevent the judgements of unfairness evolving 
into something from which the employment relationship cannot recover.  As 
we have already explained, the positive side effect of such an approach to 
EDG is the bolstering of trust between employers and employees as both 
parties perceive the other‘s willingness to deal with their concerns in a fair 
manner.  This level of trust will encourage OCB and the forms of employee 
behaviour that Katz identified as essential for effective business, and which 
the former Government hoped would flow from partnerships and fairness at 
work.  The question then becomes how to achieve this?  What is apparent 
from the white paper Fairness at Work is that the Labour Government‘s 
preferred route to successful partnerships and fairness at work was a voluntary 
one: ―the Government believes that each business should choose the form of 
relationship that suits it best.‖161  This approach is not surprising because it 
goes without saying that the most effective forms of partnership will involve 
employers and their employees freely establishing through consultation and 
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experimentation, and with reflection upon the peculiarities of their particular 
workplace, mechanisms for resolving issues and disputes that are fair and that 
result in just outcomes which promote the kind of high trust that is so essential 
for successful partnerships.  This discussion must pause therefore to repeat the 
question that was posed in the first chapter: can employers and employees be 
left to adopt and achieve the model of EDG that we have just sketched, and 
which should limit conflict and maximise fairness perceptions, with little more 
than government encouragement and a message that such an approach to 
employment relations is the best way for a business to succeed?  
 
4.2 The likelihood of voluntary fairness perception maximisation 
 
We previously argued that it is difficult to be optimistic about the chances of a 
positive answer to the question of whether a conflict reducing partnership 
model is possible.  This is the argument adopted by this thesis because putting 
in place the EDG mechanisms necessary to enhance fairness perceptions and 
reduce protracted and destructive conflict, and then to effectively and 
genuinely implement those mechanisms, requires a belief on the part of both 
parties to the employment relation that such a change is worthwhile and in 
their respective best interests.  Essential to achieving that belief is an internal 
acknowledgement by each party that the other is as committed to the success 
of the system as they are.  Once the system is up and running effectively the 
ideal is that its success will perpetuate its increasing acceptance on the part of 
both parties.  In other words, the longer the partnership model of EDG is in 
place, the more it will result in employees having their concerns dealt with in 
what they perceive is a fair way, and this in turn will leave the employer with 
an increasingly productive workforce, and the early scepticism about the 
system will gradually subside.  But the initial hurdle of overcoming that early 
scepticism and lack of trust in the worth of the system, and the other party‘s 
willingness to genuinely adopt and implement it, is substantial for a number of 
reasons.  We have already discussed those reasons in some detail, but it is 
worth summarising them at this point.   
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First, any attempt to put in place and adhere to those measures which 
characterise the previous Government‘s approach to partnership, requires a 
leap of faith on the part of employers and employees.  This is partly ―because 
the benefits of co-operation are unlikely to accrue immediately‖162 and, in-
fact, they may never accrue given the fluctuating fortunes of businesses in the 
modern market place. Secondly, a lack of immediate benefit may reflect in 
part the employee‘s unease about committing, initially at least, to the flexible 
and innovative forms of work behaviour that the employer will expect as its 
reward for adopting a partnership approach to EDG.  Thirdly, the high levels 
of trust that are necessary to support partnership at work and OCB are unlikely 
to exist at the outset in a workplace in which the concept of partnership is 
something entirely foreign. Fourthly, the likelihood of employees freely 
responding to efforts by the employer to maximise fairness perceptions in the 
early stages in the way predicted by the partnership approach is uncertain and 
perhaps unlikely due to other features of the modern labour market.  These 
features might be construed as challenging the credibility of any promise that 
an employee‘s commitment to the partnership approach will benefit them in 
the long run.  They include the decline of internal labour markets; the increase 
in outsourcing; the ―casualisation‖ of employment; and the growth in the less 
secure or ―peripheral‖ workforce.163  Fifthly, the extent to which achieving the 
high levels of trust necessary for the attainment of successful partnerships is 
inhibited by the authoritarian nature of the traditional employment relationship 
and the role of disciplinary sanctions as a cornerstone of that relationship.  
Finally, the road to partnership is made rockier still given that the reluctance to 
trust is not unique to employees; many managers view their staff as inherently 
untrustworthy and many managers are, as a result of this lack of trust, 
unwilling ―to shift from traditional forms of work organisation‖164.   
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It is interesting to speculate about the current sources of this mistrust between 
employers and employees which are no doubt many and varied from 
workplace to workplace.  A possible source of mistrust may be certain 
individual employment rights, such as the law of Unfair Dismissal, which does 
more to encourage legal posturing between the parties which in turn promotes 
animosity on the part of the employer in particular who believes that their 
―right‖ to control their business and to direct labour as it sees fit is undermined 
by the following antagonistic threat: ―if you dismiss me I‘ll sue you‖.  The 
employer who is confronted with that threat (particularly where they consider 
it to be spuriously made) is likely to feel resentful towards the staff making the 
threat and that may in turn impact on their feeling and suspicion about the 
motives and trustworthiness of their staff in general.   
 
In addition to the 6 impediments to partnership listed above, it is worth 
making the point again that to realise the economic benefits of partnership and 
OCB, employers must increase the likelihood of their workforces perceiving 
them as fair.  Of course it is unlikely, if not impossible, to predict that an 
employer can achieve fairness perceptions amongst all employees in relation 
to all things, because in the end what is and is not considered fair will vary 
greatly between individuals.  An employer cannot be expected to realise the 
cornucopia of expectations held by its entire workforce.  This is so given that, 
in particular, the employer cannot be held responsible for perceptions of 
unfairness formed on the part of individuals when those perceptions are, by 
any reasonable standard, unfair or unrealistic, but nevertheless entrenched and 
unwavering in the mind of the employee.  What the employer can realistically 
hope to achieve is a maximisation of fairness perceptions amongst as many of 
its workforce as possible and in relation to as much as possible, be that issues 
of pay, promotion, benefits, the list goes on.  But how does the employer set 
about this task?   
 
4.3 A role for regulation of EDG in maximising fairness perceptions?  
 
This thesis poses the question phrased in the first chapter: can employers and 
employees be effectively encouraged to adopt and achieve a model of 
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successful partnerships by little more than government encouragement, and a 
message that such an approach to employment relations is the best way for a 
business to succeed?  The answer is probably no.  To repeat the point made 
earlier in this thesis: it is highly unlikely that employers and employees, who 
have traditionally come together in a low trust relationship of subordination, 
will suddenly, freely, effectively and without exception grasp and run with the 
previous Government‘s concept of partnership, particularly in relation to 
EDG.  Such a change would involve a dramatic shift in the culture of many if 
not most workplaces.  What is more, the empirical evidence suggests that even 
in workplaces that purport to favour a partnership approach to employment 
relations, there is a reluctance on the part of those employers to put in place 
rules and practices that provide mutual gains for employees and employers 
and that generate the high levels of trust necessary for a business to maximise 
the benefits that might be achieved by partnership at work.
165
  This suggests a 
role for regulation in the drive for successful partnerships based on high trust 
relations between employers and employees.  But can regulation help in this 
regard and if it can, and specifically in relation to EDG, what type of 
regulation is most likely to achieve that goal?   
 
4.3.1 Changing the focus of labour law 
 
A common and long standing view of the relationship between labour and 
capital and the role of labour regulation was famously described by Kahn-
Freund in Labour and the Law.  He viewed that relationship as: 
 
… an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the 
submission and the subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal 
mind known as the ‗contract of employment‘.  The main object of labour law has always been, 
and we venture to say will always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality 
of bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment 
relationship.
166
  
       
Since Kahn-Freund‘s seminal work, labour law has evolved as a vast array of 
laws and labour standards that provide a host of collective and individual 
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rights and obligations for employers and employees.  But despite the changing 
and varied face of labour law, the justification for much of its content has 
remained the same.  Labour lawyers have continued to argue that law is 
needed to protect workers from the potential for exploitation and mistreatment 
at the hands of the unscrupulous employer.  In this way lawyers have side-
stepped arguments that such regulation imposes unnecessary costs on 
employers and creates rigidities in the labour market, by pointing to certain 
distributive concerns that labour law is said to address and that are perceived 
as fundamentally worthwhile ends in themselves without reference to broader 
economic factors.
167
  This view of labour law understands that the law‘s 
primary function is to shift wealth and power within companies and other 
employers by providing workers with certain rights and influence over the 
decisions of management.  Those rights include the right to partake in 
collective bargaining, the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds 
of sex or race, the right not to be unfairly dismissed and other employee 
protection regulation.   
 
But the primary concern of this thesis is to find a model for the regulation of 
EDG in particular that is likely to promote fairness perceptions leading to 
partnership and OCB.  The end goal of this regulation is to achieve greater 
productivity and business competitiveness; it will not view employee 
protection, or balancing economic power in the employment relationship, as 
its primary objective.  Which is not to say that this thesis and the regulatory 
model eventually proposed will not see any value in law that protects and 
promotes workers rights, and that creates institutions for the purpose of 
policing and facilitating the enforcement of those rights: it does, but for 
different reasons than those traditionally expressed.  The position adopted by 
this thesis is that regulation, which protects and promotes certain rights for 
workers, and which in turn helps the evolution of fair and efficient workplaces 
and high levels of fairness perceptions, can have the effect of improving the 
competitiveness of business and it is on this basis that such regulation should 
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be justified.  In other words, employment protection regulation, for example, 
can be justified on the basis that it supports realisation of the overriding policy 
objective of greater competiveness; it is not developed on the basis that 
employment protection is, by itself, the regulatory end goal.   
 
This change in emphasis from regulation for certain egalitarian purposes, to 
regulation for the object of improving competitiveness through partnerships at 
work, was and is significant.  It creates a new regulatory compass that points 
lawmakers in the area of labour law towards setting aside or amending certain 
individual or collective rights or long established mechanisms and institutions 
devised to protect those rights because, in the end, those rights and institutions 
are considered to be detrimental to, or incompatible with, the greater good of 
enhanced competitiveness through fairness at work and partnerhsips.  This 
approach has significant potential implications for the regulation of EDG that 
we shall explore in later chapters.  But it is first worth considering some of the 
characteristics that the new regulatory model is likely to require.    
 
4.3.2 Outlining the characteristics of the new regulatory model – reflexive 
self-regulation and other factors 
 
Effective regulation of EDG that aims to maximise fairness perceptions is 
more than just the enactment of standards or processes aimed at achieving or 
assisting the policy objective of creating and preserving partnerships at work.  
That regulation must also be concerned with changing the behaviour of 
employees and employers such that they act in conformity with the legal 
framework established to support the policy objective.  This is a difficult task 
no matter what the objective, but it is particular challenging in the context of 
regulating for partnerships.  Where a statutory right or obligation is aimed at 
protecting employees against nothing more than an employer‘s abuse of 
managerial power, compliance with that obligation might be achieved by 
providing the employee whose rights have been violated with a significant 
level of compensation.  In those circumstances compliance may be 
accomplished because the cost to the employer of non-compliance, and the 
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incentive for the employee to bring a claim, are both substantial.
168
  In the 
context of laws aimed at preserving and promoting partnership, however, that 
formula is unlikely to succeed in achieving the policy objective.  That is 
because the use or the threat of legal sanctions as the primary means of 
deterring or preventing the abuse of managerial power is incompatible with 
the attainment of high levels of trust between employers and employees and 
the level of cooperation that is necessary for successful partnerships.   
 
The role of the law in the context of regulating EDG for partnership is a subtle 
one; it is to reduce the likelihood or unnecessary escalation of trust damaging 
conflict, and the creation of a regulatory framework which at the same time 
protects and promotes a working environment that is favourable to the 
emergence of high trust relations.
169
  To achieve this, the law relating to EDG 
(particularly the law of Unfair Dismissal) must move away from its current 
focus on attributing blame after the relationship has broken down and 
providing compensation for any failure on the part of the employer to comply 
with its legal obligations.  More consistent with the objective of partnership 
are standards or rules that focus on preventing certain forms of relationship 
damaging behaviour and that encourage the parties to preserve their 
relationship where that is possible.  Laws that create incentives to enforce 
rights after the event through the use of adversarial institutions, without 
mandating some prior form of internal resolution or, more to the point, dispute 
prevention, promote the type of relationship of conflict that is anathema to the 
concept of partnership and the maximisation of fairness perceptions.  Legal 
regulation of EDG for fairness requires a legislative framework which 
recognises and promotes, amongst other things, those factors that we set out in 
the previous chapter as being the essential elements of fairness judgements.  
Those elements include: a willingness on the part of employers and employees 
to raise their concerns early and a mechanism that allows that to happen; a 
recognition of the role of procedural and interactional fairness in maximising 
fairness perceptions; and the free and accurate flow of information about 
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rights and obligations in relation to EDG.  The regulation of EDG in this 
context should also overtly acknowledge that the implementation and 
enforcement of the law will take into account the gains that employers expect 
to achieve by adhering to, in good faith, the partnership driven legal 
framework. 
 
This regulatory focus of this thesis on enhancing business competitiveness is 
significant because, as discussed above, it reminds us that fairness and 
partnership are not policy ends, but simply means to an end.  Therefore, while 
some form of regulation may well create circumstances that appear to 
encourage partnership, that regulation cannot be enacted or implemented if the 
cost to the employer or the economy of its implementation is such that the 
regulation blunts the competitive edge it is intended to enhance.  That is not to 
say that regulation must avoid costs to the employer or the state; in the end the 
regulator will be concerned about creating efficient rules and processes that 
balance the costs of regulation against its potential benefits.  Let us take an 
example to make that point.  It may be possible to eliminate all unfair 
dismissals by requiring each employer to pay for the services of an 
employment judge to determine whether or not the employer is legally entitled 
to dismiss an employee before the dismissal takes place.  That mechanism 
might eliminate all unfair dismissals and it may well support partnership at 
work by providing employees with a real sense that their employer will not 
arbitrarily and unreasonably terminate their employment, but this possible 
benefit will be outweighed by the substantial cost to employers of complying 
with such a process. 
 
It is also fair to say that successful partnerships will not be preserved and 
promoted by coercive regulation of EDG which takes little account of the 
peculiarities of particular workplaces and each instance of EDG, including the 
personalities involved.
170
  Such regulation is likely to breed resentment 
between the parties and, even worse, a resistance to the type of co-operative 
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relations envisaged by the partnership model.  Partnership is more likely to be 
assisted by a legal framework that promotes or at least reflects a culture in 
which the parties are encouraged to resolve their problems themselves and to 
set their own standards and methods within certain broad boundaries 
established by law.  This might be achieved in part at least by the enactment of 
certain minimum standards of behaviour on which more detailed and reflexive 
forms of self-regulation can be constructed by the parties themselves.  This is 
particularly relevant in the context of an attempt to maximise fairness 
perceptions given that what is considered fair treatment will vary greatly from 
workplace to workplace and from individual to individual.  Because that is the 
case it is impossible and unhelpful for the law to set anything but a general 
and imprecise substantive standard of conduct in any given instance of conflict 
or potential conflict between the parties.  Any attempt by the regulator to do 
otherwise is likely to impose burdens on both parties that are inconsistent with 
their particularly expectations and objectives and which are therefore likely to 
be ignored or avoided where possible.  Such regulation is unlikely to do much 
for the maximisation of fairness perceptions.    
 
Perhaps the most common form of state supported or induced self regulation 
of the employment relationship is procedural regulation by which the state 
compels or entices the parties to resolve those issues that exist between them 
by negotiation.  This form of regulation involves the state setting certain 
procedural ground-rules that govern the general nature, and in some cases 
content, of the negotiations, but which refrain from imposing substantive 
outcomes on the negotiating parties.
171
  Collective bargaining between trade 
unions and employers is one example of this form of regulation.  The law sets 
out certain processes and conditions concerning how and sometimes when 
collective bargaining should take place and leaves the parties to bargain over 
certain issues and to resolve those issues as they see fit.  The law has no say in 
the outcome of those negotiations, but will intervene if asked to by one party 
claiming a failure on the part of the other to comply with their procedural 
obligations. The emphasis of this form of regulation is on process rather than 
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substance because, as Collins argues, ―it is expected that conformity to the 
procedure is likely to produce outcomes that correspond more closely to the 
desired standard than any attempt to enforce rigid substantive standards‖172.   
 
The standard sought in the present context is co-operative partnerships 
between employers and their staff.  But as we have suggested, there are certain 
problems with this form of self-regulation.  To begin with, insofar as this 
regulation requires the involvement of a trade union or other employee 
representative body, the fact that trade union membership is currently very low 
means that collective representation is likely to be difficult for employees to 
achieve and as a result they will be left to negotiate (or not to negotiate as the 
case may be) directly with their economically more powerful employer.  The 
reality is that in such circumstances employers will tend to impose terms on 
employees who are unlikely to resist such imposition.  As a consequence, any 
outcome, say for example in relation to procedures for resolving EDG issues, 
will only support the concept of partnership to the extent that the employer is 
prepared to self-impose terms that may not always seem in their best interests, 
and to comply with those terms in good faith and in such a way that its 
employees believe the employer‘s commitment to the fair treatment of its staff 
is real and constant.  This suggests perhaps the need for some form of 
representative body to plug the gap created by Britain‘s relatively low level of 
union membership.  In the context of EDG, the representative body could be 
involved not only in the negotiation of the processes and substantive standards 
by which issues relating to EDG are resolved, it could also participate in the 
actual resolution of individual cases.  Whatever the approach adopted, the 
central object is not the achievement of an agreement on certain processes and 
standards about fair and reasonable ways to deal with EDG, the central 
concern is on reaching agreement and implementing that agreement in a way 
that supports the goal of partnership at work.  As we have already suggested, 
that goal is likely to be realised only if employees believe that they will be 
treated fairly and reasonably in relation to EDG and employers are convinced, 
as a consequence of any agreed standards and processes for resolving EDG 
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issues, that such processes and standards are more than just an additional cost 
for them to bear, but are a worthwhile goal of their business to which they are 
committed.    
 
Further, the law should act as a backstop or a stick, creating a strong sanction 
available to the parties where internal resolution has been tried, but without 
success because one party has not complied with the established internal 
processes and standards.  In other words, the sanction will only be available to 
either party where the internal processes have failed.  This is logical because 
by that time the hope of preserving a relationship of partnerships between 
those involved in the dispute will almost certainly have given way to other 
concerns.
173
  Those other concerns are probably related less to the particular 
dispute than they are to maintaining the future effectiveness of the legal 
backstop.  Ongoing co-operative relations are unlikely to be preserved unless 
the employer continues to be in a position to make credible promises to its 
employees regarding, for example, fair treatment and a commitment to refrain 
from unfairly disciplining its staff.  Those promises are less credible where the 
employees perceive from their understanding of previous cases that the 
employer can disregard their legal obligations with relative impunity.  The 
strong sanction acts as an incentive for the employer to comply with the 
internal processes and standards.  This method of regulation may also act as an 
incentive to employees to raise their concerns directly with their employer, 
because they know that they will have no recourse to external processes unless 
they first seek resolution through those mechanisms set up internally to deal 
with such issues.  An optimistic view of such regulation is that the more 
employers and employees resolve disputes without reference to the Courts and 
the employment tribunals, the more they will come to recognise the value 
attached to such behaviour and the less likely they will be to resort to more 
conflict based, adversarial and trust destroying forms of dispute resolution.   
 
One further point concerns the credibility of the internal processes.  It is not 
enough to mandate by regulation that an employer must put in place processes 
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to deal with disciplinary issues or employee grievances.  Such self regulation 
is likely to lack credibility in the eyes of the employees who seek to rely upon 
it or against whom it is enforced.  As we have explained, any external 
regulation that establish a general framework for the establishment of certain 
EDG processes and standards, will inevitably and desirably leave considerable 
scope for the parties to the employment relation to implement standards and 
procedures that best reflect their particular workplace.  But if those workplace 
specific rules are compiled by the employer alone they are likely to represent 
the employer‘s interests and perhaps, at best, an assumption on the part of the 
employer concerning the interests of their employees.  The result is unlikely to 
be a perception on the part of employees that those rules represent the route to 
fair treatment.  Even where by any reasonable standard certain rules imposed 
more or less unilaterally by the employer are, objectively speaking, fair, they 
are nonetheless likely to be considered unfair by employees because they are 
likely to be seen by employees as lacking legitimacy.   
 
More likely to succeed in maximising fairness perceptions are rules that are 
compiled with real employee input, and that are implemented and monitored 
for compliance by employees and employers.  Employees are less likely to 
question the legitimacy and therefore the fairness of regulations which they 
helped prepare.  That is so partly because the very process of genuinely 
involving employees in the preparation and implementation of these processes 
is likely to elicit feelings of fairness and trust towards the employer such that 
the employees are already inclined to find that the rules are fair.  And then 
there is the point that if the rules and their implementation are to a significant 
degree sanctioned by employees they are more likely to be viewed as fair by 
most of the workforce and it might be considered less likely, where an 
employee makes use of an internal process the outcome of which is 
unfavourable, for that employee to judge that the process is unfair if in fact he 
was instrumental in the establishment of that process.  And even if an 
individual employee does feel aggrieved by the process as it has been applied 
to them on this occasion one can speculate that any action they might take 
against the employer in response to that outcome is not likely to be supported 
by other employees who will not perceive the employer to have been unfair.  
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The complainant‘s colleagues are more likely to take the view that: ―the 
employer has done everything we agreed they had to do and that is all we can 
ask of them‖.  So while the internally agreed processes and standards may 
have in this instance raised the ire of one employee, the damage to the general 
perception of the employer as fair is unlikely to be effected and therefore the 
overall negative impact on employee behaviour and workplace motivation is 
unlikely to be significant.  More than that, the general view that the employer 
has been fair in their dealing with the complainant may eventually bring that 
employee into line with the general consensus.  That is because in those 
circumstances the complainant employee may be considered by his fellow 
employees as the unfair party to the conflict because he is refusing to accept 
the legitimacy and fairness of the process that he and they agreed was fair.  
The reactions of his colleagues may be to sideline that employee or ostracise 
him from the group of employees until he accepts the outcome of the agreed 
process. 
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CHAPTER 5:  DOES THE LAW OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL AID 
FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS? 
 
Having made these general comments about the shape regulation of EDG to 
maximise fairness perceptions might take, we turn now to consider whether or 
to what extent current regulation of EDG matches this analysis.  In other 
words, is the current regulation of EDG promoting fair treatment at work and 
thereby increasing the likelihood of fairness judgement and the 
competitiveness enhancing benefits that flow from that regulation?  In this 
chapter we focus on the law of Unfair Dismissal and we refer to the equivalent 
law in New Zealand because it is, perhaps more so than any other common 
law jurisdiction, similar enough to the English regulation to make it a valuable 
source of comparison.  The first conclusion we come to is that the current 
application of the law of Unfair Dismissal is unlikely to support the goal of 
fairness perceptions and OCB.  For reasons that we will explore, the tribunals 
have failed to take a holistic view of fairness, preferring instead to focus on 
procedural fairness and effectively leaving to one side considerations of 
distributive and interactional justice.  This is unsatisfactory if the regulatory 
objective is greater fairness perceptions because, as we have discussed, 
employee fairness judgements involve a variable mix of employee 
assessments about substantive and procedural fairness.  The second main point 
made in this chapter is that it may be possible to draft legislation which 
instructs the tribunals to focus holistically and more robustly on all aspects of 
fairness (i.e. procedural, distributive and interactional), but it may not be 
possible for the tribunals or the parties themselves to effectively translate that 
instruction into decisions and actions that are likely to lead to a greater level of 
fairness perceptions.     
 
Further, it is argued that a weakness of the current law of Unfair Dismissal as 
a means of maximising fairness perceptions goes beyond the challenges 
associated with substantive and procedural fairness judgements.  This is 
apparent when we recall that the conflict continuum, which predicts that a 
significant proportion of disciplinary action, including dismissal, sits at the 
end of the continuum, but is rooted in earlier unresolved perceptions of 
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unfairness that the employee has internalised or responded to by retaliation 
and which has led to, for example, a dip in performance or some form of 
misconduct.  The dip in performance or misconduct may have been the direct 
and immediate cause of the dismissal, but its genesis is far more complex.  If 
we accept this we must recognise that the law of Unfair Dismissal is too 
focused at the end of the conflict spectrum to have any real chance of 
minimising conflict and maximising employee judgements that the employer 
is fair and trustworthy.  The law of Unfair Dismissal is framed in a way that 
turns the employer‘s attention to the issue of process in particular when they 
are considering disciplinary sanctions and the possibility of dismissal and not 
before, but by that stage the attitudes of the parties towards each other have 
almost certainly deteriorated such that the likelihood of re-establishing mutual 
trust is limited.   
 
5.1 The law of Unfair Dismissal: substantive fairness and the „range of 
reasonable responses‟ test 
 
The protection against Unfair Dismissal is contained in Part X of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996).  Section 94 of that Act states 
simply that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his 
employer, while section 98 goes on to provide the employment tribunals with 
a degree of guidance about the factors relevant to determining whether a 
dismissal is fair or unfair.  Specifically, section 98 establishes a framework for 
the tribunal‘s decision that defines three steps for the fairness enquiry to 
follow.  First, the employer must show that the reason given for the dismissal 
is the principal reason for the dismissal.  Secondly, the employer must 
demonstrate that the reason they relied on for dismissal was a substantial 
reason.  The statute sets out examples of what amounts to a substantial reasons 
which include, for our purposes, capability, qualifications and misconduct, 
although a substantial reason does not have to be one of those reasons 
specifically contained in section 98.
174
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5.1.1 The range of reasonable responses test: a barrier to fairness 
perceptions 
 
Finally, and perhaps the most contentious of the three steps in the fairness 
enquiry, is the requirement that the employment tribunal consider whether the 
dismissal for the established substantial reason, was reasonable or 
unreasonable in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the 
case.
175
  In applying this third step it is vital to recognise that the employment 
tribunals have refrained from the imposition of precise standards of behaviour 
upon employers.  Tribunals have instead chosen to respect the autonomy of 
managerial disciplinary decisions by recognising a discretion within which the 
employer can act without detailed supervision.  This approach is commonly 
referred to as the range or band of reasonable responses test which was 
famously articulated by Browne-Wilkinson J (as he was) in Iceland Frozen 
Foods Ltd v Jones
176
: 
 
We consider that the authorities establish that in law the correct approach for the industrial 
tribunal to adopt in answer to the question posed [(ie whether the decision to dismiss was 
reasonable or unreasonable)] is as follows: (1) the starting point should always be the words of 
section [98(4)] themselves; (2) in applying the section an industrial tribunal must consider the 
reasonableness of the employer‘s conduct, not simply whether they (the members of the 
industrial tribunal) consider the dismissal to be fair; (3) in judging the reasonableness of the 
employer‘s conduct an industrial tribunal must not substitute its decision as to what was the 
right course to adopt for that of the employer; (4) in many, though not all, cases there is a band 
of reasonable responses to the employer‘s conduct within which one employer might 
reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably take another; (5) the function of the 
industrial tribunals, as an industrial jury, is to determine whether in the particular 
circumstances of each case the decision to dismiss the employee fell within the band of 
reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might have adopted.  If the dismissal falls 
within the band the dismissal is fair: if the dismissal falls outside the band it is unfair. 
 
The range of reasonable responses test suggests that there is very little scope 
for employment tribunals to challenge or find fault with the substantive 
justification that an employer presents for their decision to dismiss.  In short, 
the tribunals are instructed to consider not whether the dismissal was fair, but 
to ask whether dismissal was an action that some reasonable employers would 
have taken.  A dismissal should only be viewed as unfair if no reasonable 
employer would have dismissed the employee in the circumstances.  As 
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Collins explains, ―[i]n effect, the tribunal has to find that the employer acted 
perversely, arbitrarily, capriciously, or in some other way outside the broad 
band of discretion left to them‖177 before they will find that the dismissal is 
unfair.   
 
There are a number of possible explanations for the tribunals‘ and Courts‘ 
insistence on this abstentionist approach to the legislation and their reluctance 
to interfere with management decisions to dismiss.  One view is that any other 
approach would lead to an escalation in the number of unfair dismissal claims 
such that the cost of maintaining a tribunal system able to cater for such a case 
load would be prohibitively expensive.  However, Collins suggests that 
underlying the range of reasonable responses test is reluctance on the part of 
judges brought up in the common law tradition to depart from three perceived 
virtues of the common law: respect for the autonomy of the private sphere; 
neutrality between conflicting interests; equality of treatment of the parties.
178
  
As Collins explains: 
 
The legislation demands an investigation of the propriety of the exercise of managerial 
discretion, hitherto a largely unregulated sphere of private autonomy.  It requires the Courts to 
favour the interests of employees in job security, thereby abandoning the legitimizing stance 
of neutrality between capital and labour.  Finally, the formal legal equality is shattered, for 
whilst employees remain free to terminate the employment relation for any reason abruptly, 
the employer has to follow certain procedures and give certain reasons for dismissals.
179
  
 
It may also be the case that tribunals prefer the range of reasonable responses 
test because they are reluctant to become involved in managerial decisions 
which are made based on a particular expertise and understanding of the 
employer‘s workplace, the industry in which they work, the personalities 
involved and other information which the tribunal does not feel best placed to 
judge.  In that situation the tribunal may feel that they are simply not in a 
position to make a better decision than the employer.   
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Whatever the reason behind the range of reasonable responses test, its 
significance in the context of the current discussion concerning fairness 
perceptions, is that it treads destructively upon what we might consider is the 
potential of the current Unfair Dismissal legislation to promote fairness at 
work.  As we have explained, employee perceptions that their employers are 
fair will help to create trust and bonds of loyalty that are likely to motivate 
employees towards OCB and innovative performance.  This was the view 
adopted by Alan Fox who argued that employees are motivated to work at or 
near their best in a high trust environment.
180
  If employees feel the employer 
trusts them to do a good job, they will repay that trust by working hard and 
doing their best for the firm.  The employer can go some way to creating a 
high trust environment by, amongst other things, avoiding circumstances 
which cause the employee to feel constantly under the threat of dismissal, 
because any working environment in which the employee feels insecure will 
only encourage employees to do the minimum required of them and to 
shirk.
181
   
 
But as we have discussed that threat of dismissal sits close to the surface of 
many employment relationships as employers use the threat of disciplinary 
sanctions as one means of maintaining the authority structure which most 
employers believe is an essential characteristic of the employment relation.  
That being the case it is arguable that some form of regulatory control over the 
employer‘s power to dismiss will alleviate employee feelings of insecurity and 
help create an environment in which loyalty and productivity are more likely 
to flourish.  But of course it is not enough that the legal prohibition against 
Unfair Dismissal simply exist for it to have this positive effect on employee 
performance.  If the law of Unfair Dismissal is to help maximise fairness 
perceptions and feelings of trust it must affect employer behaviour in relation 
to dismissal such that, because of the law, the employer acts in manner that 
employees consider fair.  In a similar vein, the law of Unfair Dismissal may 
also assist in the evolution of a high trust working environment by bolstering 
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the credibility of employer promises of future benefits or rewards and 
reducing the likelihood of certain unfair and trust destroying opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of the employer.  For example, an employer may 
promise an employee a bonus if they manage to reach a certain sales target.  
The employee is motivated to work to achieve that target because he feels the 
target is fair and the bonus worthwhile, but the employer can make a short-
term cost saving by dismissing the worker before he becomes entitled to the 
bonus.
182
  Such action by the employer will be potentially devastating to any 
trust that the employer has built up amongst its employees.  A law against 
Unfair Dismissal can avoid this outcome, and help convince workers that 
when their employer promises them something, it will not easily be able to 
avoid the short term costs of that promise by using its power of dismissal, 
because should it attempt to renege on the promise made, it will become 
subject to legal sanctions.   
 
But any optimism about the ability of the law of Unfair Dismissal to maximise 
fairness perceptions by encouraging fair behaviour in relation to disciplinary 
action, and adding credibility to certain employer promises, is heavily diluted 
if not washed away by the range of reasonable responses test.  By sanctioning 
only the worst kinds of dismissal it is inevitable that a large proportion of 
dismissals determined to be within the range of reasonable responses test are 
nevertheless viewed by the reasonable employee as being harsh and unfair.  
For some employees this sends a negative message that the law is prepared to 
permit unfair treatment.  This does little to bolster the credibility of employer 
promises, promote trust and reduce the likelihood of opportunistic employer 
behaviour.  Furthermore, the range of reasonable responses test does not 
encourage fair behaviour by employers, rather it discourages the most 
arbitrary and capricious disciplinary practices which will at best have a neutral 
impact on fairness perceptions.   
 
The range of reasonable responses test also reduces or eliminates the ability of 
the law to minimise the likelihood of an employer dismissing an employee 
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who had hitherto been productive and committed to OCB for an isolated 
incident of, for example, misconduct.  Such a dismissal may have a negative 
impact on business competitiveness.  To start with, the employer is likely to 
have invested time and resources in training the dismissed employee that will 
be lost when the employee departs, and duplicated upon the arrival of their 
replacement.  But more than that, an effective and competitive business that 
has managed to motivate its employees (including the dismissed employee) to 
work innovatively and hard, will lose the benefits that flow from such 
employee performance in terms of greater productivity and profitability and, 
what is more, they may lose them to a competitor. That commitment to OCB 
may not be duplicated in the performance of the replacement worker, or if it is, 
it is unlikely to re-occur immediately.  At best it will take time for the new 
employee to develop the necessary commitment to the employer‘s business 
that was exhibited by the departed employee.  That commitment may evolve, 
but only once the new employee has had the opportunity to make certain 
judgements about their treatment by the employer and other factors.   
 
In addition, the range of reasonable responses test reduces the opportunity for 
the law of Unfair Dismissal to set in motion a chain of fairness perceptions, of 
the kind discussed in the previous chapter, which can have a positive impact 
on employee performance.  For example, the test does not include any 
assessment of the proportionality of the dismissal.  Tribunals are directed to 
refrain from precise calibrations of the proportionality of the punishment of 
the employee‘s disciplinary offence.  The reason for this is of course that such 
an assessment would involve the tribunal substituting their own judgement for 
that of the employer.  But a test of proportionality may not only reduce the 
number of harsh dismissals, it may force employers to reassess the worth of 
dismissals over other forms of remedial action, which may in turn have a 
positive bearing on fairness perceptions.  Consider for instance an employee 
who has committed some isolated incident of misconduct, such as failing to 
turn up to a client meeting, with the result that the client complains to the 
employer‘s Managing Director and the employer losses one order of work.  
The employee in question has a long and successful service record with the 
employer, he is one of the employer‘s top sales people and he has an 
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unblemished disciplinary record.  Furthermore, the impact on the employer‘s 
business is not significant; while the client complains, it does not withdraw its 
business altogether.  The employee is upset and disappointed with themselves 
and concerned that they may lose their job and the employer is angry and 
minded to dismiss the employee.  An application of the range of reasonable 
responses test to this set of facts may lead the employer to conclude that 
dismissal in these circumstances is fair and warranted and a tribunal may 
support that assessment.  But if the employer is required to step back and 
consider whether dismissal is a proportionate response to the employee‘s 
offence, taking into account the employee‘s service record and sales success, 
and the damage done to the employer‘s business by the employee‘s actions, 
the employer may be forced to conclude that dismissal is not the right option.  
The willingness of the employer in this example to refrain from dismissal may 
have a positive impact on the employee.  He may feel that the employer has 
been fair with him in circumstances where even the employee himself may 
have considered dismissal to be justified or at least a real possibility.  That 
being so the employee may respond to their reprieve by increasing their level 
of effort and productivity.  In addition the employer‘s actions may be 
favourably looked upon by the employee‘s colleagues and the employer has in 
the end managed to retain a productive and profitable employee.  The equation 
in this example is simple: had the employer chosen to dismiss this employee 
they would have gained nothing, but they would have lost a valuable human 
resource.   
 
The range of reasonable responses test reduces the likelihood of fairness 
perceptions in relation to dismissals or possible dismissals further still given 
that it permits employers to dismiss employees whom they merely suspect are 
guilty of some form of misconduct, even though the evidence does not 
demonstrate guilt on the balance of probabilities, let alone any higher 
standard, such as beyond reasonable doubt.  Provided the employer has carried 
out some form of investigation, the tribunal is unlikely to overturn the 
employer‘s decision that the suspicion of misconduct is enough to warrant 
dismissal, because doing so would amount to the tribunal substituting its 
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judgement for that of the employer.  A well known case will suffice to 
illustrate this approach.   
 
In HSBC v Madden
183
 the employee, Mr Madden, had been employed by the 
Bank from 1986 to the time of his dismissal in 1997.  During that time up until 
the circumstances that led to his dismissal he was regarded by the employer as 
a good and trustworthy employee.  Prior to Mr Madden‘s dismissal three of 
the employer‘s customer‘s had their debit cards stolen after they had been 
dispatched for collection by them from their respective branches.  The cards 
were used to obtain goods by deception.  Around the same time bank 
computer records showed that someone had made unauthorised inquiries 
through the bank‘s internal computer system as to the status of each of the 
three customers‘ accounts to which the debit cards related.  Mr Madden 
happened to be in the relevant branches when the cards might have been stolen 
and he was the only member of the employer‘s staff who was at the respective 
branches when all three inquiries were made using the employer‘s internal 
computer system.  Based on this set of circumstances, and despite Mr 
Madden‘s denials that he had anything to do with the theft of the cards and the 
refusal of the police to press charges against him, he was summarily dismissed 
for gross misconduct.  The tribunal found that the dismissal was unfair based 
in essence on the inadequacy of the evidence on which the decision to dismiss 
was based, including: that there was no clear culprit for the theft of the cards; 
there was no firm evidence as to when the cards were taken; there was no 
direct evidence that Mr Madden had accessed the computer system; there was 
no consideration of the personal or financial affairs of other members of staff; 
that Mr Madden was in a good financial position and why would he jeopardise 
his career for such a paltry sum; and so on.  The Court of Appeal rejected the 
tribunal‘s finding and approach criticising it for substituting its judgement of 
the evidence for that of the employer.  The result was that the dismissal was 
judged to be fair because, in effect, the bank had not found anyone other than 
Mr Madden who had the opportunity to commit the offence.   
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But such an approach can do little to promote fairness perceptions amongst 
employees whose feelings of insecurity and therefore reluctance to commit to 
OCB and other ‗beyond contract‘ performance is only likely to be reinforced 
by such employer action.  The aim of the employer seeking to maximise 
fairness perceptions must be to get right judgements about whether 
misconduct occurred, before deciding to dismiss, and the only way to do that 
is to base that decision on solid evidential foundations.  A willingness to 
dismiss on sketchy or purely circumstantial evidence, will do nothing for the 
development of trust and loyalty amongst employees, and who is likely to 
commit to OCB for an employer who might terminate your employment on 
the basis of a suspicion?  In a sense, the law of Unfair Dismissal may be 
adding to a feeling of mistrust and unfairness amongst employees by building 
up their expectations of protection under the law only to have them dashed 
when they see those protections so easily avoided by the employer.  In those 
circumstances employees are likely to feel even less inclined to trust the 
employer and to work hard for the good of the business, and in fact this 
scenario may be considered as a force perpetuating the low trust relationship 
that Fox identified as characteristic of the employment relation.   
 
5.1.2 The employment tribunals: judging substantive fairness and 
reasonableness 
 
One factor that we have not yet discussed, in relation to the range of 
reasonableness responses test, is the how the tribunals set the boundaries of 
what is and what is not reasonable behaviour.  Collins explains that this 
process is at the same time a standard setting and standard reflecting 
exercise:
184
 
 
The members of the Industrial Tribunal draw upon their experience of the standards of 
employers, but then interpret that experience to set the boundary of the range of reasonable 
responses.  That boundary line draws upon conventional practices, but represents an 
interpretation of those practices, viewing them in the light which the members of the tribunal 
regard as most fair and reasonable.  The approach is neither wholly conventional nor 
normative, neither merely standard-reflecting nor standard-imposing.  The tribunal adopts an 
interpretative approach itself, taking its own view of industrial practice viewed in its best 
light. 
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At first glance this notion of ―good industrial practice‖ appears to provide 
employees with a good deal of protection against arbitrary and unfair 
dismissals.  But this initial optimism is tempered when one takes into account 
two factors.  First, the conventions to which the tribunals turn in their search 
for best practice have evolved out of negotiations between employers and 
employees and, having done so, they reflect the relative bargaining power of 
the parties.  If, as is commonly understood to be the case, employees lack 
bargaining power such that the employer is able to insist on, for example, a 
harsh disciplinary policy, then the tribunal‘s interpretation of those 
conventions is likely to bolster and perpetuate standards that do very little to 
maximise fairness perceptions, but that are instead viewed by employees, 
either in form or implementation or both, as unfair and unjust.
185
  Secondly, as 
Collins explains, ―it must be recalled that the standard of ‗good industrial 
practice‘ sets only the boundaries to reasonable behaviour, so that employers 
can operate a severe disciplinary policy provided they do not step outside the 
spectrum of conventions recognised by the standard of ‗good industrial 
relations practice‘‖.186   
 
The first of these two points is particularly relevant in the current context, 
because a law that allows an employer to promulgate disciplinary rules that are 
unfair from the employee‘s perspective is missing an important opportunity to 
promote fairness at work.  If the law required the tribunals to question the 
merits and justice of disciplinary rules, it would cause the employer to 
consider those rules from not just their perspective, but from a wider 
perspective, including the views of their workforce as to what is a fair and just 
disciplinary policy.  Only by doing that might employers feel comfortable that 
those rules are not going to be subject to legal review and criticism.  Such an 
approach by the tribunals would promote the kind of reflexive self regulation 
that we have discussed is essential for the maximisation of fairness 
perceptions at work.  But the reality is something different.  Because of their 
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superior bargaining power many employers unilaterally produce disciplinary 
rules that are presented to each new employee on a non-negotiable basis.  The 
document therefore represents the employer‘s view of the appropriate 
disciplinary policy and provided the employer thereafter follows those rules, 
there is a reduced likelihood that the tribunal will find that a resulting 
dismissal is unfair.
187
 
 
5.1.3 Substantive fairness: is it enough to remove the ‘range’ from the 
reasonableness test? 
 
To this point it has been suggested that while a law which prohibits unfair 
dismissals might promote fairness perceptions at work and grow trust, the 
adoption by the tribunals and the Courts of the range of reasonable responses 
test, at least as it applies to the employer‘s substantive reasons for dismissal, 
has the effect of stymieing that potential.  It does so by permitting harsh 
dismissals that employees view as unfair, by allowing employers to disregard 
whether the sanction of dismissal is a proportionate response to the 
employee‘s offence, by allowing dismissals based on suspicion and 
circumstantial evidence, by refusing to question the fairness of disciplinary 
rules unilaterally promulgated by the employer, by thereby limiting the role 
the law might play in bolstering the credibility of employer promises to their 
staff, and generally by limiting the role the law might play in helping 
employers to appear fair in relation to disciplinary matters.  All this said it 
would be naïve to think that by doing away with the range of reasonable 
responses test we will instantly render the law of Unfair Dismissal an effective 
regulatory instrument in the goal of maximising fairness perceptions at work.   
 
There is much more to be done that we will discuss below, but at this stage we 
continue to focus on the reasonableness standard that is so central to the law.  
Even if we do away with the range of reasonable responses test we are still left 
under the current legislation with the need to determine the standards of 
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reasonable behaviour that apply in any instance of alleged unfair dismissal.  
The obvious question for the tribunals is by whose standard do we judge 
reasonableness: the employer‘s, the employee‘s, or a neutral or reasonable 
person‘s?  These three standards may often agree, but not necessarily and, in 
particular, there are likely to be clear differences between the views of the 
employer and its employees in a number of situations.   
 
One could suggest that an employer‘s inclination would be to put immediate 
business concerns ahead of more abstract notions of social justice and welfare 
that might appeal more to employees, and that in general, employers take a 
stronger approach to disciplinary matters than employees.  As such these 
distinctions make a critical difference to the outcome of a dismissal case and 
therefore to the potential impact the law can have on the behaviour of the 
parties prior to that outcome and the perceptions of fairness or unfairness that 
might flow from that.  In other words, if the approach of the Courts and 
tribunals is to base standards of reasonableness on what a reasonable employer 
would do, which is, as we have seen, the approach taken by the tribunals and 
Courts in Britain, it is highly unlikely, unless the standards of the employee 
match that of the employer in a given set of circumstances, that the law will 
encourage employer behaviour in relation to dismissal that employees will 
consider to be fair.  At the same time, if the standards of reasonable behaviour 
are set by reference to the views of the reasonable employee, the employer is 
likely to feel aggrieved and resentful and inclined to respond by defensive 
behaviour aimed not at maximising fairness perceptions amongst its 
workforce, but at avoiding future claims.  Such action may include reducing 
employee responsibility and freedom of action and an increase in close 
management; action which is anathema to the overriding objective of 
partnership and fairness at work which, it has been argued, can increase the 
competitiveness of British businesses through innovation and OCB.    
 
This, therefore, suggests that some form of neutral standard is preferable.  
Early decisions from the Courts in New Zealand suggested a preference in that 
country for adopting an ‗objective reasonable person‘ approach to the issue of 
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whether, under New Zealand‘s law against Unjustifiable Dismissal188, a 
dismissal was reasonable.  In Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher 
Construction Co the specialist labour Court stated that each case must be 
treated on its individual merits, but in doing so the Courts and tribunals must 
take account of: 
 
… the conduct of the worker; the conduct of the employer; the history of the employment; the 
nature of the industry and its customs and practices; the terms of the contract (express, 
incorporated and implied); the terms of any other relevant agreements, and the circumstances 
of the dismissal.  The Court also has regard to good industrial practice which includes some 
consideration of the moral and social attitudes of the community.
189
 
 
In Telecom South Ltd v Post Office Union, Richardson J in the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal explained that the correct approach to determining the 
lawfulness or otherwise of a dismissal is as follows: 
 
A dismissal is unjustifiable if it is not capable of being shown to be just in all the 
circumstances.  Justification is directed at considerations of moral justice.  Whether a 
dismissal can be said to be justifiable can only be determined by considering and balancing 
the interests of the worker and the employer.  It is whether what was done and how it was 
done, including whether recompense was provided, is just and reasonable in all the 
circumstances, including of course, the reason for the dismissal.
190
 
 
Despite this earlier preference for a neutral approach to assessing 
reasonableness standards, the New Zealand Courts subsequently, albeit as we 
shall see temporarily, moved to an approach in keeping with the practice in 
this country of assessing whether dismissal was action which a reasonable and 
fair employer could have taken in the circumstances.
191
  An approach to 
assessing reasonableness and fairness that accounts for the interests of both 
parties is more likely to lead to outcomes that are objectively fair and capable 
of promoting fairness perceptions.  Such an approach will arguably require 
employers to take disciplinary action that is proportionate to the offence, to 
consider employee interests when it comes to preparing disciplinary rules, to 
require more than suspicion before deciding to dismiss etc.  At the same time a 
neutral approach recognises that employers have a legitimate interest in being 
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able to dismiss employees whose continued presence is detrimental to the 
interests of their business.  The reasons why the tribunals
192
 and Courts in 
New Zealand and Britain prefer to consider what is reasonable from the 
employer‘s perspective are probably a mixture of those referred to earlier 
(common law traditions, not feeling able to reach a better decision than the 
employer, concern to limit the number of tribunal applications etc)
193
 and, in 
Britain at least, the fact that section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, 
and in particular section 98(4), arguably directs the tribunals towards such an 
approach.
194
   
 
But this optimism about the merits of a neutral reasonableness standard in 
achieving the goal of maximising fairness perceptions at work and growing 
trust, must be questioned when we considered, yet again, what fairness in this 
context actually is.  For fairness to impact upon employee performance it is 
not enough that the employer considers their actions to be fair, and nor is it 
enough that an employment tribunal considers the employer‘s actions to be 
fair.  What matters is that employees consider the employer‘s behaviour to be 
fair and therein rests one of the key shortcomings of a law against Unfair 
Dismissal, range of reasonable responses test and employer standards or not, 
as a mechanism for maximising fairness perceptions.   
 
The potential for the law of Unfair Dismissal to impact upon perceptions of 
fairness, at least in-so-far as those perceptions relate to the reasons for 
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dismissal, depends upon its ability to mould employer behaviour in a way that 
employees consider to be fair.  But its ability to do this is limited by the fact 
that any such law cannot be overly, if at all, prescriptive of the circumstances 
that will merit dismissal and those that will not.  What is or is not a fair 
dismissal will depend at best on a detailed examination of the facts set against 
the surrounding circumstances, interests and personalities of the parties and 
other individuals involved.  That being so, any law against Unfair Dismissal 
must be drafted in broad terms, and that is certainly the case in Britain, New 
Zealand, Canada, Australia and elsewhere.  But this necessary lack of 
specificity about what constitutes good grounds to dismiss, means that the 
capacity of the law to effect employer behaviour, and employee perceptions of 
that behaviour, will be subject to the employer‘s interpretation of what it 
means to be fair, and that interpretation will be loaded with the employer‘s 
views about the best way to run their business.   
 
It is very unlikely that the employer‘s interpretation of what is fair when it 
comes to disciplinary action, and an employee‘s view of the requirements of 
fairness, will coincide.  For example, an employer may feel that they are 
justified in dismissing an employee who has been ill for a long period of time 
because the employer needs that position filled and does not believe they 
should bear responsibility for an illness that has nothing to do with them.  An 
employee, on the other hand, when determining what is a fair response by the 
employer will focus on, for example, the importance to him of retaining his 
position, including: maintaining the social bonds he has developed at work; 
the need to provide financially for him and his family; the challenges of 
finding a new position; the commitment that he has shown prior to falling ill.  
Even if the message is clear from the statute, and its judicial interpretation, 
that the employee‘s interests should be considered before dismissal, the 
employer is likely to skew any balancing of interests in favour of their 
perceived interests and might, at the same time, misinterpret what the 
employee‘s interests actually are.  The result will almost certainly be that the 
employer takes action or behaves in such a way that the employer believes is 
lawful and fair, but that the employee considers is unlawful and unfair.  All 
this is not to say that there will not be a number of enlightened employers who 
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will strive to act in a manner perceive to be fair because they understand the 
value to the business of doing so, but those efforts are unlikely to be driven by 
the standards of reasonableness contained in the statute.   
 
A long term optimistic view is that the more the tribunals and the Courts are 
required to assess and determine Unfair Dismissal claims, the more adept they 
will become at structuring guidance for employers on what it means to be fair 
and reasonable in a dismissal context.  Provided employers are aware of and 
consider the guidance so as to avoid the risk of a successful Unfair Dismissal 
claim, they are not likely over time to dismiss unfairly, and this improved 
behaviour will positively impact on employee fairness perceptions.  This may 
be an overly optimistic view for a number of reasons.  First, the protection 
against Unfair Dismissal has been interpreted and applied for not far short of 
half a century and there is no clear evidence that employers are becoming 
better or ―fairer‖ when assessing the subjective justification for dismissal.   
 
Secondly, and this point has already been suggested in the preceding 
discussion, there is an infinite number of potential scenarios involving 
workplace discipline or dismissal, and for that reason it is not possible for the 
tribunals and Courts to give definitive guidance relevant to dealing with every 
possible scenario.  Whilst it is true that there are many dismissals which are 
similar on their face, the deeper complexities that accompany most Unfair 
Dismissal claims means that no two instances are identical.  The endless 
differences between dismissals are caused by a variety of factors including 
workplace culture, personalities, the peculiarities of the industry, the 
commercial position of the business and a host of other factors that cannot 
easily be reconciled to create a framework for employer behaviour that has the 
potential to ensure that a dismissal, if undertaken in accordance with the 
framework, is guaranteed to be fair.   
 
Thirdly, this optimistic assessment also depends on the tribunals forming a 
view of fairness in each given instance of dismissal that is aligned with the 
employee‘s view of fairness.  Unless these two views are aligned, judicial 
guidance on substantive justification for dismissal cannot hope to promote 
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increased employee perceptions of fairness.  But just as it is unlikely that the 
employer will form a view of what is fair that accords with the employee‘s 
perception fairness, so too it is unlikely that the members of the employment 
tribunal will form a view that aligns precisely with the employee‘s perception 
of what is fair.  This is inevitable given that the members of the tribunal 
themselves come to the task of assessing fairness with their own personal 
understanding of what is fair in any given instance of dismissal, and with 
limited insight to the particularities of each employer‘s workplace, and the 
personalities and personal histories involved.  In addition and as already 
discussed, historically the tribunals have set the boundaries of what is fair with 
reference to the reasonable employer‘s notion of fairness which, again, is 
unlikely to be aligned with reasonable employee‘s understanding of the 
concept. 
 
5.1.4 The tribunals’ approach to assessing substantive fairness – generic 
uncertainty 
 
In reality the tribunals and the Courts have given very little clear guidance on 
the meaning of substantive fairness and the reasons for this are explained in 
more detail elsewhere.
195
  In the meantime it is instructive to review the value 
or not of instances where judicial guidance has been offered on what it means 
to be fair in the context of a decision to dismiss.  In summary, judicial 
guidance invariably reflects the obstacles to effective direction that are 
discussed above; the guidance is broad and generic and at times it adds a 
further skin of uncertainty to the already uncertain statutory language.  In this 
way it is possible to view judicial instruction on the meaning of substantive 
fairness as creating a further level of description beyond the statutory language 
which itself is subject to interpretation and uncertainty.  The New Zealand 
experience presents a good example. 
 
In 2004 Parliament in New Zealand introduced section 103A of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000.  The Employment Relations Act includes 
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provisions that protect employees against Unjustifiable Dismissal – the 
statutory equivalent in New Zealand of the Unfair Dismissal protections 
adopted in the United Kingdom.  Prior to the enactment of section 103A the 
question of whether or not a dismissal was justified was determined by judicial 
interpretation of the statute alone
196
.  That interpretation, best demonstrated by 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal‘s decision in W & H Newspapers Ltd v 
Oram [2000] ERNZ 448, reflected the range of reasonable responses test and 
required the New Zealand Employment Relations Authority to inquire whether 
or not the act of dismissal was what a fair and reasonable employer could have 
done given the relevant surrounding circumstances.  Section 103A altered this 
test.  This new statutory provisions required the Authority to apply the 
following test when determining the question of justification: 
 
...the question of whether a dismissal or action was justifiable must be determined, on an 
objective basis, by considering whether the employer‘s actions, and how the employer acted, 
were what a fair and reasonable employer would have done in all the circumstances at the 
time the dismissal or action occurred [emphasis added]. 
   
The test in section 103A was, on the face of it, a fundamental shift from the 
range of reasonable responses test.  The new test suggested that in any given 
instance of dismissal there is a single standard of fairness to be applied – in the 
circumstances dismissal is justified or it is not.  This binary decision required 
the Authority to assess the process that the employer followed leading up to 
the dismissal and the substantive reason for the decision to dismiss.   
 
The impact of section 103A was considered in detail by the New Zealand 
Employment Court in White v Auckland District Health Board
197
.  In White 
the employee was a senior physician, having been a registered medical 
practitioner since 1974 and employed by the employer in this case since 1977.  
He was dismissed for alleged inappropriate use of the employer‘s internet and 
email facilities.  In delivering his decision on Dr White‘s claim that he had 
been unjustifiably dismissed, the Chief Judge of the Employment Court 
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proceeded to set out in some detail the Court‘s view of how section 103A 
should be interpreted and applied.
198
  That direction was: 
 
The Employment Relations Authority and the Court are required to consider separately what 
the employer did and how the employer did it, to determine what a fair and reasonable 
employer would have done and how in these circumstances. 
 
Although an employer may continue to have recourse to a range of legitimate options in 
determining whether the employer will dismiss an employee or disadvantage an employee in 
employment, it is for the Employment Relations Authority or the Court to evaluate that action 
against the objective standard of what a fair and reasonable employer would have done in the 
circumstances. 
 
This test does not, however, give the Authority or the Court unbridled licence to substitute 
their views for that of the employer. 
 
The Authority or the Court may, on an objective analysis, reach a different conclusion from 
that of the employer. 
 
Such scrutiny is not to be undertaken in a mechanical or pedantic way and in many instances 
there is no clear distinction in practice between what an employer does and how the employer 
does it. 
 
The concept of ―unjustifiability‖ is not confined to matters of legal justification but is, rather, 
a broader concept of whether what has happened was in accordance with justice and fairness. 
 
With respect to the Chief Judge, this guidance could do little to meaningfully 
direct employers on whether or not dismissal in any given instance was fair.  
To the contrary and as suggested above, the guidance tended only to layer 
uncertainty on the already uncertain meaning of justification as defined by 
section 103A.  An analysis of some of the direction given by the Chief Judge 
helps to make the point.  First, section 103A appeared on a plain reading to 
discard the range of reasonable responses test by requiring that any person 
applying the test for justification consider what the fair and reasonable 
employer would (rather that could) have done in the circumstances.  But the 
Employment Court in White awkwardly extrapolates the wording of the statute 
in a manner which might serve to confuse employers.  On the one hand the 
Court says that the employer may continue to have recourse to a range of what 
the Court refers to as ―legitimate‖ options when determining whether to 
dismiss, while on the other hand the Court says that it will be for it to 
determine whether the action actually taken is what a fair and reasonable 
employer would have done in the circumstances.  In the next breath the Court 
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says that it does not have ―unbridled license‖ to substitute its views for those 
of the employer, but that it ―may‖ reach a different conclusion to the 
employer.   
 
What do these statements mean in practical terms?  One interpretation of the 
dictum is that it is very unclear: the employer has a number of legitimate 
options to choose from including, presumably, dismissal, but if it chooses 
dismissal the Court has the right to disagree with that choice, but only up to a 
point, although exactly where that point is cannot be determined.  It might be 
more explicable to simply recite the provisions of the section?  Secondly, what 
is one to make of the statement that the concept of ―unjustifiability‖ is not 
confined to matters of legal justification but is, rather, a broader concept of 
whether what has happened ―was in accordance with justice and fairness‖?  
Here the Court has added the concept of justice to the test for justification.  By 
doing so the Court runs the risk of unnecessarily introducing a further loaded 
term to the existing notions of fairness and reasonableness that expressly 
underpin the test in section 103A.  It may be in the context of section 103A 
that the term ―justice‖ adds nothing to the concepts of fairness and 
reasonableness, but if that is correct, what is the point of introducing the 
concept of justice in the judicial guidance?  If on the other hand the concept of 
justice is intended to add something to the statutory language, what precisely 
is that addition and what assistance is it to the employer who is trying to apply 
the Court‘s guidance to a real life disciplinary situation?  Thirdly, the Court 
says that justification must be determined from the point of view of the neutral 
observer.  But this appears at odds with a plain reading of section 103A which 
appears to invite the inquiry from the perspective of the fair and reasonable 
employer.     
 
For the sake of completeness it is worth noting that the law in New Zealand 
has been altered yet again.  In particular the test for justification was amended 
by the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2010 to now read: 
 
―(1) For the purposes of section 103(1)(a) and (b), the question of whether a dismissal or an 
action was justifiable must be determined, on an objective basis, by applying the test in 
subsection (2). 
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―(2) The test is whether the employer's actions, and how the employer acted, were what a fair 
and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances at the time the dismissal or 
action occurred. 
―(3) In applying the test in subsection (2), the Authority or the Court must consider—  
―(a) whether, having regard to the resources available to the employer, the 
employer sufficiently investigated the allegations against the employee before 
dismissing or taking action against the employee; and  
―(b) whether the employer raised the concerns that the employer had with the 
employee before dismissing or taking action against the employee; and 
―(c) whether the employer gave the employee a reasonable opportunity to 
respond to the employer's concerns before dismissing or taking action against the 
employee; and 
―(d) whether the employer genuinely considered the employee's explanation (if 
any) in relation to the allegations against the employee before dismissing or 
taking action against the employee. 
―(4) In addition to the factors described in subsection (3), the Authority or the Court may 
consider any other factors it thinks appropriate. 
―(5) The Authority or the Court must not determine a dismissal or an action to be unjustifiable 
under this section solely because of defects in the process followed by the employer if the 
defects were- 
―(a) minor; and 
―(b) did not result in the employee being treated unfairly.‖ 
 
This new section was largely the result of intensive lobbying by the business 
community in New Zealand, which complained that the previous test for 
justification placed too much of a burden on employers and was too difficult 
to apply in practice.  The first thing to note about the new section is that it 
effectively reintroduces a range of reasonable responses test by providing that 
the Authority and the Court must consider whether the actions of the employer 
were aligned with what a reasonable employer ―could‖ have done in the 
circumstances.  The further point to make about this provision in the context 
of the current discussion is that it demonstrates the difficulty of effectively 
developing precise statutory standards of fairness, that apply to every 
employment relationship and every instance of alleged unfair and 
unreasonable treatment.  The Employment Court is yet to interpret the new 
legislation, but on its face the new provisions create an increased scope for 
argument about the meaning of justification, because they introduce terms 
which purport to add clarity to the meaning of justification but which are, each 
of them, at best subject to interpretation, and at worst confusing.  In short, the 
amended section 103A tends to lump uncertainty of application on a statutory 
test the meaning of which was, admittedly, already unclear.  For example, 
subsection 3(a) requires that before reaching a conclusion on justification, the 
Employment Relations Authority must consider whether the employer took 
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the time to ―investigate the allegations‖ made against the employee.  This 
requirement makes very little sense in the context of a dismissal for 
redundancy and similar concerns can be raised in relation to subsection 3(b).  
In fact, the entire subsection 3 appears to be focused on action taken in 
response to alleged misconduct.  It refers to investigations and giving the 
employee a chance to respond to allegations.  Where, for example, the 
employer‘s action relates to concerns about performance, fairness would 
typically dictate a requirement to provide an opportunity to improve over time.  
This approach to dealing with poor performance would not typically be 
couched in terms of an investigation and allegations which must be responded 
to.  But the statute requires that the Authority must take these matters into 
account when considering all instances of justification.   
 
5.2 A preliminary conclusion – the law of Unfair Dismissal is not suitable 
to achieve fairness and OCB 
 
The preceding discussion about the law of Unfair Dismissal, and specifically 
substantive fairness, leads inexorably to the following preliminary conclusion: 
the current law is not suitable if the policy objective is greater OCB and 
maximising fairness perceptions amongst employees.  The current law relies 
on concepts of fairness and reasonableness that are necessarily broad and 
lacking definition to account for the infinite variety of circumstances that 
might surround a decision to dismiss.  But the vagueness of these core 
concepts means that the parties charged with interpreting and applying the 
concepts to specific instances of disciplinary action (employers, employees 
and the tribunals) will inevitably diverge in their interpretations of what it 
means to be substantively fair, because each of them will bring their own 
interests and prejudices to the exercise.  That being so, the law of Unfair 
Dismissal can do little to aid the goal of maximising employee perceptions 
that their employer is fair.  The Courts and the employment tribunals cannot 
be, as we have seen, reasonably expected to adjust this negative assessment by 
putting flesh on the bones of the fairness and reasonableness concepts; they 
cannot be expected to provide employers in particular with clear direction that 
if followed will guarantee disciplinary outcomes that have every chance of 
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being perceived by employees as fair.  Where the Courts have attempted to 
provide direction that direction itself tends to be at best vague and at worst 
confusing, which in turn adds to the complexity of the interpretation exercise.  
In other words, the argument can be made that judicial interpretations of 
substantive fairness which add to the complexity of the interpretation exercise, 
may increase the likelihood that employers will dismiss employees for reasons 
that the employees perceive as being unfair.     
     
5.3 Procedural fairness and unfair dismissal – the tribunals‟ “comfort 
zone” 
 
While the tribunals and Courts have demonstrated a clear reluctance to 
supervise disciplinary dismissals closely, particularly when it comes to 
questioning the employer‘s substantive reasons for dismissal, they have been 
relatively rigorous in asserting that, before they will find a dismissal was fair, 
they must be convinced that the employer followed a fair procedure.  The 
necessary procedural steps have not been formulated precisely by the Courts 
and they have always been subject to the overriding question of 
reasonableness, but they normally include the following: a clear explanation to 
the employee of the alleged offence, an opportunity to respond to that 
allegation or to improve performance, and a right to have that response or 
attempt to improve considered before a decision to dismiss is taken.
199
  The 
willingness of the tribunals to require certain procedural standards in relation 
to dismissal, and their reluctance to second guess the employer‘s reasons for 
dismissal, has meant that a claim of procedural unfairness is by far the most 
likely ground for a successful application to the tribunal.
200
  The willingness of 
tribunals and judges to impose procedural standards may have several 
explanations.  As Collins explains
201
: 
 
Procedural requirements may be perceived by the Courts as posing a lesser degree of 
interference with managerial discretion than substantive standards.  A fair procedure can be 
presented as a necessary ingredient of any rational personnel policy, because it ensures both 
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that dismissals occur only when dismissal lies in the employer‘s economic interest, and that 
potential damage to co-operation from the remaining workforce owing to resentment against 
harsh discipline is minimised.  Another explanation may simply be that in addressing 
questions of procedural fairness the Courts are dealing with familiar principles of ‗natural 
justice‘ or ‗due process‘, which can be applied by analogy to public law standards. 
 
A further possible explanation relates to the wording of section 98(4)(a) which 
requires the tribunal, when determining the issue of fairness, to consider 
whether the employer ―acted reasonably‖.  Deakin and Morris have suggested 
that this emphasis on the employer‘s conduct means that the substantive 
justice of the dispute is, by and large, a secondary consideration.
202
   
 
5.3.1 The potential impact of procedure fairness on fairness perceptions 
 
But whatever the reason for the tribunal‘s willingness to impose standards of 
procedural fairness, the fact that they do is, on the face of it, a practice that 
might play a positive role in maximising fairness perceptions at work.  In an 
earlier chapter we discussed the significance of procedural fairness as a factor 
likely to impact upon employee behaviour including OCB.  An employer 
whose disciplinary processes are considered to be unfair by its workforce may, 
as a result, engender amongst employees negative perceptions of the 
employer‘s organisation as a whole which may in turn lead to 
counterproductive employee behaviour that will hurt the organisation.
203
  
More specifically a fair disciplinary process is likely to have the following 
effects.  The person who is subject to the disciplinary action is unlikely to feel 
fairly treated if they are dismissed irrespective of whether the dismissal 
procedure was objectively fair, but, that said, the chances of a dismissed 
employee feeling that the employer acted fairly by dismissing them are 
certainly increased if the decision was reached following what most fair 
minded people would consider was a fair process.   
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But does it matter that an employee who no longer works for the employer 
perceives their dismissal to be unfair?  Such an outcome may cause the 
dismissed employee to feel anger and resentment that will encourage him to 
bring a claim of Unfair Dismissal that, had they perceived their dismissal to be 
fair, they would not have been inclined to bring.  The fact is that an Unfair 
Dismissal claim has the potential to impact negatively on the employer by 
forcing it to expend sometimes significant sums on defending the claim, and 
by forcing it to involve other members of staff in the unpleasant process of 
preparing for, and participating in, an adversarial tribunal process that may 
negatively impact on staff morale.  The perception of unfairness by the 
dismissed employee may also cause him to speak disparagingly about the 
employer to existing and prospective employees and customers, or other 
business associates, in a manner that damages the employer‘s reputation 
amongst those individuals or organisations.  Of course the dismissed employee 
may be inclined to criticise the employer regardless of whether in truth they 
consider their dismissal was fair, but in those circumstances an employer is 
better placed to defend their reputation, and minimise any reputational 
damage, if they are able to point out that the decision to dismiss was based on 
the outcome of an objectively fair process.  In other words, the damage to the 
employer‘s reputation amongst its remaining employees and others caused by 
the dismissed employee‘s statements regarding his dismissal will be 
minimised, or avoided, if those employees and others perceive that the 
dismissal was fair.  The same assessment can be made in relation to potential 
reputational damage that is based on perceptions of the dismissal that are 
unrelated to the statements of the dismissed employee, but are formed by 
passive observance and interpretation of the dismissal and the processes 
leading to it.   
 
The fairness of the process and its impact on the disciplined worker is also 
relevant in circumstances where the outcome of the process is not dismissal 
but some lesser sanction, such as a warning or demotion.  Just because the 
worker was not dismissed that does not make him immune to a sense that his 
treatment was nonetheless unfair.  If he harbours those feelings he is in a 
position, as an existing employee, to act upon them in a manner that is 
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damaging to the employer.  Indeed this sense of unfairness may eventuate 
where the employee has not been sanctioned at all but has been subject to a 
disciplinary process that he feels he should never have been subjected to.  
Perceived procedural fairness will help alleviate these feelings and increase 
the ability of the parties to get on with their relationship in a manner that is 
productive.   
 
Furthermore, it may be the case that dismissals following a fair procedure do 
more than merely avoid damage to the employer‘s reputation; they may have 
the effect of enhancing the commitment of the employer‘s remaining 
employees to the employer‘s organisation and thereby increase levels of 
productivity.  As Konovsky and Pugh have explained: ―the use of procedurally 
fair … practices affects high order issues such as employees‘ commitment to a 
system and trust in its authorities because the use of fair procedures 
demonstrates an authority‘s respect for the rights and dignity of individual 
employees.  This demonstrated respect indicates that an authority is devoted to 
the principles of procedurally fair treatment, thus resulting in the employees‘ 
trust in the long term fairness of the relationship.  Fair procedures may have 
symbolic meaning insofar as individuals are treated as ends rather than 
means‖.204   Employees who perceived that they will not be subject to the 
ultimate disciplinary sanction, without first being given the opportunity to 
participate in a fair process, are more likely to feel a greater sense of job 
security and trust in their employer, and they are more likely, therefore, 
according to Fox
205
, to function at a higher level and be more productive than 
those who do not feel that way.  It is also worth making the point that the more 
an employee feels a sense of job security and commitment to their employer 
based on their perception that the employer uses fair processes in relation to 
disciplinary matters, including, most importantly, dismissal, the less likely the 
employee will be enticed away to work for another employer.  We have 
already discussed the importance to the employer‘s organisation of retaining 
productive and good quality staff, and that is more likely if those staff feel a 
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sense of commitment towards their employer.  The employer‘s staff may 
assess that remaining with an employer who is overtly committed to fairness is 
likely to be in their long term interests, whereas moving to another employer 
who may be prepared to pay them more on arrival, but who they know little 
about, may not be in the employees‘ best interests.  In other words the 
pragmatic employee places a premium on their current employer‘s fairness 
that they are not in a hurry to relinquish.   
 
In a similar vein, following a genuinely fair process that involves an 
investigation, meeting with the employee, giving the employee an opportunity 
to put their case and considering the employee‘s statements, is likely to reduce 
the number of dismissals (fair and unfair).  Employers who undertake such a 
process may be encouraged not to dismiss on the basis that their early 
understanding of events was wrong, or that there are mitigating circumstances 
that mean dismissal is not warranted etc.  In this way employers give 
themselves the opportunity to make a better and more informed decision that 
avoids the cost and inconvenience of dismissing a productive employee who it 
is in the best interests of the business to retain, while at the same time 
encouraging perceptions of fairness from amongst staff that can have the 
positive effects we have already discussed.    
 
5.3.2 The rights and wrongs of prescribing dismissal process and the 
dangers of process obsession 
 
This leads us to consider whether the law of Unfair Dismissal is mandating or 
at least encouraging the use of disciplinary procedures that are likely to be 
perceived as fair and to have the positive effects discussed above?  It has never 
been the case until recently that the law provides employees with an 
unqualified right to a fair procedure before they can be fairly dismissed and 
while, as we have suggested, the tribunals and Courts have been reluctant to 
permit dismissal without the employer adhering to some basic conception of 
natural justice, they have never mandated or described a minimum standard of 
procedural fairness.  That said it is generally accepted that one of the principle 
effects of the law of Unfair Dismissal has been the introduction or revision by 
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employers of disciplinary procedures and processes aimed either directly or 
indirectly at compliance with the legislation.  A study carried out by Evans 
and others found that of the two-thirds of firms sampled with formal 
procedures, nearly three-quarters had introduced them in response to the 
Unfair Dismissal legislation.
206
  Whether or not the reason for the introduction 
of disciplinary procedures is a response to the legislation or some other 
imperative, the fact is that the majority of employers in Britain have adopted a 
formal disciplinary procedure.
207
  But that fact requires some fleshing out for 
the purposes of this discussion.  The percentage of workplaces with formal 
disciplinary procedures drops substantially for employers with 10-24 
employees and one might reasonable assume that the percentage continues to 
decline for employers with less than 10 employees.
208
  It is also correct that 
these small employers are disproportionately found as respondents in claims 
before the employment tribunals, including claims for Unfair Dismissal.
209
  If 
you consider these factors together it is possible to conclude that small 
employers are subject to a disproportionate number of tribunal claims for 
Unfair Dismissal because they do not have in place formal disciplinary 
procedures.  Add to this the point made by Evans
210
 that the mere existence of 
written procedures does not imply their use and that, of the employers sampled 
who had formal disciplinary procedures, a significant proportion chose not to 
follow them.  Hence the way to reduce Unfair Dismissals, and maximise the 
chances of procedural fairness in the context of disciplinary action having a 
positive influence on employee behaviour, is to impose a mandatory procedure 
on all employers, regardless of their size.  Or is it?   
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As part of its reforms contained in the Employment Act 2002, the previous 
Government introduced fixed minimum procedural standards for dismissal and 
the resolution of grievances (these mandatory procedures have since been 
revoked).
211
  There was much about this piece of legislation which conformed 
to the type of regulation that we suggested earlier might go some way to 
creating and maintaining partnerships and fairness at work.  First, the statutory 
procedure mandated that the parties must come together to discuss their 
problems before any decision to dismiss is taken and the regulations created 
clear incentives for the parties to follow that course (for example, any failure 
to so by the employer would result in an automatic finding of Unfair 
Dismissal).   
 
Secondly, it is worth noting that while the law of Unfair Dismissal as it has 
been interpreted by the Courts is generally considered to require an employer 
to follow some form of procedure before dismissal, the exact nature of that 
procedure has never been clarified.  The Labour Government‘s procedure 
helped to overcome that problem (although, as we discuss below, there is a 
question mark over whether a prescribed procedure is desirable in the context 
of a law which aims to maximise fairness perceptions at work).   
 
Thirdly, a mandated procedure has the potential benefit of assisting employers 
to make credible commitments to their staff that they will be treated fairly, at 
least in terms of any disciplinary process that might lead to dismissal.  The 
ability of employers to make credible commitments in this area of the 
employment relationship is important to building successful partnerships.  
This is particularly so in the context of a relationship that has for so long been 
characterised by a level of mistrust between the parties; a lack of trust that is, 
to a large extent, attributable to the concern employees have about the ability 
of their employer to unfairly exercise their managerial power against them.  
The credibility of that promise was promoted further still by the existence of 
enhanced sanctions for non-compliance with the procedure.   
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Fourthly, the previous Government left scope for the parties to adapt the 
procedure to better suit their particular workplace.  It did so by mandating 
minimum standards that are not overly prescriptive and that small employers 
in particular could (in theory) apply without difficulty.  At the same time the 
procedure allowed larger employers with existing EDG procedures to keep or 
modify those procedures, provided their alternative processes included the 
minimum procedural standards contained by the legislation.   
 
Finally, if the statutory procedure was followed in good faith, it should have 
gone some way to avoiding certain outcomes that might have been considered 
market failures in a labour market intended to be characterised by 
partnerships, fairness and efficiency.  For example, an employer who follows 
the procedure might have uncovered circumstances that should have caused 
them to refrain from dismissing an employee with a good performance record 
and in whom they had invested a considerable amount of management and 
training time.   
 
But despite the optimism implicit in the preceding comments, the empirical 
evidence about the ability of disciplinary procedures in general to impact upon 
employer and employee behaviour, such that Unfair Dismissals are reduced 
and fairness perceptions increased, is ambiguous to say the least.  It is far from 
clear that those procedures are likely to result in employers dealing with 
disciplinary matters in a way that employee‘s consider is fair.  Using data from 
the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, Knight and Latreille studied 
the rates of disciplinary sanctions and dismissals, and the incidence of Unfair 
Dismissal complaints to employment tribunals in Britain.
212
  They concluded, 
inter-alia, that while employee perceptions of managerial style, high levels of 
commitment and job satisfaction do indeed act to reduce the rate of 
disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal and disciplinary action short of 
dismissal, the existence of dismissal procedures alone has little bearing on the 
probability that a firm will be the subject of an employment tribunal claim of 
Unfair Dismissal.  The latter finding might encourage us to think that the 
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existence of formal disciplinary procedures does not positively impact on 
employee perceptions of fair treatment when it comes to disciplinary action 
and dismissal, because for those procedures to have such an impact they 
would have to reduce the number of incidences of unfair disciplinary action 
which would in turn reduce the number of Unfair Dismissals and Unfair 
Dismissal claims.  But while the conclusion that the existence of disciplinary 
procedures does not impact on fairness perceptions may be correct (a point we 
shall address below) that is not a conclusion which can be drawn from Knight 
and Latreille‘s work.   
 
Their conclusion relates to the impact of procedures on the likelihood that a 
dismissed employee will bring a claim of Unfair Dismissal; it is not concerned 
with whether or not the dismissal was actually objectively unfair and in a 
similar vein it does not address whether the procedure was in form and 
operation fair and likely to be perceived as such.  It is the latter point that we 
are most interested in when we talk about dismissals (as opposed to some 
other lesser form of disciplinary action) because where procedures have the 
effect of causing an employer to act in a manner that we might consider is 
objectively fair, those actions are likely to impact positively on fairness 
perceptions amongst the employees that remain following the dismissal and it 
is, as we have discussed, the perceptions of those remaining employees that 
are particularly significant.  Just because a dismissed employee brings a claim 
for Unfair Dismissal, that does not mean the dismissal was objectively unfair, 
or perceived by the dismissed employee‘s former colleagues as unfair.  While 
an employee will almost certainly be less inclined to bring a claim if they 
perceive their dismissal was fair
213
 there will be cases where employees are 
motivated to bring a claim in-spite of this perception (for example, they may 
see bringing a claim as a way of rectifying their damaged reputation, they may 
consider it a means of forcing the employer to settle and thereby receive a 
compensation payment, or they may be pressured into bringing a claim by 
those who are well positioned to influence their actions).  There is of course 
also the point that an employee who has suffered the ultimate sanction of 
                                                  
213
 L. Dickens, M. Hart, M. Jones and B. Weekes, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal and 
the Industrial Tribunal System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) 29-51.  
 133 
dismissal is unlikely to readily accept that their dismissal was fair and that is 
true even in circumstances where the procedure leading to the dismissal was, 
objectively speaking, entirely fair.  That is almost certainly an indirect result 
of the stigma attached to dismissal and the negative effect it can have on how 
others, particularly prospective new employers, might view the dismissed 
person.  Being dismissed for disciplinary reasons sends a negative message 
about the employee as a person and a worker (for example, if might suggest 
they are dishonest, incompetent or disloyal).  That message may be real or it 
may be in the employee‘s head, but either way it is counter-intuitive for a 
person to accept such negative implications about themselves irrespective of 
whether, objectively and in relation to the events leading to their dismissal, 
they contain an element of truth.  What must be correct is that the mere 
existence of dismissal procedures (whether legally prescribed or compiled by 
the employer) is unlikely to have any bearing on fairness perceptions.  At best, 
written procedures can when first publicised instil a hope of fair treatment in 
the minds of those employees who consider they are on paper a statement of 
fair processes, but that hope will soon be dashed if the employer fails to follow 
the procedures or applies them in a way that employees consider to be unfair.  
In other words what matters is not the existence of procedures but how 
employers make use of those procedures and how employees judge that use.
214
   
 
The question becomes, therefore, whether the law as it stands is able to play a 
positive role in achieving the goal of increasing the likelihood of employers 
using disciplinary procedures in a manner that employees consider to be fair?  
Let us consider first the former statutory disciplinary procedure.  As we have 
already discussed there were several aspects of the statutory procedure that 
reflected what has been suggested are the essential characteristics of a 
regulatory system geared to achieving partnerships and fairness at work, but 
those aside, its ability to direct employer behaviour in such a way so as to 
maximise fairness perceptions was limited.  At the heart of its shortcomings 
was, perhaps ironically, the fact that it attempted to prescribe a disciplinary 
process.  This is a problem for several reasons.  To begin with, any attempt to 
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prescribe a process that is intended to cover all workplaces in all industries 
having, as they do, an infinite variety cultures, methods of working and 
personalities, is unlikely to appear fair, either in form or implementation, to all 
employees in all workplaces.  The law cannot hope to prescribe a procedure 
that takes into account all of these factors; all it can hope to achieve is a 
general non-reflexive standard process that applies a broad and general 
understanding of what it means to be procedurally fair, but which might not 
reflect in its execution what it means to be fair in a particular workplace in a 
particular instance of employee misconduct or poor performance.  In the 
context of a policy aimed at maximising fairness perceptions one might 
conclude therefore that the law should steer away from any attempt at 
prescribing a disciplinary process.    
 
One argument against this might be that some procedure is better than no 
procedure, and that at least there is a chance that an employer who follows a 
minimum standard will be judged by its employees to have acted fairly in 
some instances of disciplinary action.  The weakness of such an argument is 
that it fails to recognise that a minimum procedure encourages employers to 
do nothing more than what has been prescribed which in turn will do little to 
influence perceptions of fairness and may in fact have a negative impact on 
fairness at work.  It is very arguable that a prescribed statutory process reduces 
the incentive or encouragement (encouragement which is potentially inherent 
in a general non-prescriptive standard of fairness coupled with sanctions for 
non-compliance) for employers to reflect on what is a fair and reasonable 
process in the circumstances before they take disciplinary action.  An 
employer who is required to reflect on what is fair in a particular set of 
circumstances may be forced to genuinely consider the interests and 
circumstances of the employee in question lest they fall foul of the law.  But 
that incentive is less likely to exist in the context of the current statutory 
procedure because such a procedure sends a message to employers that all 
they have to do to avoid falling foul of the law is to follow the minimum 
requirements of the procedure and nothing more.   
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Of course, in Britain, adherence to the statutory procedure did not technically 
mean that the employer had done enough to pass the general test of fairness, 
but it did mean they would avoid a finding of automatic unfairness and having 
to pay enhanced levels of compensation.  Moreover, while merely following 
the statutory minimum procedure did not guarantee that a dismissal was 
procedurally fair, employers (and employment tribunals for that matter) might 
have taken the view that only in extraordinary circumstances would following 
the statutory procedure fall outside the employer‘s range of reasonable 
responses and fail to pass the general test of fairness contained in Section 98 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996.  At least in the pre-statutory procedure 
environment the employer was left guessing to some extent about what they 
needed to do to comply with the legal standard of fairness when it came to 
process.  That level of uncertainty may have encouraged some employers to 
go beyond what became the statutory minimum and that extra might have 
enhanced the chances of the employer‘s workforce judging the employer‘s 
conduct to be fair. The apparent weakness in the ability of the statutory 
procedure to increase fairness perceptions might have been reduced by 
imposing a more onerous and detailed minimum procedure that more closely 
reflects existing codes of practice, such as the current ACAS Code on 
Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures, but that is unlikely.   
 
This thesis argues that the correct position is that any legislatively mandated 
standard of procedural fairness (whether general or prescriptive) will struggle 
to significantly impact on fairness perceptions at work.  The more you 
prescribe a disciplinary process the more you increase the chances that its 
implementation and application will not appear genuine; the procedure‘s non-
reflexive nature will cause employers to deal with disciplinary issues in a way 
that may be unnecessary or pointless in the circumstances and which may be 
unwanted by the employee.  Just because the law says that an employer‘s 
behaviour is fair does not necessarily make it so in the eyes of the employer‘s 
employees and it is the employees‘ perceptions that matter in the current 
context.  It is ironic, therefore, that for some employers at least the statutory 
procedure may have caused them to deal with disciplinary matters in a manner 
that was less likely to encourage fairness perceptions than the regime that 
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existed prior to the statutory procedure, because the minimum procedures 
discouraged internal reflection on what amounts to a fair process in a 
particular workplace in a particular set of circumstances. 
 
We have already explained that a prescriptive process, like the mandatory 
statutory procedure, encourages the employer to go through the motions of 
following the procedure, in order to insulate themselves from the 
consequences of a legal finding of unfairness.  To that we add that a general 
standard of fairness such as exists in section 98(4) of the Employment Rights 
Act 1996 is likely to have a similar effect.  This fact is born out in empirical 
studies which indicate that one of the most significant changes prompted by 
the enactment of the Unfair Dismissal law was the introduction to workplaces 
of formal dismissal and disciplinary procedures.  For example, a study by 
Evans found that of the two-thirds of firms with formal procedures nearly 
three-quarters had introduced them in response to the legislation.
215
  A 
probable explanation for this phenomenon is that employers are introducing 
disciplinary procedures in an attempt to minimise the likelihood that they will 
be subject to successful Unfair Dismissal claims, and given that, as we have 
discussed, the vast majority of successful claims are the result of defects in the 
dismissal process, such defensive action is likely to be worthwhile.  As Collins 
points out: ―the growth of formal disciplinary procedures can be explained as a 
defensive tactic in the cost/benefit calculus of management. The cost of 
introducing formal procedures is (I assume) fairly low, and the potential 
benefit is the reduction of claims for Unfair Dismissal.‖216   
 
But the difficulty of this defensive approach in the context of a policy that 
seeks to maximise fairness perceptions is clear.  If employees perceive that 
employers are following the legally prescribed process to the letter to avoid an 
Unfair Dismissal claim rather than any genuine attempt to deal with 
disciplinary issues in a fair way, the ability of the law to positively impact on 
feelings of trust and fairness will be substantially reduced if not destroyed.  
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That is an inevitable conclusion based on our discussion of organisation 
justice research into procedural fairness, which found that employees are 
likely to judge they have been treated fairly overall if they believe that their 
involvement in the decision process carries with it the potential to influence 
the outcome of that process.  An employee, who judges that the process in 
question is being followed to avoid the legal consequences of not following 
that process, is likely to conclude that their involvement in that process is not 
intended, and is highly unlikely, to influence the employer‘s final decision.   
 
Of course that is not always the case and there will be instances where the 
employee‘s involvement can, in the end, affect the outcome of a disciplinary 
process.  Take for example the Madden case that was outlined above.  If Mr 
Madden had been able during the investigation into the theft of the debit cards 
to produce a witness who could testify to the fact that Mr Madden was with 
the witness at the time the goods purchased with the cards were bought, it is 
perhaps unlikely that Mr Madden would have been dismissed.  But such 
instances of employee input affecting the outcome of disciplinary action are, it 
is argued, rare.  It is the writer‘s experience that most employers approach 
disciplinary action with a pre-determined outcome in mind and the point of the 
disciplinary process is to achieve that outcome in a manner that is least likely 
to expose them to legal action.  Moreover, this view of the employer‘s 
approach to procedure is, in the writer‘s experience as a legal practitioner, 
shared by employees.  In other words most employees view the disciplinary 
process as leading to an inevitable outcome which will be predicted by the 
employer‘s disciplinary policy (for example, if the employee has committed 
some form of minor misconduct which the policy says may warrant a warning, 
the employee is likely to believe that a warning is the inevitable outcome once 
the process has begun).   
 
A recent example from the writer‘s own practice is arguably typical.  The 
employee had worked as a nurse in a rest-home for 17 years.  One morning 
two members of staff witnessed the employee kick one of the elderly residents 
in the leg.  The witnesses reported what they had seen to the rest-home 
manager who contacted the owner who contacted the writer.  His immediate 
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instructions were an explanation of what had been witnessed and a request for 
advice on how to dismiss the employee (bear in mind that at this stage there 
had been no investigation beyond what the witnesses had told the manager).  
An investigation was conducted and it turned out that there were mitigating 
circumstances in the employee‘s favour that some reasonable employers may 
have felt excused her actions, or at least justified the imposition of a sanction 
less than dismissal.  But it appeared to the writer, as it has done on many 
occasions, that having pre-determined the outcome before the process began, 
the employer was in no mind to back away from that initial judgement and the 
employee was dismissed.  Of additional interest was the employee‘s attitude to 
the procedure.  From the start she protested that the process was a sham and a 
waste of her time and when, following her dismissal, she was offered a right of 
appeal, she refused saying that nothing she said was going to change the 
employer‘s mind.   
 
Of course this view of the reason why employers follow disciplinary 
procedures may be skewed and overstated somewhat given the context in 
which that view has been formed.  It is perhaps predictable that employers 
who seek the advice of a lawyer about how to undertake a legal disciplinary 
procedure before it has begun are doing so because they have already 
conceived the outcome of the procedure.  An employer who enters a process 
with an open mind, or with motives unrelated to the legal consequences of the 
outcome, is perhaps less likely to consult a lawyer; at least in the early stages 
before any threat of legal action has been explicitly or implicitly made by the 
employee.  In support of this suggestion it appears that some employers do 
introduce disciplinary procedures for reasons other than to avoid certain legal 
consequences.  The Evans study we referred to earlier indicated that two-thirds 
of the organisations studied introduced formal procedures in response to the 
Unfair Dismissal legislation, which means of course that one-third of the 
sample formulated the procedures for other reasons.  Similarly, in a survey of 
100 Times 1000 companies quoted in research by Dickens et al showed that 
two thirds of the employers sampled had formal procedures, and most of those 
procedures had been in place prior to the legislation.  Only a quarter of the 
employers in the study had introduced procedures because of the Unfair 
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Dismissal law.
217
  In addition it is worth considering that in the United States, 
where employment at will remains the norm in many states, it is by no means 
uncommon for employers to operate formal disciplinary policies.  If avoiding 
the legal consequences of an Unfair Dismissal is not the motivating factor 
behind the introduction by these employers of disciplinary procedures then 
what is?  Collins suggests that one explanation for why certain employers 
introduce procedures is their concern to appear fair and to achieve the benefits 
that are likely to flow from that appearance: 
 
The very existence of a formal procedure is intended to help to establish perceptions among 
the workforce of the fairness of the disciplinary system, whatever the reality of the situation.  
By contributing to the construction of a reputation for fairness, the formal procedure should 
help to create consent to the disciplinary system and reduce objections to it, which might 
otherwise lead good workers to quit or refrain from full co-operation in the performance of 
work.
218
 
 
We note that Collins does not appear to be arguing that a law which mandates 
a standard of fair process can contribute to fairness perceptions amongst the 
workforce.  In fact the law is superfluous to the argument which is that some 
employers will introduce formal procedures because they want to appear fair 
and, if that is correct, they will formulate those procedures irrespective of what 
the law says.  Somewhat ironically in the context of a discussion that supports 
some form of regulation in the area of EDG, this argument gains support a 
priori from Epstein‘s work on employment at will.219  Epstein argued inter-
alia that employer‘s will be reluctant to dismiss employees unfairly under 
employment at will for two main reasons that resonate in the midst of the 
present discussion.  First, the employer would lose the benefit of the dismissed 
worker‘s skills and would incur the cost of hiring and re-training their 
replacement.  Secondly, and most significantly in the current context, the 
employer‘s reputation would suffer.  Members of the current workforce who 
witness that the employer had dismissed someone arbitrarily might decide to 
look for a new job elsewhere with a better employer.  Alternatively they might 
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decide to reduce their level of effort: there is no point in working hard if there 
is no job security.  Employers who take this view are likely to seek out 
methods to avoid dismissing employees in a way that is and appears unfair.  
One way of achieving that is to introduce disciplinary procedures that if 
followed by management will minimise the risk of apparently Unfair 
Dismissals.   
 
So there are employers who are motivated to introduce fair procedures 
because they see the potential benefit to their businesses in appearing to the 
workforce as a fair employer, but in the end the important point is whether or 
not they are successful in that objective: are employers that are motivated to 
be fair actually perceived as fair by their employees?  A further observation is 
that these enlightened employers are not driven by legislation to introduce 
procedures that they hope are perceived as fair.  This provides a glimmer of 
hope for regulation that aims at bringing the other employers into line.  That is 
because such regulation is not extreme or radical at least in terms of its 
objective given that the objective is shared by a good proportion of employers 
who do not require statutory encouragement to introduce fair dismissal and 
disciplinary processes.  At the same time it is worth reiterating that the 
existence of prescribed and general standards of what is a fair process may 
undermine the ability of those employers who seek to enhance their reputation 
as fair from actually achieving that goal?  Is it the case that employees 
employed by an employer who wants to appear fair will be unconvinced that 
fairness is the employer‘s true intention because their judgement is clouded by 
a general perception that employers adhere to disciplinary processes so as to 
appear fair in the eyes of the law?  This seems a reasonable theory and all the 
more likely to be correct in a modern labour market in which job mobility is 
high and employees are likely to sample a large number of employers during 
their working lives.  
 
5.4 Remedies for Unfair Dismissal: missed opportunities? 
 
The nature of the fairness inquiry and its application make it unlikely, if not 
impossible, for the law of Unfair Dismissal to have a positive impact on 
 141 
fairness perceptions.  But that said might the statutory limits on dismissal 
encourage fair treatment at work if the remedies for Unfair Dismissal are 
properly targeted and sufficiently robust to discourage unfair treatment leading 
to dismissal?  The answer to that question would depend, in part, on whether 
the tribunals and the Courts are encouraged and willing to interpret and award 
those remedies in a way which supports the creation of a strong regulatory 
stick that prods and pokes employers towards a better understanding of what it 
means to be fair, and towards applying that understanding in a manner that 
will aid fairness perceptions and OCB.  We might predict that an employer 
faced with the prospect of, for example, having to pay a substantial financial 
remedy if they complete a dismissal which a tribunal later finds to have been 
unfair, will as a result go the extra mile to ensure that the dismissal is fair.  
That desire may cause the employer to engage with the employee in a manner 
which is focused on finding a resolution to the disciplinary issue that avoids 
dismissal (or at least the prospect of an Unfair Dismissal claim).  The 
employer‘s motivation in that case is not to be fair, or to be perceived as fair, it 
is to avoid having to defend a claim the outcome of which is uncertain and, if 
the outcome goes against the employer, that may be costly.  In other words the 
perception of fairness is a means to an end rather than the end itself.  But, that 
said, if the impact of the employer‘s actions on the employee is to garner a 
belief that the employer is concerned about the employee‘s best interests, that 
belief may be enough to support a growth in fairness perceptions and OCB 
amongst the employee and his or her colleagues.   
 
In this section we ask and explore the following question: are the current 
remedies for Unfair Dismissal and the extent to which they are applied by the 
tribunals, likely to encourage fair treatment at work; if the answer to the first 
question is no, would new and different remedies coupled with a more robust 
approach on the part of the tribunals and Courts to awarding those remedies, 
have a more positive impact on fair treatment at work?  
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5.4.1 Reinstatement and re-engagement 
 
We consider first the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement.  The 
Employment Rights Act 1996
220
 provides that if, on a finding of dismissal, the 
employee indicates a wish to be re-employed, the tribunal may make an order 
of either reinstatement or re-engagement under sections 114 and 115; if no 
order is made under this section, it must make an award of compensation 
calculated in accordance with sections 118 to 126.  In other words, ―the 
preferred remedies for Unfair Dismissal are reinstatement, re-engagement and 
monetary compensation in that order‖.221  An order for reinstatement requires 
the employer to ―treat the complainant in all respects as if he had not been 
dismissed‖, and must specify any amount payable by the employer in respect 
of the period during which the employee should have been in employment but 
was not.
222
  The practical consequence of reinstatement is apparent – the 
employee is put back in the position that they held before they were unfairly 
dismissed.  Re-engagement on the other hand involves the employer (or an 
associated employer) being forced to re-employ the claimant to a position 
which is ―comparable to that from which he was dismissed or other suitable 
employment‖.223   
 
Both reinstatement and re-engagement are discretionary remedies.  In deciding 
whether to award either remedy the tribunal must consider not simply whether 
the claimant wants to be reinstated, but also ―whether it is practicable for the 
employer to comply with the order of reinstatement‖, and in a case where the 
employee has contributed to the dismissal, whether the order would be just.
224
  
Where the tribunal does not believe that reinstatement is appropriate, it must 
go on to consider re-engagement, which will cause it to reflect on the same 
factors that it considered in assessing the claim for reinstatement.
225
  Except in 
a case where the employee contributed to his own dismissal, an order for re-
engagement must be on terms ―which are, so far as reasonably practicable, as 
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favourable as an order for reinstatement‖.226  And in exercising its discretion 
to make either order, the tribunal may not take into account the fact that the 
employer has hired a permanent replacement for the complainant unless the 
employer can show that it was not practical to do otherwise, or that it engaged 
the replacement after a reasonable period had elapsed without the complainant 
indicating that he or she wished to be re-employed.
227
  Significantly the Act 
does not provide the tribunals and the Courts with the power to require that the 
employer abide by the order of reinstatement or re-engagement.  Under section 
177 of the Act, if the employer fails to abide by the order, the tribunal‘s only 
option is to make an award of compensation.  According to section 177(3), 
where the employer‘s non-compliance is a full failure to reinstate or, as the 
case may be, re-engage the employee, the compensatory award will include an 
additional amount equivalent to between 26 and 52 weeks‘ pay (this figure is 
subject to a statutory cap on the amount of a week‘s pay).  Further, the 
employer may avoid the additional award of compensation if it can show that 
it was not practical to comply with the order.
228
  This means that the employer 
gets two chances to argue for the impracticality of reinstatement or re-
engagement.  According to the Employment Appeals Tribunal, ―one process 
looks forward, the other looks back and although it may be that a cherry that is 
rejected at the first bite will be likely to be regarded as indigestible at the 
second, there is in our view no doubt at all that two bites are allowed‖.229 
 
On the face of it the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement might be 
useful allies in the battle for greater fairness in relation to disciplinary action 
and enhanced fairness perceptions.  Any employer who is contemplating 
dismissal might think twice if they believe there is a real chance that following 
the dismissal the employee will be back at work by order of the tribunal.  The 
employer might at least be more concerned to avoid unfairness in the dismissal 
or, more optimistically, they might look to resolve the issues which have led to 
the disciplinary situation, given that it is better to fix those issues immediately 
rather than be forced to do so following a drawn out and costly tribunal 
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hearing, at the conclusion of which the employee might well be re-employed.  
However, there are a number of obstacles which stand in the way of 
reinstatement and re-engagement being aids to greater fairness perceptions. 
 
First, the tribunals and the Courts have shown themselves reluctant to take a 
robust approach to applying and awarding the two remedies.  In particular, the 
tribunals and the Courts have taken a conservative line in their interpretation 
of when it is ―practicable‖ to order reinstatement or re-engagement in the first 
place, or, when the order is made, whether to grant the additional 
compensatory award where the employer has failed to comply with the order.  
At both stages the Courts have made it clear that what is practicable should not 
be equated with what is possible.  It has been held that the tribunal should not 
order re-engagement for instance, where the evidence ―points overwhelmingly 
to the conclusion that the consequence of any attempt to re-engage will result 
in serious industrial strife‖.230  It has also been decided that it is inappropriate 
to order reinstatement where the parties had been in a close personal 
relationship which had broken down beyond the point of repair
231
, or where 
the employer, no matter how unreasonably, remains convinced of the 
employee‘s alleged misconduct.232  In this way the tribunals‘ approach to the 
exercise of their discretion reflects the method of the common law Courts in 
that factors to be taken into account are, ―the fact that the atmosphere in the 
factory is poisoned... the fact that the employee has displayed her distrust and 
lack of confidence in her employers and would not be a satisfactory employee 
on reinstatement... insufficient employment for the employee‖.233  This 
reluctance on the part of the Courts and the tribunals to be robust in their 
application of the ―primary remedy‖ of reinstatement may in part be a 
reflection of the reluctance of judges from the common law tradition to tread 
on managerial prerogative (this is Collins‘ analysis which we have discussed 
above and which we shall consider again in this ongoing discussion).  This 
view gains additional support from the Court of Appeal‘s decision in Port of 
                                                  
230
 Bateman v British Leyland UK Ltd [1974] ICR 403,406. 
231
 Enessy Co SA v Minopriro [1978] IRLR 489. 
232
 Wood Group Heavy Industrial Turbines Ltd v Crossan [1998] IRLR 680. 
233
 Rao v Civil Aviation Authority [1992] IRLR 203, 207. 
 145 
London Authority v Payne
234
.  In that case the decision that re-engagement 
was not impracticable on the grounds that the employer could have considered 
offering voluntary redundancy to existing staff in order to make way for the 
applicant, was held to have been incorrect.  The Court said: 
 
[The tribunal] should give due weight to the commercial judgement of the management unless 
of course the witnesses are disbelieved.  The standard must not be set too high.  The employer 
cannot be expected to explore every possible avenue which ingenuity might suggest.  The 
employer does not have to show that reinstatement or re-engagement was impossible.  It is a 
matter of what is practicable in the circumstances of the employer‘s business at the relevant 
time. 
 
It may also be the case that this reluctance to award reinstatement reflects 
nervousness on the part of the Courts and the tribunals about re-inserting an 
employee into a working environment where, given the inevitable relationship 
damaging nature of litigation, the employment relation will have been, at least, 
seriously harmed.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the tribunals and the Courts are 
reticent to make judgements about whether the employment relationship, once 
legally reinstated, can practically work. 
 
The bare facts are that the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement are 
rarely awarded.  According to the Tribunal Service‘s own statistics, between 
2007 and 2008 only 8 out of the 3,791 successful claims for Unfair Dismissal 
resulted in orders of reinstatement or re-engagement.
235
  There are several 
apparent reasons for the low rate of awards.  The first picks-up on the point 
made above regarding the reluctance of the tribunals to grant such awards.  
Research conducted by the Industrial Relations Research Unit in the early 
1980s led to the conclusion that: 
 
...the [employment] tribunals pay a lot of attention to the employer‘s views regarding the 
acceptability and practicability of re-employment and rarely award the remedy in the face of 
employer opposition.  This is partly because of a view that re-employment which has to be 
imposed will not work.
236
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A related explanation (and perhaps justification) for the tribunals‘ reluctance 
to award reinstatement reflects the main reason why dismissals are found to be 
unfair.  We have argued that the tribunals are not well positioned to make 
judgements about whether or not the employer‘s reasons for dismissal are 
unfair.  The tribunals do appear aware of this gap in their competency which 
reflects in the fact that most successful Unfair Dismissal claims are successful 
based on findings of procedural unfairness.  Reinstatement and re-engagement 
may not be appropriate in cases where the dismissal was fair but for a defect in 
the procedure followed leading to the dismissal.  We return to this point in the 
next several paragraphs. 
 
The final reason for the low rate of reinstatement and re-engagement awards is 
that claimants rarely ask for them.  This is perhaps not surprising given that 
the Unfair Dismissal, the events leading to the dismissal and the litigation 
process, will frequently make the prospect of returning to work unpalatable for 
many claimants.  There is also the practical point that a number of employees 
will have found alternative work by the time they receive a decision from the 
tribunal, which makes the question of reinstatement irrelevant.   
 
It is possible to conceive of changes to the current regulation that may make 
reinstatement and re-engagement more powerful remedies; effective as a 
deterrent against unfair treatment at work.  For instance, the legislation could 
be amended to direct the tribunals to be more willing to order reinstatement 
and to restrict the right of employees to seek compensation without first 
stating a reason why reinstatement or re-engagement should not be awarded.  
Such a change in the law may cause employers in particular to focus more on 
what it means to be fair in the context of disciplinary action.  As with all cases 
of Unfair Dismissal, the employer cannot know for certain in advance of the 
tribunal‘s decision, whether their defence to a claim will be successful.  If the 
defence is not successful and the tribunal is likely to order reinstatement, the 
employer will be faced with the prospect of trying to re-integrate an employee 
who will almost certainly harbour feelings of resentment that will be difficult 
to manage.  This point was made above, but it may be better from the 
employer‘s perspective to deal with and resolve the employer‘s concerns in an 
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effort to avoid dismissal, a possible claim for Unfair Dismissal and the 
challenges of re-integration following an award of reinstatement.  On the 
employee‘s part, if they understand the tribunal‘s reluctance to award 
compensation over reinstatement, they too may be more inclined to search out 
ways of resolving the issues which have lead to the disciplinary action.  This 
would be preferable to drawn out litigation with no certainty of outcome on 
the issue of liability, only to be at best given the option by the tribunal at the 
end of the proceedings of returning to work in an environment which, 
following the litigation proceedings and because of those proceedings, is 
significantly more challenging than it was prior to the litigation.  But aside 
from the challenges associated with creating legislation which is clear enough 
in its instruction to ensure that the tribunals do in practice award reinstatement 
more readily, it is highly questionable whether a more robust approach to 
awarding remedies which result in re-employment will also result in higher 
levels of fairness perceptions.   
 
First, there remains the problem that the tribunals are unlikely and probably 
unable, for the reasons we have discussed, to challenge the employer‘s 
substantive justification for the dismissal in a way that the employees looking 
on will perceive as fair.  And if the employer‘s reason for the dismissal is not 
able to be rigorously challenged by the tribunal, the potential fairness 
incentive which might flow from a greater willingness on the part of the 
tribunals to award reinstatement is not likely to be realised.  That is because 
reinstatement cannot and will not be a commonly awarded remedy unless, 
inter-alia, there is a corresponding increase in the number of instances where 
the tribunals find Unfair Dismissal for reasons relating to substantive 
unfairness in particular.  .  The tribunals are, as we have discussed, much more 
willing and able to judge procedural fairness, but awards of reinstatement are 
unlikely to increase off the back of an increased willingness on the part of the 
tribunals to enforce stricter standards of procedural fairness.  In the case where 
Unfair Dismissal is found based on procedural unfairness only, it may well be 
that reinstatement is not appropriate, because the employer has good and 
objectively fair reasons for dismissal, which reasonably dictate that the 
employee should not be returned to work.  On this final point it is worth 
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recalling that fairness perceptions is the goal with respect to the dismissed 
employee (accepting that such a goal may be difficult to achieve) and, perhaps 
more importantly, those employees who remain employed.  The employer is 
unlikely to be perceived as fair by the remaining workforce if they re-employ 
(or do not dismiss because they fear an order for reinstatement) an employee 
who their colleagues rightly perceive to be disruptive, a poor performer, a 
trouble maker etc.   
 
Secondly, and most importantly in the context of this thesis, the remedies of 
reinstatement and re-engagement are unlikely to aid fairness perceptions 
because they almost certainly do not drive general improvements in how 
employers deal with EDG issues, in particular they are unlikely to encourage 
dispute prevention and early resolution.  That is because an employer is only 
likely to turn its mind to the remedies for Unfair Dismissal and 
consequentially be influenced by their potential impact, if dismissal and the 
possibility of an Unfair Dismissal claim is looming.  In that case it is likely 
that the dispute will have escalated to a point where the relationship may well 
be irreparably damaged and where the prospect of regaining trust and 
confidence on both sides is slim.  What is required, as we have said on several 
occasions above, is a mechanism which promotes dispute prevention and the 
early resolution of the disputes that do arise.   
 
The preceding discussion is not to say that the rigorous application of a strong 
sanction like reinstatement or compensation would not influence some 
employers to put in place practices that are likely to avoid Unfair Dismissal, 
because it may.  And those practices might focus on effective dispute 
prevention and early dispute resolution.  It is argued, however, that it would 
take a significant shift towards a much more stringent and stringently enforced 
re-employment remedy before such a remedy is likely to have a significant 
influence on the creation of internal practices that will build and maintain trust 
and promote fairness perceptions.  But such a stringent remedy would itself 
present different impediments to greater fairness at work and, in particular, the 
goal of partnership through increased fairness, which is the enhanced 
competitiveness of British businesses.  An employer who believes that its 
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ability to dismiss poor performing or misbehaving staff is impaired because 
they are likely to be reinstated, may be reluctant to hire staff in the first place, 
which may in turn inhibit the employer‘s ability to grow and prosper, which 
then has potentially negative implications for society and the economy as a 
whole.  Also an employer may be reluctant to dismiss a poor or troublesome 
employee because they fear the cost of having to defend a tribunal claim, the 
outcome of which may well be that the employee comes back to work, in 
which case the expenditure attached to defending the claim is all for nothing.   
               
5.4.2 Compensation 
 
We have discussed the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement, but what 
of the compensation remedy?  Could a substantial financial disincentive, in the 
form of a stringently enforced monetary award for Unfair Dismissal, drive 
employers to improve their approach to EDG in a manner which promotes 
fairness perceptions?  Perhaps, but the current approach of the tribunals and 
Courts to awarding compensation is unlikely to have that effect.  Let us begin 
to explore this point by first summarising the relevant statutory provisions and 
the manner in which they have been interpreted by the Courts.  Although 
compensation is intended to be the remedy of last resort, in practice over 99% 
of successful claims for Unfair Dismissal result in a monetary award.
237
  The 
award usually consists of two elements: the basic award
238
 and the 
compensatory award.
239
  The basic award is intended to compensate the 
employee for his or her loss of job security and it represents a number of 
weeks‘ gross pay calculated with reference to the employee‘s length of 
service.  Simplistically explained, an employee is entitled to a weeks‘ gross 
pay (currently capped at £350 per week) for every whole year of service up to 
a maximum of 20 weeks.  In short, the end value to the employee and the cost 
to the employer of a basic award are not likely to be substantial.  The greater 
potential for financial disincentive to unfairly dismiss is found in the wording 
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of section 123 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which describes the basis 
on which tribunals can make a compensatory award for Unfair Dismissal. 
 
Section 123 is designed to compensate the employee for the loss suffered as a 
result of dismissal.  Specifically subsection 1 states that: 
 
... [T]he amount of the compensatory award shall be such amount as the tribunal considers just 
and equitable in all the circumstances have regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in 
consequence of the dismissal in so far as that loss is attributable to action taken by the 
employer. 
 
On a plain and isolated reading of this provision it seems that the 
compensatory award might provide a potentially substantial tool in the quest 
to achieve greater fairness at work, but of course the provision cannot be read 
in isolation.  The first point to make in this context is that the level of 
compensation awardable is capped.  Section 124 of the Act establishes that the 
compensatory award shall be subject to a maximum which is currently just in 
excess of £66,000, and which is updated annually by statutory instrument.  
The cap might be considered a barrier to behaviour changing awards of 
compensation, in that it limits the extent to which the tribunals can in certain 
cases award compensation that genuinely reflects what the employee has lost, 
but in actuality the tribunals very rarely award compensation anywhere near 
the level of the cap.   
 
In practice, the average award of compensation in Unfair Dismissal cases is a 
small fraction of what is permitted and from 2007 to 2008 the median award 
was £4,000.
240
  The low rates of awards may in part be because a large 
proportion of the claimants are low earners with short service, but it is also, 
and perhaps mainly, because of how the employment tribunals and Courts 
have interpreted and applied the legislation.  The award is a compensatory 
award, it is not intended to penalise the employer for poor treatment of its 
staff.  The award must only reflect what the employee actually lost as a result 
of the dismissal, which is thereafter subject to a number of deductions.  Some 
of the deductions are remnants of the common law approach to calculating 
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compensation, while others are driven primarily by the Act, but have been 
applied by the Courts in a way that gives the statutory provisions greater 
significance as a force for driving down levels of compensation.   
 
First, the employee‘s compensation will be reduced if they have not taken 
steps to mitigate their loss by attempting to find another job or source of 
income.
241
  If they do find alternative work then any award of compensation 
will be reduced by the income that they have received in their new role.  
Secondly, the employment tribunals have the power under section 123(6) of 
the Act to make a reduction in the compensatory award where the employee is 
found to have contributed to the dismissal.  Such reductions are, in the writer‘s 
experience, frequently made, and they are often substantial, in some cases up 
to 100%.
242
  Thirdly, the employment tribunals are prepared to reduce 
compensatory awards by application of the ―no difference rule‖ which derives 
from the decision in Polkey v A E Dayton Services Ltd.
243
  The question of 
whether or not to apply this rule arises where the dismissal is unfair because of 
a procedural defect only.  The point for consideration is whether the employee 
would have been dismissed even if the procedure had been fair; in other 
words, did the flawed process make any difference to the outcome of the 
dismissal?  If the tribunal decides that the employer‘s failure to follow a fair 
procedure did not affect the outcome, then it will be right to make no 
compensatory award.  If the tribunal is in doubt about whether the employee 
would have been dismissed, then that doubt ―can be reflected by reducing the 
normal amount of compensation by a percentage representing the chance that 
the employee would still have lost his employment‖.244  In addition to the 
sources of deduction just mentioned, the tribunals will reduce compensatory 
awards to reflect ex-gratia payments made by the employer and other 
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payments which serve to reduce the amount of money the employee has lost 
because they were dismissed from their previous position.
245
 
 
A further important point to consider is the extent to which the tribunals and 
the Courts have been prepared to award compensation for non-pecuniary loss.  
It is difficult to argue against the suggestion that much of what the unfairly 
dismissed employee suffers is not financial loss; they suffer other damage 
which may be more important to them than pure loss of income and other 
financially measureable benefits (e.g. hurt and humiliation caused by the 
manner of the dismissal).  If the tribunals fail to award remedies to 
compensate for such loss it is inevitable that the employee will feel they have 
not been fully recompensed for what they have suffered which may, amongst 
other consequences, negatively impact the employee‘s assessment of the worth 
of the regulatory system as a mechanism for protecting them from unfair 
treatment at work.  This creates a further barrier to the argument that the law 
of Unfair Dismissal can have the effect of imparting credibility to the 
employer‘s promises (in policy documents, in presentation and in contracts) 
about its desire to treat employees fairly.  This potential effect of aiding 
credible promises must be in question if the remedies that the tribunals award 
for Unfair Dismissal do not address and compensate for the important 
consequences of that unfairness.  But, that said, it is apparent from the 
wording of section 123(1) of the Act that it was open to the tribunals and 
Courts to award financial compensation for non-pecuniary loss which flows 
from an Unfair Dismissal, including the unfair manner of the dismissal (i.e. 
where there was procedural unfairness).  This point was addressed obiter by 
Lord Hoffman in Johnson v Unisys
246
: 
 
[In] Norton Tool Co v Tewson ... it was said that the word ‗loss‘ can only mean financial loss.  
But I think that is too narrow a construction.  The emphasis is upon the tribunal awarding such 
compensation as it thinks just and equitable.  So I see no reason why in an appropriate case it 
should not include compensation for distress, humiliation, damage to reputation in the 
community or to family life. 
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However, since the Johnson decision the House of Lords has confirmed that 
compensation for Unfair Dismissal should only be payable in respect of 
identifiable financial loss.
247
  The unwillingness of the Courts to permit 
awards of compensation for non-pecuniary loss further limits the extent to 
which the law of Unfair Dismissal is likely to be a check on unfair treatment at 
work.  One presumes that if such loss was recoverable the average award of 
compensation would increase which may result in a greater wariness on the 
part of employers in relation to how they handle EDG.    
 
So as things stand there is little prospect of the financial awards for Unfair 
Dismissal amounting to a significant disincentive to employers not to treat 
employees unfairly in the context of EDG.  That is not to say they are no 
disincentive, particularly for smaller employees, but for financial awards to 
play a substantial role in encouraging fair treatment at work which is likely to 
improve fairness perceptions, those awards would have to be more substantial 
than they are.  They would probably have to take the form of some kind of 
penalty or, at the very least the scope of potential deductions and the cap on 
compensation would have to be revised.   
 
But increased and substantial financial ‗compensation‘ to penalise poor 
treatment of staff is likely to have the same negative effects that we discussed 
might result from a more stringent application of the remedies of reinstatement 
and re-engagement.  Assuming that the legislation could be effectively 
amended to require the tribunals and the Courts to tread firmly on managerial 
prerogative by ordering large financial remedies, substantial financial 
penalties for Unfair Dismissal may, if awarded, seriously weaken or even 
destroy some businesses, and therefore the prospect of such awards is likely to 
drive defensive hiring policies and a reluctance on the part of the employer to 
effectively address issues of poor performance and misconduct.  This 
reluctance can in turn negatively impact the fairness perceptions of other staff.  
Such an outcome is anathema to the end goal of fairness at work which is 
improved business competitiveness.   
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Penal remedies for dismissal may also encourage employees to raise claims 
(including resigning and claiming constructive dismissal) in the hope that the 
employer will be prepared to give the employee a smaller, but nevertheless 
substantial, financial payment in order to avoid the possibility of a much larger 
financial penalty following a tribunal hearing.  But this incentive is 
inconsistent with a policy aimed at partnerships, fairness perceptions and 
OCB; a policy which requires the parties to prevent and resolve disputes by 
better communication and building trust.  Mutual trust is less likely to evolve 
if employees are encouraged by legislation to seek financial gains in 
preference to exploring with their employer how to resolve their differences, 
whilst maintaining and improving their employment relationship.     
 
The issue of financial payments to address concerns about unfairness raises a 
further point of inquiry.  Again, we address this point in more detail in what 
follows, but it is worth discussing briefly in the current context.  So far we 
have talked about remedies as a disincentive to undertake certain unfair 
behaviour in the first place.  There is certainly a place for such remedies, but 
there must also be a place for remedies that effectively target the problem in 
dispute and provide a potential avenue for it to be resolved without dismissal 
and without recourse to financial compensation or penalties.  In other words, 
financial payments may, notwithstanding the challenges that have just been 
outlined, limit the behaviour that gives rise to the dispute, but they are unlikely 
to effectively compensate or address disputes that arise despite the financial 
remedy and which relate to issues of fairness.  For example, an employee who 
is dismissed and whose dismissal is found to be unfair has not had their 
complaint effectively resolved and nor are they appropriately compensated for 
the loss and damage they have suffered, by the award of a financial remedy.  
The loss they suffered would almost certainly have included a sense of 
humiliation, upset, and loss of confidence, loss of social ties with his 
workmates, loss of purpose, and financial loss.  A financial remedy does not 
address this list of damages, but what is the alternative?  Reinstatement may 
be one alternative, but the difficulties with this remedy are apparent and have 
been outlined above.   
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The only alternative may be to focus a greater level of regulatory attention on 
preventing disputes or ensuring that they are effectively raised (which means 
in part that they are raised early) and resolved (if possible) before they escalate 
to the point of dismissal or resignation.  In other words regulation should 
strive to significantly diminish the relevance of the financial remedy, 
including its relevance as a mechanism for discouraging unfair behaviour at 
work.    The regulatory model to achieve this will be a radical departure from 
the current model, and it must take into account the peculiarities of different 
workplaces and separate instances of EDG.                              
 
5.5 Unfair Dismissal and fairness perception: a brief summary 
 
Let us summarise the position so far.  The current law of Unfair Dismissal 
usually requires that employers follow a fair procedure before they dismiss an 
employee.  In addition to the general standard of fairness the previous 
Government introduced the statutory procedure which if not complied with 
resulted in an automatic finding of unfairness and enhanced levels of 
compensation.  While both forms of regulation may have the effect of 
increasing employee job security by limiting the freedom of employers to 
dismiss, they are not likely to have a significant impact on the goal of 
maximising fairness perceptions.  That is in large part because laws that 
require a prescribed form of procedure before a dismissal is lawful are likely 
to encourage a perception that the employer‘s process is a façade of fairness to 
protect them from legal action and is not in place to give them a meaningful 
say in the decision process.  Further, employers are required to refrain from 
dismissal if the substantive reason for the dismissal is objectively unfair.  Only 
when the employer‘s view of substantive fairness converges with that of its 
employees‘ understanding of the concept will employees perceive that their 
employer is fair. But the broad and undefined concepts of fairness and 
reasonableness mean that this convergence of views is highly unlikely for the 
reasons already discussed.   
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Further, the weakness of the current law as a means of maximising fairness 
perceptions goes beyond the challenges associated with substantive and 
procedural fairness judgements.  This is apparent when we recall that the 
conflict continuum which predicts that a significant proportion of disciplinary 
action, including dismissal, sits at the end of the continuum and is rooted in 
earlier unresolved perceptions of unfairness that the employee has internalised 
or responded to by retaliation which has led to, for example, a dip in 
performance or some form of misconduct.  The dip in performance or 
misconduct may have been the direct and immediate cause of the dismissal, 
but its genesis is often far more complex.  If we accept this we must recognise 
that the law of Unfair Dismissal and the statutory procedure in particular, are 
and were too focused at the end of the conflict spectrum to have any real 
chance of minimising conflict and maximising employee judgements that the 
employer is fair and trustworthy.  The law of Unfair Dismissal and the 
statutory procedure are and were framed in a way that turns the employer‘s 
attention to the issue of process when they are considering disciplinary 
sanctions and the possibility of dismissal and not before, but by that stage the 
attitudes of the parties towards each other have almost certainly deteriorated 
such that the likelihood of re-establishing mutual trust is limited.  This fact 
seems to be reflected, in part at least, in the results of a study carried out by 
Rollinson et al which cast doubt on the effectiveness of disciplinary action on 
the behaviour of employees.
248
  The research found that most disciplined 
workers had a tendency to further rule break and two reasons given for this 
was a feeling by employees that the disciplinary process was flawed and that 
management decisions were a form of revenge for earlier behaviour.  In other 
words the disciplinary process and outcome can be seen as one further step in 
the conflict continuum which led to retaliatory and non-productive behaviour 
from the employee and which brought the employment relation closer to an 
end.  If the employer had been encouraged to engage with the employee at an 
earlier stage, when the attitude of the parties to each other was almost certainly 
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more attuned or receptive to resolution rather than disciplinary sanctions and 
retaliation, the outcome may have been more favourable for all concerned.   
 
But the law is not formulated to achieve that outcome: the law is focused on 
minimising the number of occasions an employer responds to an employee‘s 
misconduct or poor performance by dismissing in a manner that the law 
considers is unfair (and we can question whether it successfully achieves that 
objective).  However, if the goal is fairness maximisation the law relating to 
dismissals and disciplinary action should be re-focused on reducing the types 
and instances of behaviour by both sides that result in the employer taking 
formal disciplinary action in the first place.   How to achieve this is the 
question?  We have already made the case that imposing a standard 
disciplinary process on the parties is not the way forward and that the 
preferred approach is to mandate that the parties develop their own policy and 
procedure (including an understanding of fairness standards) which takes 
account of the peculiarities of the particularly workplace and is adaptable to fit 
any instance of conflict.  Is it enough therefore to leave employers to develop 
their own procedures?  No must be the answer to that question.  Any such 
process will tend to reflect the interests of the employer and is unlikely to be 
viewed as fair by the employer‘s workforce.  In the Rollinson study mentioned 
earlier it was discovered that employees objected to their employer‘s policies 
and procedures in large part because they felt those rules lacked legitimacy.
249
  
This tends to confirm that it is in the interests of all parties to ensure that there 
is in place policies and processes relating to EDG that are effective and 
acceptable to those who are required to operate them, and equally to those 
whose concerns they address.  In this respect, it will be helpful to involve 
employees in the formulation and implementation of those polices and rules.  
This approach will mean a significant change for most employers in the way 
they devise and utilise their workplace policies and procedures.  Kersley et al 
in their study of data from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
found that grievance and disciplinary procedures had not been subject to 
consultation or negotiation with employees or their representative in four-
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fifths of all workplaces sampled.
250
  The law must be formulated to alter this 
statistic if any process is to be view as fair in terms of its form and 
implementation. 
 
There is a further point worth making at this stage.  Recall the argument that 
the policy objective of regulation in the area of EDG is to maximise OCD by 
increasing fairness perceptions amongst employees.  It is important to 
remember that the employees whose perceptions we are concerned with are 
not just those who are subject to disciplinary action; we are also concerned 
with the perceptions of their colleagues looking on.  And in cases of dismissal 
it is the perceptions of the remaining employees that matter the most – the 
dismissed employee is gone and the importance of their perception will be 
marginal in most cases.  Moreover, it is not just the decision to dismiss that 
will be subject to scrutiny by the employer‘s other employees, the decision not 
to dismiss will also be subject to fairness and reasonableness judgements.  Just 
as a decision to dismiss may be judged by the remaining workforce as unfair, 
so to a decision not to dismiss may be judged as unfair and the consequences 
of not dismissing may have direct or indirect negatives impacts on employee 
OCB and productivity. Take for example the case of an employee who is 
constantly performing below an acceptable standard.  Their failure to perform 
is having a negative impact over a long period of time on his colleagues who 
are forced to work extra hours for no additional reward to cover the poorly 
performing employee‘s inadequacies.  The employee in question has been 
warned on a number of occasions regarding their failings but those warnings 
have apparently fallen on deaf ears.  The employee‘s colleagues have 
complained about the poor performance and its impact on them but still the 
employer will not dismiss the offending worker.  Why is the employer 
reluctant to dismiss?   
 
Herein lays a key dilemma for employers faced with the current Unfair 
Dismissal legislation and it is an important weakness of this and equivalent 
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employment protection legislation the world over.  Many employers are 
reluctant to dismiss because they are not certain that dismissal will be lawful 
(that is, that it will not be judged as fair by an employment tribunal).  And they 
have good reason to be unclear about whether a decision to dismiss will be 
judged as unfair – it is impossible to be certain.  It is simply not possible when 
dealing with concepts such as fairness and reasonableness to assess in any 
given instance that a decision to dismiss will or will not be judged by a 
tribunal as unfair.  Of course there will be cases where the judgement can be 
made with a level of confidence, but this will not always be the case.  The 
result of this uncertainty is that many employers will act conservatively or in a 
way that seeks to avoid dismissal when dismissal may well be the correct 
outcome for the business and the rest of the workforce.  Any regulatory model 
that seeks to increase fairness perceptions and OCB will have to overcome this 
weakness in the current legislation and provide employers with a greater level 
of certainty regarding when it is lawful to dismiss.            
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CHAPTER 6: DOES CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF 
GRIEVANCES AID FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS?  
 
To this point our discussion of the law of Unfair Dismissal has focused on its 
relationship to disciplinary action and dismissal, but any attempt to understand 
the limits of the law in the context of fairness maximisation requires us to also 
consider the law‘s impact on grievances.  This discussion is particularly 
important given our understanding that grievances and disciplinary action are 
often inextricably linked in that an unresolved grievance can lead to negative 
employee behaviour that can result in disciplinary action and perhaps 
dismissal.  Furthermore, its link with disciplinary action and dismissal aside, 
the manner in which an employer responds to employee grievances can, as we 
have discussed, have an important bearing on an employee‘s productivity, 
their level of OCB and other factors that are vital for organisational 
effectiveness, including staff retention.   
 
As with the law of Unfair Dismissal, in this chapter concerning grievance 
regulation we argue that the regulatory focus is on procedural fairness rather 
than distributive and interactional fairness, thereby limiting the extent to 
which the law can effectively influence the employer to take action that might 
be judged as fair by its employees.  Further, this chapter argues that regulation 
of employee grievances provides aggrieved employees with limited options 
for legal recourse beyond resignation and taking their chances with a claim for 
constructive dismissal.  But such a claim is drastic and likely to be taken by 
the employee with great reluctance, and the unlikely prospect of having to 
defend such a claim will not tend to positively influence employer behaviour.   
Further, by the time an employee is contemplating such action the odds of 
maintaining a productive relationship with their employer are low and, 
therefore, even if, in that instance of EDG, the employer did turn their mind to 
the employee‘s view of fairness, it is likely to be too little too late.   
 
But would regulation which provides a meaningful remedy for unfairness at 
work make any real difference to the level of positive fairness perceptions?  
Such remedies exist in New Zealand but, it is argued, they are unlikely to 
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substantially influence greater levels of fairness.  That is in large part because 
assessing fairness continues to be based on non-specific standards which are 
unlikely to result in a common view of what it means to be fair in every 
instance of EDG, and the Employment Relations Authority in New Zealand is 
predominately focused on procedural fairness when interpreting and applying 
those standards.  Further, it is a significant and bold step to litigate against 
your current employer and employees will, it is argued, be reluctant to take 
such action.  Where employers know this they are not likely to be influenced 
by the potential for such claims in a way that drives employer behaviour 
which will influence fairness perceptions.  
 
6.1 Regulating employee grievances – extreme abstentionism 
 
In the first part of this chapter we consider the extent to which regulation of 
employee grievances in Britain provides a mechanism for generating fairness 
perceptions.  We look at the status of internal grievance procedures, the 
implied term of trust and confidence and the regulatory experiment that was 
the Statutory Grievance Procedure.  
 
6.1.1 The legal status of internal grievance procedures 
 
Most employers in Britain have adopted some form of grievance procedure for 
managers and employees to follow in relation to employee complaints about 
perceived negative treatment that they have received during the term of their 
employment.
251
  In some instances those procedures are incorporated 
expressly or impliedly within the contract of employment, in the remainder of 
cases the grievance procedures are expressed to sit outside the contract as 
policies which the employer has the right to amend without the agreement of 
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their employees.
252
  This distinction between contractual and non-contractual 
disciplinary grievance procedures is, on the face of it, an important one.  
Where an employer fails to follow a contractual grievance process they are in 
breach of contract and in principle the employee has grounds to pursue a claim 
for breach of contract in the employment tribunals or the Courts.  Where, 
however, the procedure is not contractually binding on the employer, the 
employer‘s failure to follow the procedure will not by itself give rise to a 
breach of contract claim.  The employee may claim that the employer‘s refusal 
to follow the non-contractual process amounts to a breach of the implied term 
of trust and confidence, which we shall discuss in more detail below, but this 
is a more challenging claim to successfully pursue for the obvious reason that 
a breach of the non-contractual procedure is not necessarily a breach of 
contract, whereas non-compliance with a contractually binding procedure is.  
The barriers of proof and evidence are substantially higher in the former 
compared to the latter.   
 
Importantly of course the contractual or non-binding nature of the grievance 
procedure is primarily an issue of process, not substance.  An employer may 
have in place a written contractual process which it follows, but adherence to 
that process will not necessarily resolve the substance of the employee‘s 
grievance in a fair manner.  Where the employee considers that their grievance 
has not been dealt with fairly, what if any, further recourse do they have?  
Some procedures provide a right of internal appeal, but assuming that also 
does not satisfy the employee, does the law provide the employee with a 
meaningful avenue of complaint?  The cautious answer to that question is 
―possibly‖.  While it is possible that the contract of employment provides an 
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the tribunal had been justified in its finding that the individual employment contract contained 
an implied term that employers would reasonably and promptly afford a reasonable 
opportunity to their employees to obtain redress of any grievance they may have.  As with any 
implied term, this term can be specifically excluded by the express wording of the 
employment contract (see Mahmoud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. 
[1998] AC 20).  It is not uncommon, as we suggest above, for employers to expressly provide 
in their contracts of employment that disciplinary and grievance procedures are not 
contractually binding on the parties. 
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express right that might form the basis of a breach of contract claim which 
challenges the substantive outcome of the grievance (for example, a right to be 
treated fairly and in good faith) such express provisions are not, in the writer‘s 
experience, the norm.  More likely the employee will be forced to formulate a 
claim based on the implied term of trust and confidence.
253
   
 
6.1.2 The implied term of trust and confidence and the inadequacy of 
remedies for breach 
 
This implied term has been judicially formulated as follows: the employer 
shall not without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner 
calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust between employer and employee.
254
  On its face, 
therefore, the implied term of trust and confidence might provide an aggrieved 
employee with an opportunity for justice where they perceive that they have 
been treated unfairly or unreasonably whilst in employment, and their 
complaint has not been resolved by the employer to the employee‘s 
satisfaction.  Any initial optimism should, however, be reflected upon with 
caution. 
 
Following analysis of a line of cases culminating in the Court of Appeal‘s 
decision in Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v 
Buckland
255
, Bogg argues that the implied term of trust and confidence is 
based on, or should be interpreted with reference to, the concept of 
reasonableness. Without the concept of reasonableness, Bogg argues, ―trust 
and confidence simply could not function‖.256  Whilst suggesting that there is 
                                                  
253
 This assumes that the employee‘s complaint is not grounds for a claim that the employee 
has been discriminated against on one of the protection grounds of discrimination (for 
example, race, sex or disability).  In that case the claim of discrimination could be pursued 
whilst in employment in reliance on one of the discrimination statutes and the various actions 
available under that legislations (for example, the Equality Act 2010). 
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 See Mahmoud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. [1998] AC 20; Woods v 
W. M. Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666, 670; Lewis v Motorworld Garages 
Ltd [1986] ICR 157; and Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1991] 1 
WLR 589. 
255
 [2010] ICR 908. 
256
 A L Bogg ―Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v Buckland: Re-
establishing Orthodoxy at the expense of Coherence‖ (2010) 39 ILJ 408, 419. 
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no general duty on the employer to act reasonably, Bogg argues that the 
implied term gives rise to ―a multiplicity of more specific rules which deploy 
reasonableness in a crisp and focused way (i.e. did the employer‘s conduct 
have reasonable cause?  Was the contractual power exercised within 
appropriate parameters of reasonableness?  Was there reasonable reliance so 
as to generate a protected legitimate expectation?)‖.257  Bogg‘s interpretation 
might suggest that the law, via the implied term, does in fact provide 
employees who have complaints of unreasonableness and unfairness, with a 
potential and effective remedy for unfair treatment.  But, it is argued, such an 
assertion is likely to be an overstatement or, at the very least, it requires 
careful qualification.  Bogg‘s assessment that the implied term has resulted in 
a number of cases where the tribunals and Courts have placed limits on 
employer power and managerial prerogative, is of course correct, but those 
limits have their own boundaries that are established by the judicial definition 
of the implied term that is described above: to breach the term the offending 
behaviour must be calculated to destroy or seriously damage the employment 
relationship.   
 
In other words, whilst it may be true that the implied term has acted as the 
foundation for a number of specific rules prohibiting certain forms of 
employer behaviour, it is also true that the behaviour prohibited by those rules 
was of a particularly harsh nature.  The cases that Bogg cites to support his 
case help to reinforce this point.
258
  The implied term does not, therefore, we 
argue, provide a legal basis for raising concerns about employer behaviour that 
the employee perceives as unfair, but which is not, by any objective measure, 
―calculated to destroy or seriously damage the employment relationship‖.  
And this continues to leave a gap, discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter, between the law and genuine employee concerns about unfairness; 
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 Supra at note 256, 419. 
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 For example, Gogay v Hertfordshire CC [2000] IRLR 703 (where the Court of Appeal 
scrutinised the employer‘s exercise of disciplinary powers of suspension following an 
allegation of sexual abuse); United Bank v Akhtar [1989] IRLR 507 (the employee was given 
6 days notice that he was required to move his employment from Leeds to Birmingham and he 
was refused a relocation allowance); French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646 (the employee 
was required to relocate by his employer and the employers provided an interest free loan to 
support the move.  The employer subsequently sought to adjust the terms of the loan which 
would have cause the employee to suffer a financial loss of £40,000). 
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concerns which do not stand to be tested by legal rules, but which nevertheless 
stand in the way of fairness perceptions.  While it is true that the implied term 
and its applications are evolving, and may evolve into a general duty of 
fairness or good faith, it is submitted here that no such evolution is foreseeable 
in the near future.
259
   
 
The shortcomings of the implied term as a mechanism for driving higher 
levels of fairness perceptions deserves further comment in the current context.  
Many if not most concerns that an employee is likely to have about treatment 
at work will not derive from employer behaviour that is calculated to destroy 
or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust.  But, as we have 
explained, the genesis of more serious outcomes and negative impacts on 
fairness perceptions can be found in these seemingly less significant 
grievances and the law should, in the context of a policy aimed at maximising 
fairness perceptions, be concerned to avoid instances where employee 
grievances escalate such that the complaint becomes a serious issue that may 
amount to a breach of the implied term.  Take for instance the employee who 
is aggrieved because they believe that their manager is overly verbally 
aggressive towards them.  The employee complains but the employer, having 
heard the complaint, decides to take no action.  The employer has in place a 
non-contractual grievance procedure, but the employer chooses not to follow 
the procedure in this instance because it views the employee‘s complaint as 
unreasonable.  It is highly unlikely that the employee in the example will have 
grounds to successfully claim that the employee‘s action (or inaction) amounts 
to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence.  But the employee is 
not satisfied.  They feel that they have been unfairly brushed aside by the 
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 To complete this point the writer prefers to explain the implied term of trust and confidence 
with reference to the following statement by Mark Freedland, who argues that a central 
function of the implied term is to establish ―a general standard of behaviour for employing 
entities and employees, which is elaborated in particular contexts or aspects of employment 
relations‖.  Adopting this statement in the current context this thesis argues that the implied 
term of trust and confidence does provide a general and adaptable standard of behaviour or 
fairness, but that standard is set so as to provide employers with considerable leeway in terms 
of what is and is not permissible.  That leeway is inconsistent with the policy objectives 
expressed in this thesis.
 
(M. R. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) 159). 
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employer.  They perceive that the employer is unfair.  They immediately begin 
searching for an alternative position, their standard of work performance 
reduces and their level of absence from work increases to the point that they 
are issued with a formal warning. They shortly thereafter resign.  If in the 
example the employer was under potential threat of a successful claim for 
breach of contract or some other legal obligation, would they have dealt with 
the employee‘s claim in a manner that was more likely to satisfy the 
employee?  That different approach may not have resulted in the employee‘s 
ideal outcome, but it may have involved the employer proceeding to address 
the grievance in a manner which demonstrated to the employee that at least the 
complaint was taken seriously and fairly considered.   
 
6.1.3 Constructive dismissal – an unsatisfactory choice? 
 
Further, if we assume an instance where the behaviour of the employer is 
sufficiently serious enough to constitute a breach of the implied term, what is 
the employee‘s remedy?  The employee continues in their role and their 
reputation is intact so there is no question of them having suffered any 
financial loss for which they might be compensated by an award of damages.  
The employee may well have suffered distress and injury to feelings by the 
employer‘s conduct, but the tribunal or Court is highly unlikely to award 
compensation for such non-pecuniary loss.
260
  Can the employee obtain a non-
financial remedy; can the employee insist that the employer follow the 
grievance procedure or, more to the point, can the employee obtain an order 
from the tribunal or Court that the employer must require the manager to 
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 In a contractual action, the right to recover damages for injury to feelings is restricted by 
the decision of the House of Lords in Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488. In that 
case a company wrongfully dismissed a manager in was that the Court accepted was ―harsh 
and humiliating‖ (at 493).  Their Lordships refused however to make an award of damages for 
the injury to feelings cause by the manner of his dismissal.  However, in Johnson v Unisys Ltd 
[2001] UKHL 13, an employee who recovered the maximum compensation amount under the 
unfair dismissal legislation also sought to recover damages for non-pecuniary loss at common 
law, alleging that the manner of his dismissal constituted a separate breach of contract which 
had cause him mental distress.  The House of Lords rejected the claim on the grounds that it 
would be wrong to allow the financial limit set down by the statutory scheme for unfair 
dismissal to be evaded by giving the claimant a parallel remedy at common law which is 
subject to no such limit.  Significantly therefore it appears that the House of Lords has left 
open the door for a possible review of the Addis judgement where the claim is pursued 
discretely as a common law action.  It would however take a very brave employment tribunal 
to award such a remedy without further and clearer guidance from a higher Court. 
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behave in a different and less aggressive way?  No is the simple answer.  The 
common law will not normally permit a Court or tribunal to make an award of 
specific performance in such circumstances.  While it is the case that the 
traditional limits on the award of specific performance have been significantly 
relaxed in the context of the employment relationship,
261
 it remains highly 
unlikely that the Courts will make an award requiring an employer to alter the 
outcome of a grievance procedure where the procedure was followed, but the 
outcome was, or was perceived by the employee, to be unfair.
262
  Such power 
over the substantive outcomes of processes that occur within the context of an 
ongoing employment relationship is well beyond what the common law Courts 
have demonstrated they are willing to wield.  The Courts are only likely to 
order specific substantive outcomes following a grievance process on the 
occasion where the contract or grievance procedure expressly requires the 
employer to reach those specific substantial outcomes in the circumstances of 
the grievance, and such occasions are, in the writer‘s experience, rare.         
 
In short, therefore, unless an employee can establish that the basis of their 
grievance amounts to a breach of contract (perhaps a breach of the implied 
term of trust and confidence) or some unlawful form of discrimination, the 
employee has no action at common law or statute.  And even if the employee 
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 H. Collins, K. D. Ewing and A. McColgan, Labour Law, Text and Materials (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2005) 463. 
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 Generally speaking the Courts will not award specific performance where the contract 
provides for personal performance by the defendant (see Edwin Peel, Treitel: The law of 
Contract (12
th
 ed., London, 2009) 1100).  Also, specific performance will not be ordered of 
continuous contractual duties, the proper performance of which might require constant 
supervision by the Court, and that would certainly apply in the case of the example given in 
the text above (see Ryan v Mutual Tontine Association [1893] 1 Ch 116 and Treitel: The Law 
of Contract (at 1114)).  But see later discussion regarding compliance orders under the 
provisions of the New Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000.  This not to say that the 
Courts will not grant injunctions to restrain an employer from taking action against an 
employee where, for instance, the employer has failed to follow their internal disciplinary 
process (see CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307).  The principle situation to be 
considered is that in which an employer purports to dismiss the employee without granting 
him or her the benefit of a contractual procedure, or without having a good substantive reason 
when, in the rare instances where this is the case, the contract requires such a substantive 
reason.  The employee may then refuse to accept that the employer‘s breach has brought the 
contract to an end and seek an injunction to restrain the employer from treating the employee 
as dismissed until the correct procedure is operated and/or a good reason established (see 
Jones v Lee [1980] ICR 310; Irani v Southampton and South West Hampshire Health 
Authority [1985] IRLR 203; Robb v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council 
[1991] IRLR 7).  A specific order may also be sought to prevent a unilateral variation of 
contractual terms (McLaren v Home Office [1990] IRLR 338) or unauthorised action short of 
dismissal (Honeyford v Bradford Metropolitan City Council [1986] IRLR 32).      
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can establish a breach of contract, they will have no remedy unless the 
employer‘s breach has caused them some form of financial loss for which the 
tribunal or Court may award damages.  In many cases where the breach occurs 
in the context of an ongoing relationship which continues beyond and despite 
the breach, the employee will not have suffered financial loss for which they 
can be compensated.   The only potential avenue of claim is for the aggrieved 
employee is to resign and claim constructive Unfair Dismissal.  But this is a 
drastic step for the employee to take.  They will potentially be left without a 
job and income for an indefinite period and there are certainly no guarantees 
that the Unfair Dismissal claim will succeed.  There is never a guaranteed 
outcome in any Unfair Dismissal case, but the hurdles to success are greater 
for the employee in the context of a constructive dismissal claim.  In that case 
the onus is on the employee to establish that the employer‘s behaviour was 
such that the employee can say they have been dismissed pursuant to section 
95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
263
  Effectively, this course 
reflects the common law approach to repudiation and cancellation or 
termination of contracts.  In other words the employee is asserting by their 
resignation that the employer‘s behaviour amounted to a breach of contract 
such that the employee was entitled to bring the contract to a conclusion and 
they chose to do so.  Having established dismissal, the onus switches to the 
employer to show that the dismissal was fair.
264
  And given that the employee 
is alleging repudiation on the part of the employer, it is not enough to 
overcome their onus for the employee to demonstrate that the employer was 
unreasonable, nor is it enough that the employer was merely in breach of 
contract.  The employee must adduce evidence to support a conclusion that the 
employer conducted itself in a manner which constituted a fundamental breach 
of the employment contract.
265
  Further, even if the employee is successful in 
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 Section 95(1)(c) states an employee is dismissed if, inter alia, ―the employee terminates the 
contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is 
entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer‘s conduct.‖  Cases such as 
Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharpe [1978] ICR 693 demonstrate the question of onus.  
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 Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1982] ICR 693. 
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 Western Excavating (ECC) v Sharp [1978] ICR 221.  Note also that it is possible for the 
employer to commit a fundamental breach of contract by a series of acts which taken 
separately, do not amount to a fundamental breach.  In Lewis v Motorworld Garages Ltd 
[1986] ICR 157, 167 Neill J made the following statement of principle: ―[I]t is now 
established that the repudiatory conduct may consist of a series of acts or incidents, some of 
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their claim, they will have expended considerable effort and emotion getting to 
that point.  They may also have incurred the cost of legal representation which 
will offset to a degree (potentially to a substantial degree) the value of any 
financial remedy awarded to them by the tribunal or Court.
266
   
 
In short it is very arguably inconsistent with the policy objective of OCB and 
maximising employee fairness perceptions that frequently the only legal 
recourse an aggrieved employee has against unfair treatment at the hands of 
his employer (and extreme treatment at that), is resignation and a claim for 
constructive Unfair Dismissal – with all of the challenges and disadvantages 
that pursuing such a claim inevitably entails.  Some may argue that the threat 
of such a claim sitting in the background is a sufficient incentive for the 
employer to treat its employees well, but such an argument is arguably 
incorrect.  The substantial hurdles to a successful constructive dismissal claim 
that are discussed above mean that the chances of an employer being faced 
with a claim (let alone a successful claim) for constructive Unfair Dismissal 
are relatively small and unlikely to weigh heavily on the mind of an employer 
and its managers as they go about their daily interactions with staff.  Much 
more likely to drive good treatment of employees is an enlightened 
understanding, unrelated to legal regulation, on the part of the employer that 
fair rather than unfair treatment of employees can create a loyal and more 
productive workforce.  Moreover, any employee who has reached the point 
where resignation and legal action is the only possible option is party to an 
employment relationship which is probably beyond repair.  Here again the law 
intervenes at a point in time on the dispute continuum that is simply too late to 
be of any significant value.     
                                                                                                                                
them perhaps quite trivial, which cumulatively amount to a repudiatory breach of the implied 
term of the contract of employment that the employer will not, without reasonable and proper 
cause, conduct himself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the 
relationship of confidence and trust between the employer and employee...‖. 
266
 We discuss further on the remedy of reinstatement.  Reinstatement is unlikely to be 
awarded in a constructive dismissal claim given that the essence of the claim is the employee 
saying to the tribunal that the employer‘s behaviour was so offensive as to render the 
relationship repudiated.  The employee chose to accept the repudiation and terminate the 
contract; he cannot now alter his thinking and seek to have the contract reconstituted.  If for 
no other reason the tribunal is likely to determine that reinstatement in such a case in not 
practicable pursuant to the guidance provided in section 116 of the Employment Relations Act 
1996. 
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6.1.4 The Statutory Grievance Procedure – a step in the right direction? 
 
The obvious shortcoming of the law as it stands in relation to employee 
grievances is that it lacks teeth when they are needed most.  For the law 
relating to employee grievances to have any hope of positively impacting on 
the fairness perceptions of existing employees, it must be prepared to 
meaningfully intervene at a point in time when the relationship can be 
protected and thereafter encouraged to thrive.  Currently, its only meaningful 
point of intervention is, arguably, upon resignation via the law of constructive 
Unfair Dismissal.  Moreover, the law only mandates fair behaviour on the part 
of the employer (unlawful discrimination aside) in the context of dismissal 
(that is, in relation to the reasons for the dismissal and the process followed 
leading to the dismissal).  The employer is not legally prohibited from treating 
their employees unfairly and unreasonably during employment except to the 
extent that such treatment is severe enough to constitute a breach of the 
employment contract (for example, because the treatment amounts to a breach 
of the implied term of trust and confidence).   And as we have discussed, even 
then the remedies available to the employee for breach of contract while they 
remain employed can be little or nothing.  If the law is to have any chance of 
encouraging fairness perceptions and maximising OCB, it must present 
employees with a meaningful opportunity to seek redress for perceived unfair 
treatment while at work.  In this way the law will also send a stronger signal to 
employers that it requires fair treatment at work which in turn may translate 
into employer behaviour that is more likely to be consistent with the objective 
of OCB. 
 
The now repealed statutory grievance procedure (SGP)
267
 was in principle a 
step towards a more rigorous legal intervention to prevent unfair treatment 
during the ongoing employment relationship.  The SGP was introduced to 
ensure that employees‘ workplace concerns were raised, discussed and 
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 Schedule 2 of the Employment Act 2002, which came into force on 1 October 2004, 
contained two statutory grievance procedures – a three stage procedure and a modified 
procedure.  The circumstances in which the grievance procedures were to apply were set out 
in the Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004. 
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preferably resolved before the parties became embroiled in tribunal 
litigation.
268
  The standard SGP was a three step process as follows: 
 
1. The employee was required to set out the grievance in writing and send 
the statement or a copy of it to the employer. 
2. The employer was required to invite the employee to a meeting to 
discuss the grievance.  The meeting was not to take place unless: the 
employee had informed the employer what the basis for their grievance 
was when they made the statement under step 1; and, the employer had 
been given a reasonable opportunity to consider his response to that 
information.  The employee was obligated to take all reasonable steps 
to attend the meeting and after the meeting the employer was required 
to inform the employee of the employer‘s decision and the employee‘s 
right to appeal if they were not satisfied with the decision. 
3. If the employee chose to appeal, they were required to inform the 
employer of that desire and, in response, the employer was required to 
invite the employee to attend a further meeting.  The employee was 
obligated to take all reasonable steps to attend the meeting after which 
the employer was required to inform the employee of its final decision. 
 
In order to encourage employees and employers to follow the SGP the 
Employment Act 2002 provided that, where the SGP applied in respect of an 
employee‘s grievance, and where the employee presents an employment 
tribunal claim arising from that grievance, the tribunal claim was inadmissible 
unless the employee had sent a written statement of the grievance to the 
employer (in compliance with step 1 of the standard SGP).  Once the SGP had 
been initiated, both parties were required to comply with its requirements.  
Where the SGP had not been completed owing to the fault of either party, the 
tribunal award made to the employee in the event of a successful claim would 
generally be adjusted (upwards if the fault was the employer‘s and downwards 
if it was the employee‘s). 
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 Income Data Services Ltd, Statutory disciplinary and grievance procedures: employment 
law supplement (London, 2004) 37. 
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The SGP on its face appeared to be a step in the right direction to effectively 
regulating employee grievances in a way that promoted effective resolution of 
employment disputes and maximises fairness perceptions.  The SGP 
incentivised the parties to undertake a process of investigation and resolution 
by blocking access to the tribunal or threatening an increase or decrease in 
tribunal awards if the mandated process was not complied with.  In this way 
the mandatory process addressed the issue of employee reluctance to raise 
concerns with their employer for fear of retribution – if they failed to do so 
they would be without recourse to a legal remedy via the tribunal.  And the 
threat of a greater award would logically focus the mind of the employer on 
adopting a fair process for fear of being hit harder financially if they failed to 
do so and following a successful claim by the employee.  Further, the 
procedure was simple and there was nothing to prevent the parties from 
agreeing a process that was more detailed and tailored to the particular 
workplace – the SGP was a minimum legal standard.   
 
But beneath its veneer the SGP was never destined to be the secret sauce of 
effective grievance regulation.  It suffered from many of the same 
shortcomings that have already been discussed in relation to the statutory 
disciplinary procedure and the law of Unfair Dismissal in general, and several 
more.  First, the SGP was only that – a procedure.  It did not mandate 
substantive fairness in relation to grievances and therefore it remained open 
for the employer to go through the motions of the procedure with no intention 
of allowing it to make any difference to the outcome of the grievance.  To test 
the substance of the grievance the employee‘s only real option remained to 
resign and claim that they had been constructively dismissed.  The only 
change from the pre-SGP era was that the employer, having followed the SGP, 
had gone some way to insulating themselves against a finding of Unjustifiable 
Dismissal because they had followed a process (the SGP) whereas previously 
they may not have.   
 
Secondly, let us consider the incentives for compliance with the SGP.  They 
were not incentives that were likely to realise early resolution of issues before 
they escalated beyond the point of repair.  They did not incentivise the 
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employee to raise their concerns as soon as possible to ensure that they could 
put the issue behind them and get on with their job.  The incentive was most 
likely to kick-in psychologically when the employee was considering 
resignation and, more than that, a claim of constructive Unfair Dismissal.  
That is a reflection of the point discussed above that the law does not prohibit 
unfair treatment at work (other than in the context of dismissal or unlawful 
discrimination) unless that treatment amounts to a breach of contract.  And 
unless the breach is so serious that the employer is able to resign and claim 
constructive Unfair Dismissal, the remedy for a breach of contract, pursued 
while the employee remains employed, may amount to nothing unless the 
employee can establish that the breach has caused them financial loss.  
Therefore the employee is unlikely to pursue a claim in the employment 
tribunal unless that claim is for constructive dismissal and, by the stage, they 
are considering that course of action the employment relationship is almost 
certainly beyond salvaging, and the issue of fairness perceptions and OCB is 
irrelevant.  In fact what the incentives were arguably achieving by that stage 
was to encourage the employee to go through the motions of the SGP to 
ensure his right to bring a claim and not to have any tribunal remedy 
reduced.
269
  Also, in the employee‘s mind they may have been concerned to 
maintain leverage in relation to settlement negotiations – this was certainly the 
writer‘s experience as a lawyer working in the context of the SGP.  In other 
words, the employee was less likely to obtain a favourable settlement of their 
claim because the employer could point to the employee‘s non-compliance 
with the grievance procedure and reasonably argue that, even if the 
employee‘s claim was successful, their award of compensation could be 
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 This is factor is almost certainly reflected in the increased number of workplace disputes 
identified by the report published following the review by Michael Gibbons into the impact of, 
inter-alia, the SGP (in-so-far as those disputes relate to employee grievances).  Specifically the 
report noted that, according to submissions, both large and small businesses reported that the 
number of formal disputes had risen since the introduction of the statutory disciplinary and 
grievance procedures.  The report said that the review heard that 30-40% increases had been 
typical in the retail sector (Michael Gibbons, A Review of Employment Dispute Resolution in 
Great Britain (DTI, London, 2007) 25.  To the extent that the increase was in the number of 
employee grievances, it was in my submission predominantly the case that those grievances 
were raised by employees who were considering a claim for constructive dismissal.  Prior to 
the SGP it is likely that the grievance would have existed and the claim of constructive 
dismissal may well have been made; the difference is that with the SGP in place the employee 
was forced into raising the grievance whereas previously they may not have raised it in a 
formal sense prior to their resignation or the filing of tribunal proceedings.    
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reduced by as much as 50% and therefore the employer was not inclined to 
offer much by way of settlement.   
 
And consider the effectiveness of the incentive on the employer.  The increase 
in an award was contingent in the first instance on the employee resigning, 
then bringing a claim and subsequently succeeding with that claim.  Those are 
substantial dependencies.  There was every chance that the employee would 
not resign.  If they did there was every chance that they would not bring and 
pursue a claim. If they did try litigation there was no certainty that they would 
succeed.  And there were good reasons not to do any of these things 
(resignation means no job and no income and litigation means time, emotional 
aggravation and potentially cost, with no guarantee of success).  Given these 
dependencies, to what extent was the risk of a 10% uplift in some far off 
possibility of a tribunal award likely to weigh heavily on the mind of the 
employer when it was considering how to respond to an employee grievance?  
Not significantly was probably the answer in many cases; particularly where 
the grievance was not perceived by the employer to be serious and they did not 
consider the risk of a tribunal claim to be great.  This is an important point.  
The incentive is about money – if the employer did not follow the procedure 
they may have been required to pay more compensation to the employee.  But 
if the employee was not likely to receive compensation because they were not 
likely to bring a claim or they were but they were not likely to be awarded a 
remedy, where was the incentive?     
 
Thirdly, and this point was made in relation to the statutory disciplinary 
procedure, at the heart of the shortcomings of the SGP as a mechanism for 
maximising fairness perceptions was the fact that it prescribed a process.  This 
was a problem for a number of reasons.  To begin with, any attempt to 
prescribe a process that is intended to cover all workplaces in all industries 
having, as they do, an infinite variety of cultures, methods of working and 
personalities, is unlikely to appear either in form or implementation to all 
employees in all workplaces as being fair.  The law cannot hope to prescribe a 
procedure for handing employee grievances that effectively accounts for all of 
these factors.  All that such a process can reasonably hope for is a general non-
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reflexive standard procedure that applies a broad and generic understanding of 
what it means to be fair, but which might not reflect in its application what it 
means to be fair in a particular workplace in relation to a particular employee 
grievance.  In the context of a policy aimed at maximising fairness perceptions 
one might conclude therefore that the law should steer away from any attempt 
at prescribing a disciplinary process, but focus very much on allowing the 
parties to the employment relationship to formulate the meaning of fairness in 
their particular workplace.  Further, it is arguable that the SGP did in fact 
encourage employers to do no more than what was prescribed which would do 
little to influence perceptions of fairness, and may in fact have had a negative 
effect on fairness at work.  The standard procedure may have reduced the 
likelihood that the employer would carefully consider what was fair and 
reasonable in the context of the particular grievance.  This was because a 
mandated standard process sends a message to the employer that all they have 
to do to act fairly and therefore lawfully is to follow the minimum 
requirements of the procedure and nothing more. 
 
Finally, as with the statutory disciplinary procedure, the more you prescribe a 
grievance process the more you increase the chances that its implementation 
will appear not genuine.  That is because you are forcing the employer to 
follow a process that may not be appropriate in the circumstances of the 
particular grievance and, more to the point it may be inconsistent with how the 
employee and the employer would prefer to approach the matter.  In that case 
the employee is more likely, with some justification, to judge that the 
employer is simply following a process for the processes sake as opposed to 
being genuinely concerned about resolving the substance of the grievance.  In 
this way, and somewhat ironically, the SGP was less likely to encourage 
fairness perceptions than a regime which requires simply that the employer 
deal with employee grievances in a manner that is fair and reasonable.  
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6.2 The New Zealand approach to regulating grievances – is it the 
solution? 
 
Is the answer to more effective grievance regulation to enact a law according 
to which employers are obligated to address employee grievances in a manner 
that is fair and reasonable and to permit the employee to seek enforcement of 
that law if necessary, whilst they remain employed, via the employment 
tribunals?  To overcome some of the key difficulties related to current 
regulation of employee grievances that are discussed above, would it be 
necessary to grant the employment tribunals the jurisdiction to award remedies 
for non-compliance with the new fairness law that represent a real incentive to 
employers to deal with employee grievances in a fair manner, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of employee fairness perceptions?  To help answer 
this question it is instructive to consider the approach to regulating employee 
grievances that has been adopted in New Zealand.   
 
6.2.1 The disadvantage claim under New Zealand law 
 
Legal regulation of employee grievances in New Zealand is best thought of 
under three headings: first, the impact of the statutory requirement of good 
faith; secondly, breach of contract; and, thirdly, the statutory claim of 
unjustifiable action or disadvantage.  We will focus first on the latter.  
Subsection 1(b) of section 103 of the New Zealand Employment Relations Act 
2000 allows an employee to bring a claim (otherwise referred to as a personal 
grievance) if ―the employee‘s employment, or one or more of the conditions 
thereof, is or are affected to the employee‘s disadvantage by some 
unjustifiable action by the employer‖.  The first point to note about this claim 
is that it can be pursued by the employee while they are employed.  Initially 
the Courts took a restrictive approach to the circumstances that could give rise 
to a disadvantage claim; in order to succeed a grievant was required to 
demonstrate that the employer‘s actions had caused the grievant some material 
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or financial loss.
270
  But this narrow interpretation of the disadvantage claim 
was eventually rejected by the Court of Appeal and it was judicially 
acknowledged that any disadvantage may form the basis of a claim, provided 
the grievance relates to the employee‘s ―employment, or one or more of the 
conditions thereof‖.271  
 
It is enough to pursue a disadvantage claim that the employee was treated 
unfairly by their employer; it is not a requirement of the legislation that the 
disadvantage must amount to a breach of contract before the disadvantage 
claim can be pursued.
272
  Further, in considering whether there has been a 
disadvantage the Employment Relations Authority (ERA) or Court may 
consider the actual effect of the employer‘s actions on the employee.273  It is 
also important in the current context to realise that the claim of unjustifiable 
disadvantage is assessed with reference to the test for justification contained in 
section 103A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (this test was discussed 
above in the context of the law of Unfair Dismissal).  That test specifies that 
the ERA or Court must, when determining a claim of disadvantage, consider 
both ―the employer‘s actions, and how the employee acted‖.  In other words 
the disadvantage claim requires the ERA or Court to consider more than the 
process the employer followed (or did not follow as the case may be) when 
dealing with the employee‘s concern; section 103A also calls upon the ERA or 
Court to assess the substance of the employee‘s claim.   
 
If the ERA or a Court determines that the employees claim is upheld, they will 
go on to assess what, if any, remedy to award.  Section 123 of the Act 
specifies the financial remedies available for a claim of unjustified 
disadvantage and they are: 
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1. Reimbursement to the employee of a sum equal to the whole or any 
part of the wages or other money lost by the employee as a result of 
the disadvantage. 
2. The payment to the employee by the employer of compensation 
for–  
a. Humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to feelings; and 
b. Loss of benefit, whether or not of a monetary kind, which 
the employee might reasonably have been expected to 
obtain if the disadvantage had not occurred. 
 
Section 128 of the Act goes on, in relation to the remedy of reimbursement, to 
provide that where the employee has lost remuneration as a result of the 
disadvantage, the ERA must order the employer to pay the lesser of a sum 
equal to that lost remuneration or to 3 months‘ ordinary time remuneration.  
That same section also provides that the ERA may order the employer to pay 
more than 3 months‘ remuneration if the circumstances warrant an enhanced 
award. 
 
The important point to note in relation to Section 123 is the availability under 
the New Zealand legislation of compensation for non-financial loss.  Unlike 
English law, Section 123 recognises that non-financial injury which flows 
from unfair treatment at work can be worthy of a financial remedy.  Although 
the availability of this remedy gives rise to difficulties associated with 
determining quantum
274
, its existence provides the employee with the 
opportunity to seek redress for the injury they have suffered and, importantly 
for present purposes, it has the potential to discourage unfair treatment on the 
part of the employer.  That is because the employer knows that unfair 
treatment of its workforce may result in claims for compensation irrespective 
of whether or not the employee has suffered financial loss.  A further point 
worth making in the context of Section 123 is the impact that an actual award 
of damages can have on future employer behaviour.  Take for instance a case 
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where an employee has been refused an opportunity to apply for promotion in 
circumstances where an invitation to seek promotion would have been 
reasonably anticipated.  The Courts in New Zealand have accepted that such 
circumstances can give rise to a successful claim of disadvantage from which 
can flow financial remedies.
275
  If in such a case the employer is found to have 
unjustifiably disadvantaged the employee and is required to pay financial 
compensation as a result, it is arguably unlikely that the employer will behave 
in the same manner again towards the employee concerned, having been 
publically reprimanded and stung financially for their prior actions.  This 
argument might be made in most instances where the employee has 
successfully pursued a disadvantage claim.  
 
6.2.2 Breach of contract, good faith and the remedy of compliance 
 
The existence under New Zealand law of the claim for disadvantage does not 
prevent an employee from also pursuing a claim that the employer‘s actions 
amount to a common law breach of contract.  While such a claim cannot, as in 
the United Kingdom, give rise to an award of damages to compensate for non-
financial loss
276
, it does under New Zealand law open the door for the 
employee to pursue other remedies not directly available in the context of a 
disadvantage claim.  Perhaps most notable of these additional remedies is a 
compliance order.   Section 137 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 
provides that: 
 
(1) This section applies where any person has not observed or complied with...(a) any 
provision of... any employment agreement... (2) Where this section applies, the Authority 
may, in addition to any other power it may exercise, by order require, in or in conjunction 
with any matter before the Authority under this Act to which that person is a party... that 
person to do any specified thing or to cease any specified activity, for the purpose of 
preventing non-observance of or non-compliance with that provision... 
 
In effect Section 137 sounds a right in the Authority to make an award akin to 
specific performance (but without the limitations and restriction associated 
with the equitable remedy) in circumstances where the employee has an 
                                                  
275
 NZ Air Line Pilots Association v Air NZ Ltd [1992] 3 ERNZ 73. 
276
 Ogilvy & Mather (NZ) Ltd v Turner [1993] 2 ERNZ 799; Telecom South Ltd v Post Office 
Union [1992] 1 NZLR 275. 
 180 
established claim that their employer has breached their contract of 
employment.  In this way it is open to an employee whose grievance also 
constitutes a breach of contract to ask the ERA to force an alteration of the 
employer‘s behaviour such that the grievance is remedied.  In theory such a 
remedy is likely to be more effective as a solution to employee grievances 
than damages; a compliance order directly addresses and corrects the 
behaviour that has given rise to the grievance, whereas damages 
retrospectively applies a financial solution to what is often a non-financial 
problem.  The significance and breadth of the remedy of compliance is 
particularly well illustrated when we consider that the jurisdiction extends to 
ordering compliance with the implied terms of the employment contract.  In 
United Food and Chemical Workers Union of NZ v Talley
277
 an allegation was 
made (but found by the Employment Court to be baseless) that threats had 
been issued by an employer against employees with the object of preventing 
them giving evidence for the union in Court.  The Court held that that this 
amounted to a breach of an implied term of the contract and said further: 
 
... it is quite clear that if such a threat was made as is alleged – that is to say, a threat of 
reprisals in retaliation for the workers being either parties to or witnesses in any such 
proceeding as that before the Employment [Relations Authority] would be entitled, in its 
discretion, to make a compliance order requiring the defendants to do some specified thing or 
to cease some specified activity as may be necessary for the purpose of preventing further 
non-observance of or non-compliance with that term of the employment contract.
278  
 
The importance of compliance orders has escalated following the enactment in 
2000 of the statutory obligation of good faith.  Section 4 of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 requires that the parties to the employment relationship 
must deal with each other in good faith; including in the context of employee 
grievances
279
.  The obligation of good faith casts aside any doubt that might 
have existed previously concerning the extent of the implied terms and 
whether they included a general obligation of fairness and fair treatment.  As 
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the Court of Appeal explained when comparing the good faith obligation to 
the implied term of trust and confidence
280
: 
 
Good faith relates both to process and outcomes in how an employment relationship is 
conducted and defined or characterised.  Mutual trust and confidence is part of this 
underpinning, but other factors will also be part of a relationship founded on good faith, such 
as responsiveness, communication, respect, goodwill, etc. 
 
The Court of Appeal‘s assessment was effectively codified in 2004 by the 
enactment of section 4(1A) of the Employment Relations Act which provides 
that: 
 
The duty of good faith... –  
(a) is wider in scope than the implied mutual obligations of trust and confidence; and 
(b) requires the parties to an employment relationship to be active and constructive in 
establishing and maintaining a productive employment relationship in which the parties are, 
amongst other things, responsive and communicative... 
 
A breach of good faith cannot it appears be remedied by an award of damages, 
but it can be addressed by an order for compliance under Section 137.  In this 
way the ERA is empowered by the Act to require an employer to rectify its 
behaviour such that it aligns with the broad duty of good faith – a duty that 
―has more to do with notions of honesty, frankness, and what lawyers call 
‗bona fides‘ rather than adherence to legal rules‖281.  Therefore good faith, 
coupled with the remedy of compliance, provide the opportunity for the 
employee to seek redress for perceived unfairness and to have that unfairness 
put right, without the need to match the circumstances of their complaint to 
some rigid legal cause of action.  
 
Of course not all established breaches of contract and good faith will be 
remedied by compliance; the remedy of compliance is discretionary.  As the 
Employment Court has explained: 
 
 It is not enough to justify the making of compliance orders that there has been non-
compliance or non-observance of an employment contract.  Once that threshold has been 
crossed the Employment [Relations Authority] has a discretion to make a compliance order or 
to refuse to make it or to postpone making [it]... That does not mean, however, that the 
[Authority] has an uncontrolled discretion to do as it pleases on the particular day as between 
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the particular parties.  The exercise of the discretion is subject to the supervision of the Court 
and the Court will not be satisfied with the governing the exercise of discretions generally and 
the specific principles which can be gleaned from relevant provisions in the [Act] .... [A]s to 
the general principles, we think it is best to be remembered that what is required of judicial 
discretion is that the adjudicator seeks to do justice between the parties.  It is a rule of 
statutory interpretation that where a discretion is conferred upon any judicial officer or public 
official it is to be regarded not as an absolute discretion but one that is conditioned by the 
requirement to do justice... justice and reason are to be the guide and not personal whim or 
predisposition. 
282
 
 
But while the discretion to order compliance is subject to the general principle 
that the ERA should seek to do justice between the parties, the specific 
provisions of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and the associated judicial 
dicta, tend to encourage the ordering of compliance following a finding of 
breach of contract, unless there is good reason not to: 
 
It is a salient feature of the provisions of the Act with which the [Authority] and the Court will 
be most concerned (those contained in Part IV) that the object of that Part is to establish that 
employment contracts create enforceable rights and obligations, that it is the responsibility of 
the parties to employment contracts to enforce their rights under them and that the primary 
remedy under the Act for breach of any employment contract or of any provision of the Act is 
an order for compliance... This means that in general where there has been a breach or a non-
observance of or non-compliance with a right or obligation created by an employment 
contract, the party claiming to be affected by that breach is entitled to enforce the contract and 
is entitled at least to a compliance order unless some good reason exists for refusing that 
remedy.  As the Court put it in its recent judgement in Grant v Superstrike Bowling Centres 
Ltd [1992] 1 ERNZ 727, ‗the [Authority] has been given by the legislature a heavy 
responsibility, almost a duty‘...  That is a very good way of describing the discretions 
conferred by [section 137]. 
 
Specifically in the context of considering compliance in the context of a 
breach of good faith, the Employment Court has said
283
: 
 
Breaches of section 4 having been established... the next question is whether there should be 
an order for compliance... as the plaintiff claims or, as the defendant submits, there should be 
no sanction.  The remedy of compliance is discretionary... unless... a compliance order is 
made, the defendant will be seen to have breached with impunity its statutory obligations 
affecting employees, many of who will lose their employment.  That is not an attractive 
proposition for a Court required to decide such cases in equity and good conscience: section 
189(1) Employment Relations Act 2000. 
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6.2.3 Is the New Zealand approach likely to deliver higher levels of fairness 
perceptions? 
 
In summary, the claim of disadvantage under the New Zealand Employment 
Relations Act 2000 allows the employee a broad opportunity to apply to an 
adjudicative body for a remedy in circumstances where they have been treated 
unfairly during ongoing employment.  The question for the ERA or Court in 
reaching a conclusion on the claim is whether the employee suffered a 
disadvantage as a result of the unfair treatment, and whether the actions of the 
employer leading to the disadvantage were nevertheless justified with 
reference to the test in Section 103A.  On its face therefore the New Zealand 
legislation via the disadvantage claim addresses a key shortcoming of the law 
in Britain in relation to employee grievances: the New Zealand law effectively 
prohibits unfair treatment at work without the need for the employee to 
establish a breach of contract or to resign and claim constructive dismissal.  In 
this way it might be argued that the New Zealand approach is more aligned 
with an approach to grievance regulation that is likely to maximise employee 
fairness perceptions.  Specifically the threat of a claim for disadvantage places 
pressure on the employer to act fairly whilst the employee is employed for fear 
of being subject to legal action.  Most employers would want, one imagines, to 
avoid such a claim if at all possible given the cost (including in terms of legal 
fees and management time) and disruption that defending such a claim 
typically entails.   
 
Further, the remedies available under New Zealand law appear on their face 
more likely to encourage fair treatment within the employment relationship 
and adherence to the concepts of good faith and compliance with the implied 
term of trust and confidence.  This is in part because they appear to realise and 
address the realities and peculiarities of the employment relationship, the 
imbalance of economic power that typifies the relationship, and the failings of 
the common law to meaningfully address these realities in the context of EDG.  
To begin with the law in New Zealand recognises that unfair treatment at work 
may not always lead to financial loss and in fact the damage suffered by 
employees who are subject to unfair treatment at work while remaining 
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employed, may well be limited to non-pecuniary loss, and the Employment 
Relations Act grants employees a legal right to recover that loss.  In this way 
the law refuses to allow the employer to act unfairly and leave the employee 
without a financial remedy and therefore without redress, unless they (the 
employee) is prepared to take the drastic step of leaving employment to take 
their chances with a claim for constructive dismissal.  Beyond monetary 
awards New Zealand law sets aside the restrictive approach of the English 
Courts to the award of specific performance, by introducing the compliance 
order.  In this way employees in New Zealand are able to request that a third 
party, the ERA, order that the employer change its behaviour and begin acting 
in a manner that it consistent with fairness and good faith.    
 
On the face of it therefore the regulatory approach to EDG in New Zealand 
seems, as already suggested, far more likely to elicit fairness perceptions and 
greater levels of OCB because it creates more meaningful incentives (albeit 
negative incentives in the form of compensatory remedies and compliance 
orders) for employers to treat their employees in manner that is likely to be 
perceived as fair.  Further, in theory at least, the law in New Zealand is more 
likely to promote a belief in the minds of employees that employer-promises 
regarding fair treatment are credible.  That is because a failure to live up to 
those promises can be more effectively addressed by legal action.  This ability 
of New Zealand employers to make more credible promises that drive fairness 
perceptions amongst staff, in turn has the potential to increase greater OCB.     
 
But this initial optimism about the New Zealand approach is tempered when 
we recall our earlier discussions regarding the challenges associated with 
judging reasonableness and fairness in the context of EDG.  As in Britain, in 
New Zealand the right or wrong of an employer‘s actions leading to a 
grievance and then how the employer deals with that grievance, are judged 
with reference to the standards of reasonableness, fairness and, specifically in 
New Zealand, good faith.  We have already discussed that concepts such as 
reasonableness and fairness are vague and subject to interpretation.  The 
interpretation applied in the context of EDG will tend to vary between 
employers and employees and this creates an obvious challenge for the goal of 
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fairness perceptions, which almost certainly requires employer and employee 
behaviour to be aligned according to a common understanding of what it 
means to be fair and reasonable in each instance of EDG.  In reality, the 
employer‘s and the employee‘s respective interpretations of fairness, loaded 
with traditionally divergent interests, will predict the lawful (i.e. fair and 
reasonable) outcome of any grievance in a potentially very different way.  It is 
important to remind ourselves of this point in the context of a discussion 
which focuses on the remedies in New Zealand for unfair treatment (such as 
the compliance order for a breach of good faith), because in the end access to 
those remedies might presuppose in part at least an assessment by both the 
employer and employee that, should the employee pursue a claim in any given 
instance of perceived unfairness, they will in fact be awarded a remedy which 
is worth the effort and cost of that pursuit.  This is vital because the 
employer‘s actions are less likely to be influenced (particularly early in the 
dispute continuum) by a potential sanction or remedy if they (the employer) do 
not believe in the first instance that their actions or inactions are unfair and 
therefore likely to be subject to a remedy.  In other words, the ability of the 
legal remedy to influence behaviour and therefore fairness perceptions and the 
making of credible promises, is hampered to a degree by the challenges 
associated with finding a common view amongst the protagonists of what it 
means to be fair and reasonable in the first place.  If an employer does not 
believe that their actions are unfair and unreasonable, they might believe in 
turn that they have very little reason to be concerned about a remedy that can 
only flow from a finding or assessment that their view of fairness is in fact 
incorrect. 
 
That said it would be wrong to suggest that a strong sanctions and remedies 
regime can have no influence on employer behaviour.  An employer who is 
aware that unfair treatment of an employee in a given instance may result in, 
for example, a substantial award of compensation, is likely to be more 
cautious in their assessment of what it means to be fair.  The key point to 
repeat is that a sanctions or remedies regime is not, without more, likely to 
influence employer behaviour and maximise fairness perceptions amongst 
employees.  The ‗more‘ might be substantial financial remedies that have the 
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effect of penalising the employer for unfair treatment.  But punitive remedies 
that are supported by robust adjudicative application are likely to have the 
other negative consequences that we discussed above in relation to remedies 
for Unfair Dismissal (defensive or conservative hiring practices and a 
reluctance to take disciplinary action where such action is appropriate).   
 
6.3 A conclusion concerning current regulation of employee grievances 
 
It is arguable that the potential impact of the current legal sanctions regime as 
it applies to employee grievances and the outcome of grievances, is most 
likely to influence the behaviour of the employer at a point in time when the 
possibility of litigation draws nearer; and there is a realisation that the 
employer‘s interpretation of fairness may be subject to challenge.  But by that 
stage the damage to the employment relationship is likely to have grown acute 
and the likelihood of eliciting fairness perceptions is significantly reduced.  
Moreover, the influence of the potential sanction is not necessarily about a 
realisation in the mind of the employer that they may have acted unfairly and 
will therefore face an award of compensation or some other remedy.  For the 
employer the willingness to resolve or settle a claim on its own terms might be 
about a host of factors which may or may not include the possibility that they 
have acted unfairly.  Those other factors might include: the legal costs 
associated with defending the claim; the potential cost of a compensation 
payment; the cost in terms of management time used in defending the claim; 
the fact that the claim is a matter of public record; not wanting to place control 
over the outcome of the dispute in the hands of a third party (the tribunals).  
As has already been stressed, what is required is an approach to the resolution 
of employee grievances that encourages the employer to focus on the 
employee‘s perception of what it means to be fair in a given instance.  This 
focus should occur during the early stages of the dispute spectrum when the 
employer‘s actions are most likely to create perceptions of fairness amongst 
their workforce and when the parties are best placed to explore a common 
view of what it means to fair in any given instance.    
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CHAPTER 7: CAN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS AND THE 
COURTS INFLUENCE FAIRNESS PERCEPIONS? 
 
It is not just the different interpretations by the employer and employee of 
fairness and reasonableness that hampers the ability of the law and remedies to 
influence employer behaviour and maximise fairness perceptions.  A further 
important barrier is, we argue, the role of the employment tribunals and Courts 
in the grievance and disciplinary process.  Any regulatory regime aimed at 
maximising fairness and fairness perceptions in relation to EDG must ensure 
an enforcement mechanism that encourages compliance with the appropriate 
standards of fairness.  In other words the tribunals and the Courts, if they are 
the chosen means of enforcing the regulation, must be prepared to challenge 
and sanction unfair behaviour and give direction to the parties regarding what 
it means to be fair, both in terms of process and substance.  But, as we have 
already discussed, this ambition assumes a number of factors that may not be 
achievable.  First, it assumes that the tribunals and the Courts can find a 
universally applicable interpretation of fairness that is both generic yet easily 
adaptable to specific instances of EDG; an interpretation that can guide 
employers and employees towards fair outcomes which employees in 
particular will always view as fair.  This is of course impossible for the 
reasons that we have already explored.  All that the tribunals and Courts can 
hope to do is try and interpret and apply the concepts of fairness and 
reasonableness to the facts of the particular case, but the outcome of that 
application and interpretation is unlikely to be predictable with certainty, nor 
will it yield clear guidance for future behaviour given the infinite variety of 
circumstances in which those claims of unfair treatment can and do arise.   
 
Secondly, notwithstanding the challenges associated with interpreting fairness 
and reasonableness in any given instance of EDG, the tribunals and the Courts 
could play a role in forcing employers to reflect more closely on their handling 
of EDG.  They could attempt an interpretation of fairness that does incorporate 
employees‘ views of fairness, which in turn might drive a higher degree of fair 
treatment and fairness perceptions.  But to achieve this objective the tribunals 
and Courts must be able and willing to rigorously question and challenge why 
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and how employers choose to act as they do when faced with EDG situations.  
The reality is that the employment tribunals and Courts do not rigorously 
challenge employer perceptions of fairness; nor do they stringently question 
the actions and inactions of employers that are driven by those perceptions.  It 
is partly the purpose of this chapter to explore the reasons for this failure.  In 
summary, we argue that there are three broad explanations, all of which are 
closely interrelated.  First, access to the tribunals and the limits of their 
jurisdiction, are not conducive to the meaningful enforcement of fairness at 
work and the evolution to a higher degree of fairness perceptions amongst 
employees.  Secondly, and this issue has already been explored to some extent 
in the context of our discussions about the law of Unfair Dismissal, the 
common law traditions from which the tribunals have evolved and according 
to which they continue to function, do not encourage judicial interference with 
the exercise of managerial prerogative.  Thirdly, even if the first and second 
factors could be overcome, a policy that aims at maximising fairness 
perceptions and greater OCB cannot be effectively realised by the use of a 
third party adjudicator to assess and rule on whether or not in any specific 
instance of EDG an employer has been fair and reasonable (we deal with this 
point extensively in the next chapter).   
 
7.1 The employment tribunals as promoters of fairness: access issues 
 
A tribunal and judicial system which enforces rights to fair treatment at work 
cannot hope to achieve greater levels of fairness perceptions unless access to 
and use of the system is simple.  If employees perceive (rightly or wrongly) 
that they are not easily able to bring their grievances and claims before the 
adjudicating body, the value of the regulation which that body is established to 
enforce is significantly reduced, and the goal of influencing higher levels of 
fairness at work is seriously compromised for a number of reasons.   
 
First, the more difficult it is in the employee‘s mind for them to achieve a 
tribunal ruling on his or her charge of unfair treatment, the less likely they are 
to believe that their employer‘s promises about fair treatment are credible, 
because they are backed up by enforceable legal principles and rules.  Further, 
 189 
where the employee perceives significant difficulty in pursuing their claim 
through the tribunals, they will almost certainly be disinclined to pursue the 
claim at all.  They may be prepared to ‗lump‘ their potential grievance on the 
basis that the challenge associated with having the grievance eventually 
brought before a tribunal if that is necessary to resolve it, is simply too 
substantial.
284
  This is anathema to the policy of increased OCB.  As we have 
discussed, unless the employee is encouraged to raise their grievances, 
resentment associated with those grievances will build, productivity will 
suffer, and the end of the relationship may be inevitable. Similarly, the 
employer may be less inclined to be guided or encouraged to act fairly by 
regulation where they know that the obstacles in the way of an employee who 
might bring a claim in the tribunals are substantial.  That is because the 
employer will realise that the risk of having to defend a claim, meritorious or 
not, is reduced.  Conversely, if the employee believes that the employer is 
likely to address their grievances, because if they do not the employer could be 
confronted with a tribunal claim, the employee may be inclined to raise the 
grievance in the hope of it being resolved.    
 
The story of the employment tribunals is one of an adjudicative body, access 
to which is perhaps not as simple as one might hope if effective enforcement 
of legal regulation of EDG is to be achieved.  In 1968 the Donovan 
Commission announced that employment tribunals (then industrial tribunals) 
should provide employers and employees ―for all disputes arising from their 
contracts of employment, a procedure which is easily accessible, informal, 
speedy and inexpensive‖285 [emphasis added].  This was and remains a 
laudable ideal, partly because disputes over employment rights commonly 
involve parties (usually claimants) with limited means (in terms of resources, 
time and/or capability) who are likely to be put off commencing and pursing 
legal dispute procedures that are drawn out, slow, expensive, and riddled with 
procedural hurdles and substantive complexity.  A tribunal system that 
presents a significant proportion of potential claimants with such barriers to 
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access is undesirable because, of course and as has been suggested, that 
system threatens to stymie the very employment rights that it is charged with 
enforcing and that are deemed to have inherent worth, in the context of the 
current discussion, as a means of promoting greater levels of fairness at work 
and OCB.  
 
Unfortunately, albeit, looking back, not surprisingly, the Donovan ideal has 
become in many respects increasingly difficult to achieve.  That is in part 
because it is an ideal that was born in a context which has long since changed.  
By June 1968, when the Commission reported back, the tribunals‘ functions, 
aside from hearing appeals from the assessment to training levy under the 
Industrial Training Act 1964, included little more than the following: 
ascertaining redundancy entitlements under the Redundancy Payments Act 
1965, resolving disputes over the refusal to provide and the meaning of written 
terms of employment
286
, considering certain appeals under the Selective 
Employment Payments Act 1966, and determining whether work was ‗dock 
work‘ for the purposes of the Docks and Harbours Act 1966.287  Most other 
matters arising out of contracts of employment were dealt with by the civil 
Courts.  Given this limited jurisdiction it would have appeared to the Donovan 
Commission that, even with the tribunals‘ roles extended to incorporate ‗all 
disputes‘ between employers and employees arising from their contracts of 
employment, the ideal tribunal system was achievable because, in fact, as 
MacMillan has argued, when Donovan referred to the employment tribunals as 
being ―easily accessible, informal, speedy and inexpensive‖, it was merely 
describing something which already existed.
288
   
 
But Donovan almost certainly failed to anticipate the considerable increase 
that was to take place in the different types of claims that fall within the 
tribunals‘ remit.  Today employment tribunals have the jurisdiction to 
determine over 80 different types of claim, many of which involve complex 
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legal issues arising from various statutes, common law and EU law.
289
  The 
increasing number of complex legal issues that the tribunals are required to 
rule on has inevitably led to more legalistic arguments and procedural 
formality in the tribunals.
290
  Legalism and formality is likely to dissuade 
employees from bringing or pursuing claims.  The prospect of facing your 
employer (or former employer) in what is a court room-like setting will be 
intimidating for many if not most employees.
291
  The sense of anxiety and 
discomfort is likely to intensify given the need to present oral and 
documentary evidence, cross examine witnesses, articulate legal arguments 
and answer the tribunal‘s questions.  The findings from the Survey of 
Employment Tribunal Applications 2008 tend to support this point.  This was 
the fifth SETA survey, commissioned on this occasion by the Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills.  The 2008 survey and the earlier surveys in the 
SETA series of studies are designed to provide information on the parties in, 
and key features of, employment tribunal cases.  The 2008 survey and the 
associated findings were based on a random sample of more than 4000 
employment tribunal cases.  And according to the survey findings, 14 percent 
of tribunal claims filed in 2007-2008 were withdrawn and most of those were 
withdrawn because the claimants found that the tribunal process was too 
stressful.
292
  This figure does not of course account for the number of 
employees who never raised claims in the first place because they found the 
prospect of tribunal litigation too daunting.  In a similar vein, the tribunals‘ 
increasing jurisdiction, coupled with other factors, has produced an 
exponential growth in their annual caseload and a corresponding difficulty 
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processing cases in a speedy fashion.
293
  If claimants perceive that their claim 
will take a significant period of time to resolve, this is also likely to dissuade 
them from bringing or raising a claim in the first instance.   
 
Further, the fact that bringing a claim in the employment tribunal involves 
interpreting and applying legal principles, handling and producing evidence, 
understanding rules of procedure, dealing with witnesses and making legal 
submissions, results in a large number of litigants using lawyers which has an 
associated cost.
294
  According to the 2008 Survey of Employment Tribunal 
Applications, claimants paid on average £4,124 for legal advice and 
representation and this is no small amount, particularly for an employee who 
has lost their job, or who may be facing the prospect of leaving their current 
employment.
295
  Beyond legal costs, the process of bringing and pursuing a 
claim in the tribunal can be costly, both in terms of financial and non-financial 
costs
296
, and escalating cost is a key reason why claimants choose not to 
pursue their claims.
297
  Non-financial costs in particular are worth further 
discussion.  All claimants who responded to the 2008 Survey were asked what 
non-financial effects they had experienced as a result of their case and the 
most commonly mentioned impacts were stress and depression.
298
  The next 
most frequently mentioned negative effects on claimants were physical health 
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problems, difficulty in getting re-employed and loss of confidence or self-
esteem.
299
  A system of resolving disputes that causes such levels of mental 
and physical (not to mention financial) hardship, is likely to be a port of last 
resort and something to be avoided for most employees.  Certainly those who 
have had past negative experiences (either themselves or indirectly through a 
colleague, friend or family member) of the system will be reluctant to make 
use of it again.  To repeat, if employees are not convinced that employer-
promises of fair treatment are supported by an accessible system of third party 
intervention if those promises are not kept, they are less likely to rely on or be 
positively influenced by those promises in the first place.  Those employees 
will also be less inclined to raise grievances as a consequence and the 
circumstances of their unresolved grievances will spawn increased feelings of 
resentment which is contrary to the objective of greater fairness perceptions 
and OCB.  Certainly it is the case from the writer‘s experience that potential 
claimants are reluctant to pursue claims and raise grievances because they are 
not convinced about the worth of doing so when set against the emotional, 
physical and financial costs bringing a claim.  In fact it is the writer‘s 
experience that many lawyers often advise their employee clients not to pursue 
tribunal claims, because it is frequently the lawyer‘s assessment that the cost-
benefit analysis weighs heavily against a claim.  
 
The current Government‘s proposals for reforming the tribunals do not appear 
likely to tackle the challenges of cost, formality and procedure that are 
discussed above.  Arguably a number of those proposals may, if adopted, have 
the opposite effect and create further barriers to access.
300
  For example, the 
Government proposes raising the cap on cost awards from £10,000 to £20,000 
while, at the same time, increasing the qualifying period for unfair dismissal 
claims from 1 to 2 years.  In addition the Government proposes providing 
employment judges with greater powers to make deposit orders at any stage 
during the proceedings up to £1000.  Currently deposit orders may only be 
made during a pre-hearing review and only then if the case appears to have 
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―little reasonable prospect of success‖.  The current proposal is to, in effect, 
relax the test and allow judges to make deposits order where, for example, the 
employee has previously issued a large number of claims, or where the 
arguments presented by the claimant are lacking in ―clarity and strength‖.301  
While it is understandable that the current Government would seek to apply 
methods to reduce the burden on the tribunals, by placing additional barriers in 
the way of access for employees to the tribunal system, these methods do not 
support the goal of fairness perceptions and OCB.        
 
7.2 The tribunals and the Courts: the barrier of abstentionism 
 
Judging the fairness of employer and management behaviour is not an exercise 
to which the British Courts and tribunals are particularly adept for reasons that 
have been explored in several important studies on the subject of regulating 
EDG.  We have already discussed the work by Collins on the law of Unfair 
Dismissal in which, while examining the range of reasonable responses test, 
he explains that underlying the range of reasonable responses test is reluctance 
on the part of judges bought up in the common law tradition to depart from 
three perceived virtues of the common law: respect for the autonomy of the 
private sphere; neutrality between conflicting interests; equality of treatment 
of the parties.
302
  He says further: 
 
The legislation demands an investigation of the propriety of the exercise of managerial 
discretion, hitherto a largely unregulated sphere of private autonomy.  It requires the Courts to 
favour the interests of employees in job security, thereby abandoning the legitimizing stance 
of neutrality between capital and labour.  Finally, the formal legal equality is shattered, for 
whilst employees remain free to terminate the employment relation for any reason abruptly, 
the employer has to follow certain procedures and give certain reasons for dismissals. 
 
This deep penetration into the management rights terrain involves nothing short of a 
reorientation of the relation between the State and civil society, or between the Courts and the 
management of business.  Instead of deferring to the business judgement of the management, 
the traditional stance of corporate and labour law, the Unfair Dismissal legislation applies a 
regulatory framework to the practice of disciplining labour.  It imposes mandatory standards 
of behaviour in a sphere of social life hitherto regarded in law as an unregulated private 
arrangement of exchange.  In this sense the legislation inaugurates a juridification of 
managerial prerogative and it is this proposed juridification which runs deeply contrary to 
the settled values and background assumptions of the common law. 
303
 [emphasis added]  
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It is worthwhile exploring this concept of juridification in greater depth.  As 
Collins points out, there is no one meaning of the concept.  For some 
juridification means little more than an increase in the amount of law, be it in 
the form of statutes, precedents or administrative regulations.
304
  For Simitis, 
the concept denotes more precisely exchanging the notion of the employment 
relationship being governed by freedom of contract, for regulation of the 
employment contract by way of mandatory public regulation.
305
  By contrast, 
Teubner regards a central aspect of juridification as the process of replacing 
the formal general private law, such as ordinary contract law, with specific 
regulation aimed at social goals such as the improvement of working 
conditions.
306
  Teubner‘s description of juridification has, as we shall discuss, 
particular significance for the purpose of this thesis, but his meaning of the 
concept is not the concept that Collins was referring to during his examination 
of the law of Unfair Dismissal.  Nor was Collins referring to the Simitis‘s 
interpretation of juridification.  In his words: 
 
What I seek to stress by my use of the term juridification is that this legislative intervention 
[the law of Unfair Dismissal] tackles a field hitherto unregulated by the law to any significant 
extent.  The term juridification therefore denotes the advent of legal regulation in an area of 
social life previously left to private power, which, though indirectly constituted by laws such 
as those establishing private ownership of the means of production and the province of 
legitimate industrial action, was not itself directly colonized and moulded by the law. 
 
In sum, by requiring the juridification of managerial disciplinary powers, the legislation 
presents the Courts with a task which they have previously sought to avoid altogether for the 
reasons connected with the respect for individual autonomy and the need to legitimize their 
position outlined above.  In these circumstances we cannot expect an avid endorsement of the 
principles of the legislation and a fervent pursuit of employees‘ interest in job security.  On 
the contrary, what we may expect is a reluctance to intervene in disciplinary matters except in 
the most egregious of cases of Unfair Dismissal.
307
 
 
While Collins was focused on the law of Unfair Dismissal, his analysis is 
equally valid in the context of the current discussion regarding the regulation 
of, and judicial intervention in, the broader concept of EDG.  Arguably, the 
Courts and the tribunals are all the more likely to avoid juridification (in the 
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Collins sense of the term) in relation to judging fair treatment of employee 
grievances, given that to do so would in many instances require the judge to 
intervene on an existing relationship as compared to one that has been brought 
to a conclusion by dismissal.  In the context of a dismissal, the tribunal or 
Court is judging past behaviour and is, in most cases, responding to unfair 
action leading to dismissal with an award of financial compensation.  In a 
dismissal case the tribunal need not (except in the rare case of an award of re-
employment or reinstatement) concern itself with how their judgement of the 
employer‘s behaviour will impact the future relationship of the two parties 
because, of course, that relationship is no more.  But in the case of a complaint 
about a grievance in the context of an ongoing relationship, the level of 
interference with managerial prerogative is potentially greater because the 
tribunal‘s finding is likely to have a direct bearing on how the two parties 
continue to relate going forward and is therefore a lasting influence and 
limitation on the autonomy of the employer.  In other words, even if 
Parliament was to enact regulation which required the tribunals to inquire as to 
the fairness of employer behaviour in the context of an ongoing relationship, it 
is unlikely, because in part of their concern to avoid juridification, that the 
tribunals would adopt a robust approach to enforcing the law which in turn 
might aid fairness perceptions.  In fact evidence to support such a statement 
may be found in the approach of the Courts in New Zealand to the unjustified 
disadvantage claim and in particular the test of justification that was contained 
in section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 2000.   
 
To recap, an employee in New Zealand can bring a claim in the Employment 
Relations Authority that they have been unjustifiably disadvantaged in their 
employment, by some unjustifiable action on the part of the employer.  In 
assessing whether the action of the employer was as a matter of law 
‗unjustifiable‘, the ERA is required to apply the test for justification contained 
in section 103A of the Act.  As we have already explained, prior to the 
changes made in 2011, the test was formulated in a way which seemingly 
avoided the notion that in New Zealand the test for justification reflected the 
range of reasonable responses test or similar.  The test stated in effect that 
when determining whether an employee had been unjustifiably disadvantaged, 
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the ERA had to consider whether what the employer did (the substance) and 
how they did it (the process) was what a fair and reasonable employer would 
have done in the circumstances.  In other words the test in the New Zealand 
legislation exhorted the ERA to apply a single standard of fairness and 
reasonableness which the employer could not escape by pleading that it was 
free to adopt a range of different behaviours, all of which could and should be 
judged as fair.  Further, the New Zealand Parliament had, by enacting 
provisions within the Employment Relations Act 2000 that steer the ERA and 
the Courts to interpret the Act in a manner that promotes good faith 
employment relations, appeared to push the Courts and the ERA to find a 
standard of fairness and reasonableness that was sufficiently reflexive of the 
good faith objective.  One might have expected therefore that the ERA and the 
Courts would have applied section 103A in a manner that was in keeping with 
its plain wording and the stated objective of the legislation – they did not.  In 
the leading case on the old section 103A test the Employment Court somewhat 
awkwardly applied the test for justification in a manner that supports Collins‘ 
assessment about the relevance of juridification in the context of any judicial 
assessment of fairness in the employment context.   
 
The case we are referring to has already been discussed above – White v 
ADHB.
308
  Far from promoting a rigorous inquiry into the appropriate 
standards of fairness expected of employers, the Court appeared to interpret 
the section 103A test in a manner that glossed over the plain wording of the 
section and thereby defeated its apparent purpose.  Specifically, the Court held 
that it remained open to the employer to have recourse to a ‗range‘ of 
legitimate options in determining how to treat its staff.
309
  Vitally, therefore, it 
appears that, even when confronted with statutory direction to more rigorously 
police unfair treatment by employers of their staff, the Courts will refuse to do 
so.  As has been explained above, there is a significant challenge associated 
with interpreting what it means to be fair and reasonable in any given instance 
of EDG.  But it is possible to view that challenge as presenting the Courts with 
an opportunity to find an interpretation that weighs in favour of higher 
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standards of fairness at work, not against them.  The fact that the Courts 
choose not to adopt such an approach is, arguably, a reflection of Collins‘ 
argument regarding their concern with juridification. 
 
7.3 Weeding out the vexatious litigant and the limits of tribunal 
jurisdiction  
 
The final point to explore in assessing why the tribunals do not rigorously 
direct fair behaviour at work, is worth exploring in the context of this and the 
previous Governments‘ apparent desire to reduce the tribunals‘ workload by 
weeding out unmeritorious claims.  That is because such a concern (real or not 
and justified or not) is, for the reasons explained below, anathema to a policy 
which aims at maximising fairness perceptions.  In particular, the influence of 
this concern about the unmeritorious claimant on regulatory outcomes, 
demonstrates further the extent to which the traditional model of providing an 
adjudicative forum as a point to resolve disputes relating to EDG may not be 
workable if OCB is the policy objective.    
 
And it is no overstatement to assert that the issue of unmeritorious claims and 
the vexatious litigant has been an important focus of lawmakers and lobbyists 
in relation to the legal regulation of EDG.  This focus is apparent in the 
present Government‘s consultation paper on resolving workplace disputes.  
There are several comments throughout the paper addressing a concern about 
―over-confident‖ claimants, the tribunals‘ failure to deal with ―weak and 
vexatious claims‖, and ease with which claimant are able to pursue 
―unmeritorious claims‖.310 It is worth noting that the consultation paper does 
not present any supporting evidence to substantiate these concerns.  The 
concern about weeding out unmeritorious claims was also central to the debate 
and discourse leading to the Employment Act 2008 and the resulting repeal of 
the statutory disciplinary and grievance procedures.  As Astrid Sanders 
observes
311
: 
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It is interesting to note the mythical figure at the heart of the Act: the allegedly increasing 
numbers of so called ‗vexatious‘ litigants.  Over and over again in the Parliamentary debates 
on Part One [of the Employment Act 2008], there was disparaging reference to ‗obsessive 
claimants who will just not give up‘.  There is evidence of a similar mindset also in the 
Gibbons Review that spoke of the parties ‗whose intent or action is to waste time and drain 
valuable tribunal resources‘.  Lord Jones in presenting the Act claimed that 17% of cases that 
go to the tribunal are ‗unreasonable‘.  It is this strong emphasis upon vexatious litigants that 
dominates Part One with wider consequences for Government policy now and in the future. 
 
Whatever the truth or otherwise behind claims about the numbers of vexatious 
claimants, the notion of establishing legal rules that aim to reduce the number 
of unmeritorious claims before the tribunals, gives rise to a much more 
fundamental point about the nature of employee grievances and the suitability 
of the tribunal system as a mechanism for resolving those disputes.   
 
It may be true that a number of claimants pursue claims which in strict legal 
terms have very little chance of success, but that does not mean the claimant is 
not genuinely aggrieved by what might be, objectively or not, unfair treatment 
at the hands of their employer.  Take for instance an employee who is refused 
promotion in circumstances where a female colleague, who the employee 
considers is less able than him, has been promoted.  The employee complains 
to the employer but nothing is done and the employee lodges with the 
tribunals claims of sexual discrimination and breach of the implied term of 
trust and confidence.  The claims are dismissed because, applying the 
technical test for direct discrimination, the employee has not been 
discriminated against on the grounds of his sex, and nor has the employer‘s 
actions amounted to a breach of the implied term, which is only contravened 
when the employer‘s behaviour is extreme.  But that does not mean the 
employee‘s complaint of unfairness has no objective merit; it means that the 
law does not provide him with a cause of action and remedy for that unfairness 
which the tribunal can then enforce.  This absence of a legal right upon which 
to base a claim is vital, because in this way the law is saying to the employee, 
the tribunal can help you, but only if you can fit your concerns within one of a 
limited number of legally prescribed actions.  That does not match nicely with 
a system which aims at resolving disputes in a manner that maximises fairness 
perceptions and creates an environment in which OCB can grow.  A system 
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that caters for such an objective will facilitate practical decisions about the 
outcomes of grievances taken on a case by case basis, and which address 
fairness and are not limited by the remedies currently available to the 
tribunals.   
 
The fact that employees perceive fairness in terms beyond the confines of 
regulation and legally defined rights and obligations is born out in the recent 
EMAR Fair Treatment at Work Report.
312
  The Report was commission by the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, BERR (now 
Business, Innovation and Skills, BIS) and involved collecting 200 answers 
from 4000 current or recent employees across Britain.  This was the first time 
a single survey source covered workers‘ awareness of their rights and the 
support available to them, a comprehensive view of the problems experienced 
in the workplace and how those problems get resolved.  According to the 
Report, 13 percent of employees surveyed felt that they had been treated 
―unfairly‖ in a sense that was not necessarily associated with a breach of 
employment rights.
313
  The reasons expressed to explain the perceived unfair 
treatment included: the attitude and personality of others (this was by some 
margin the most common source of perceived unfairness); relationships at 
work; ―it‘s just the way things are‖; and, having a group or clique which 
caused exclusion of the survey respondent.
314
  Beyond the reasons given to 
explain the unfairness, the survey disclosed that the unfairness related 
predominantly to subjects that would be difficult to frame as being in breach 
of a legal right or duty.  They included: being ignored, the type of work given; 
workload; being excluded from social activities; not being paid fairly; and, 
assessment of work.
315
   
 
Taken to the extreme, such unfair treatment might amount to a breach of the 
implied term of trust and confidence, or a breach of an express term of the 
contract (in the unlikely event that the contract includes an express clause 
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which clearly proscribes the behaviour complained of), or unlawful 
discrimination (in the event that there is evidence enough to match the 
employer‘s behaviour to the legal tests for discrimination).  In truth it is more 
likely that the unfair treatment complained of is not a breach of a legal right or 
duty, but is part of the challenge of maintaining fairness perceptions within a 
complex social environment like the modern workplace.  That does not mean 
that perceived unfair treatment is not important in the context of our policy 
objective of greater OCB, because as we have discussed at length, perceived 
unfairness will negatively impact on work performance and organisational 
commitment.
316
  Again, this assessment is reflected in the results of the Fair 
Treatment at Work Report which found that a significant number of 
employees reacted to perceived unfairness by leaving employment with the 
offending employer
317
 and, more generally, the Report confirmed that 
perceptions of unfair treatment were particularly likely to undermine an 
employee‘s trust in their employer.318   
 
This brings us back to the concern about a tribunal system and an associated 
set of legal rules that are aimed, in part at least, at weeding out unmeritorious 
claims.  Such a system might have the effect of sending a message to 
employees and employers that unfairness is in many instances lawful and 
therefore acceptable.  You might have been treated unfairly, but do not come 
to the tribunal looking for a remedy.  If you cannot get adequate redress from 
your employer, your options may be limited.  This is not the right message to 
be sending in the context of our concern to maximise fairness perceptions, but 
the message is being reinforced by a tribunal system which cannot address 
broader issues of fairness, and by a public discourse which speaks about 
claims which may relate to genuine incidents of unfair treatment, as being 
vexatious or unmeritorious.   
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Of course it would be prohibitive in terms of cost and tribunal time if 
employees were able to bring claims for general unfairness to a tribunal 
system that is already under considerable strain (although, having said that, 
such a right to claim does appear to exist, as we have discussed, in New 
Zealand).  The cost of the system and a concern that it is under considerable 
strain is apparent in the Government‘s consultation paper on workplace 
disputes.  The paper cites statistics from the Ministry of Justice which indicate 
that between 2008-09 and 2009-10, the number of tribunal claims rose by 
56%, from 151,000 to 236,100.
319
  Further, and more importantly in the 
current context, the point to emphasise again is that the tribunals and indeed 
any third party adjudicative body is simply not effectively able to deal with 
issues of perceived unfairness which reflect and are symptomatic of the 
peculiarities of a particular work environment and set of circumstances (inter-
personal and otherwise).  This reality does not align snugly within the 
description of legal rights and duties which the tribunals are asked to rule on 
and enforce.  Moreover (and this has been a theme running through this thesis) 
resolving perceived unfairness at work should not be subject to formal legal 
processes that can be costly and distressing for the parties concerned and 
which take long periods of time.  To the extent that regulation of EDG is 
appropriate, that regulation must place a greater emphasis on resolving issues 
at the early stages of the dispute spectrum when they are most likely to be 
effectively resolved in a manner that can maintain or enhance the employment 
relationship and the employer‘s reputation for fairness amongst its workforce.  
All of this points to the tribunals being the wrong mechanism to enforce 
regulation that is aimed at promoting fairness and fairness perceptions at work.  
Yet what is also clear is the need to mandate some mechanism for the 
resolution, or prevention, of perceived unfairness which in turn sets the 
foundations for the maximisation of fairness perceptions which we argue is 
essential to partnership at work and greater OCB.   
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CHAPTER 8: THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF A NEW 
WAY TO REGULATE EDG FOR FAIRNESS 
       
This chapter attempts to establish a theoretical basis for explaining the 
inability of current regulation to promote greater levels of fairness perceptions 
and OCB, whilst establishing the foundations for a model of regulation that is 
more likely to realise such an ambition.  To this end we consider the work of 
Teubner on the subject of juridification and the limitations of direct regulation 
in the arena of complex social relationships.  We observe that any law which 
attempts to mould individual fairness perceptions in the context of the 
employment relationship is unlikely to be successful unless it recognises the 
limits of direct regulation as a mechanism for achieving fairness perceptions.  
This reflects earlier discussions concerning the challenges which prevent 
direct regulation, such as the law of Unfair Dismissal, from being a catalyst 
for greater fairness perceptions and OCB.  It is argued that all the law can 
hope to achieve is a framework of indirect regulation that encourages the 
parties to self-regulate EDG in a manner which is reflexive and flexible 
enough to adequately account for the particular circumstances that attach to 
each instance of EDG.  Any such indirect regulation must encourage a 
reflexive approach to EDG which focuses on the total concept of fairness (i.e. 
procedural, distributive and interactional) and does not limit its regulatory 
interest to procedural fairness only.  Further, and perhaps most significantly, 
we suggest that it may not be prudent to enforce any indirect regulatory 
framework via the traditional mechanism presented by the tribunals and the 
Courts.  That is because, we argue, the tribunals and the Courts do not want to, 
and are not able to, effectively assess fairness in a manner that is likely to be 
perceived as fair by both parties.      
 
8.1 Re-capping the shortcomings of current regulation and principles for 
improvement 
 
We have already made the point that current regulation of EDG is inadequate 
as a mechanism for enhancing fairness perceptions and growing OCB at work.  
The reasons for this inadequacy are many and they have been explored in 
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some detail in the preceding discussion.  To take but a few extracts from what 
has already been said: current regulation fails to effectively intervene in the 
early stages of the dispute spectrum; it does not focus on the importance of 
first impressions of fairness; it relies heavily on concepts such as 
reasonableness and fairness which are subject to interpretations that are 
inevitably swayed in their application by each party‘s varied interests and 
prejudices; it defines a narrow and finite number of employment rights 
relating to EDG that do not adequately address important employee concerns 
about fair treatment (concerns that include being excluded at work, being 
ignored, not being given interesting enough work and other general but 
important examples of perceived unfairness at work); the remedies available to 
incentivise fair treatment are not sufficiently targeted at the causes of 
unfairness; current regulation tends to focus heavily on process which in turn 
leads employers to neglect the important substance of employee concerns; 
current regulation is adversarial and pits employers and employees against 
each other in a manner that perpetuates the traditional ‗them and us‘ 
employment relationship; the tribunals and Courts that are tasked with 
enforcing the regulation are reluctant to do so in a way that robustly upholds 
and thereby encourages objective standards of fair treatment; the system in 
which the tribunals and Courts operate is hampered by procedural 
requirements; the same system can be intimidating, distressing and costly for 
employees and employers to use, which consequently dissuades the parties 
from using it.   
 
We have also suggested that despite the shortcomings of current regulation as 
a means of improving fairness perceptions, some form of regulation is 
desirable because the parties cannot by themselves be left to achieve greater 
levels of partnership and thereby more competitive business performance, 
without being pushed in the right direction.  As we have already argued, it is 
highly unlikely that employers and employees, who have traditionally come 
together in a low trust relationship of subordination, will suddenly, freely, 
effectively and without exception take forward the notion of partnership at 
work, particularly in relation to EDG.  Such a change would involve a 
dramatic shift in the culture of many if not most workplaces.  So the question 
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remains: what does a new and improved model of regulation look like?  We 
have hinted at some likely characteristics of the regulation we seek: it cannot 
be enacted or implemented if the cost to the employer or the economy of its 
implementation is such that the regulation blunts the competitive edge it is 
intended to enhance; it must encourage each party to raise their concerns about 
the other or their working environment, and to raise those concerns during the 
early stages of the dispute spectrum, and in an appropriate manner; the law 
must focus directly on preventing certain forms of relationship damaging 
behaviour and encouraging the parties to preserve their relationship where that 
is possible, which will involve mechanisms for the resolution of disputes 
which are most likely to maintain (even enhance) the employment 
relationship; regulation must be flexible enough to encourage what the parties 
consider to be fair resolution of all fairness concerns, not just those that are 
related to specifically defined employment rights; regulation must allow for 
the peculiarities of particular workplaces and the various personalities that 
populate them; the law should act as a backstop or a stick, creating a strong 
sanction available to the parties where internal resolution has been inadequate; 
the methods and mechanisms for internal resolution that the law will 
encourage or mandate must be legitimate in the eyes of the parties to the 
employment relationship – they must be devised, revised, implemented and, 
perhaps, applied, with the meaningful involvement of employees as well as 
management. 
 
8.2 Juridification, structural coupling and the limits of regulation  
 
To better enable an explanation of the current state of regulation, and to help 
frame a more precise model of better regulation, it is helpful at this stage to 
explore both in the context of an appropriate theoretical framework.  We turn 
in this regard to the work of Gunter Teubner and others on the subject of 
juridification as it was defined by Teubner in his 1987 work, ‗Juridification, 
Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions‘.320  It is important to draw upon the 
theoretical assessment of juridification in this context because it helps to pull 
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together the strands of the argument so far and, more to the point, it gives 
conceptual support to the regulatory model that is suggested in this chapter 
and is more precisely described in the chapter that follows. 
 
As we have already explained, Teubner regards a central aspect of 
juridification as the process of replacing the formal general private law such as 
ordinary contract law with specific regulation aimed at social goals such as the 
improvement of working conditions and the establishment of fair treatment at 
work as a conscious priority for employers.
321
  Teubner recognises that if the 
law is to play a role in achieving such social objectives, it must overcome 
certain substantial obstacles.  He identified that there were limits to the law‘s 
ability to influence certain social institutions and that the law must be wary not 
to step beyond those limits lest it result in certain negative outcomes:    
 
Is it possible to discern fundamental limits of juridification in so far as certain juridification 
processes prove inadequate in the face of regulated social structures and/or constitute an 
excessive strain on the internal capacities of law?  The argument I would like to propose here 
is that this is not merely a problem of the implementation of law, nor of the use of state power, 
nor merely of the efficiency of law in terms of the appropriateness of means to ends, but it is a 
problem of the ‘structural coupling’ of law with politics on the one hand and with the 
regulated social fields on the other.  Once the limits of this structural coupling have been 
overstepped, law is caught up in an inevitable situation which I propose to examine more 
closely under the heading ‗regulatory trilemma’.322 
 
Teubner goes on to explain the ‗regulatory trilemma‘ with reference to Max 
Weber‘s concepts of formal and material rationality of law.323  He points out 
that Weber identified two conflicting tendencies in the development of law: an 
increase in formal specialisation, professionalism and internal systematisation 
on the one hand; and, exposure to increasing material demands from social 
interests on the other (e.g. the welfare state).  Taking his bearings from 
systems theory, Teubner reformulates Weber‘s analysis and describes these 
conflicting tendencies as a battle between the social function of law (which 
Teubner describes as being to produce from conflicts, social expectations in 
which the law then increasingly intervenes) and effective performance of law 
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to match the demands of the social environment.
324
  As Teubner points out, 
this analysis suggests that the development of what he refers to as ‗formal‘ law 
should be understood as a process in which the two conflicting trends intensify 
simultaneously: 
 
On the one hand the ‗formalisation‘ of law is intensified in the sense that law partakes of the 
functional differentiation of society and develops its autonomy to a point which sociologists 
today refer to as autopoietic self-reference... In the field of law autopoietic self reference 
means that its validity is based solely on legal normativity and that legal validity has 
definitively freed itself from all extralegal connections – politics, morality, science – as well 
as from justifications in terms of natural law.  Law can only reproduce itself intra-legally.
325  
 
On the other hand, Teubner explains, the ‗materialisation‘ of law grows with, 
and is caused by, the increase in formalisation.  Teubner says further: 
 
The more the legal system specialises in its function of creating expectations by conflict 
regulation, the more it develops and refines norms and procedures which can be used for 
future oriented behaviour control.  This can only be formulated in the following paradoxical 
terms: law, by being posited as autonomous in its function – formality – becomes increasingly 
dependent on the demands for performance from its social environment – materiality.  And in 
today‘s conditions this means: autonomous, positive, highly formalised and professionalised 
law, when instrumentalised for purposes of political control, is exposed to specific demands of 
politics on the one hand and of regulated areas of life on the other. 
 
This tension between increasing autonomy and increasing interdependence explains the 
necessity and the problem of modern juridification.  The problem lies precisely in the 
‗contradiction‘ between increasing autonomy and simultaneous increasing dependence.  When 
certain sectors of society such as economy, politics, law, culture and science become so 
autonomous that they not only program themselves, but exclusively react to themselves, they 
are no longer directly accessible to one another.  Within its own power cycle, politics 
produces binding decisions, law reproduces its normativity in the decision-rule cycle and the 
economy is, so to speak, short-circuited in the money cycle.  Reciprocal influences do, of 
course, occur permanently but they do not operate according to simple casual scheme.  
External demands are not directly translated into internal effects according to the stimulus-
response scheme.  They are filtered according to specific selection criteria into the respective 
system structures and adapted into the autonomous logic of the system.  In terms of 
environmental influences on law, this means that even the most powerful social and political 
pressures are only perceived and processed in the legal system to the extent that they appear 
on the inner ‗screens‘ of legal reality constructions.  Conversely, legal regulations are 
accepted by environmental systems only as external triggers for internal developments which 
are no longer controllable by law.
326       
        
Teubner‘s view is extremely enlightening in the context of this investigation 
into how best to regulate EDG to achieve greater fairness perceptions and 
OCB.  We are of course, in considering disputes and dispute prevention and 
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resolution within the employment relation, assessing the extent to which law 
can influence this particular social structure.  By adapting Teubner‘s 
arguments to the current discussion we see that we must abandon any notion 
that law or politics could have a direct goal oriented controlling influence on 
the employment relation.  Instead the objective of regulation in the area of the 
employment relation must be described ―in far more modest terms as the mere 
triggering of self-regulatory processes, the precise direction and effect of 
which can scarcely be predicted‖.327  Therefore we are not saying that 
regulation has no hope of influencing how employers and employees interact 
in relation to EDG, but we are saying that any influence is limited (and should 
not attempt to exceed that limit) by the self-regulatory response that the 
regulation triggers.  As Teubner explained, every regulatory intervention 
which attempts to step beyond these limits is either irrelevant and without any 
meaningful effect on the applicable social structure, or it has a negative and 
disintegrating effect on the regulatory law itself and the social structure which 
it seeks to influence.
328
  This assessment rings true when we translate it to the 
preceding discussions about the impact of current regulation in the area of 
EDG.   
 
Let us consider as an example the law of Unfair Dismissal, particularly in 
relation to procedural fairness.  If the political or policy objective is greater 
OCB and partnership through maximising fairness perceptions, that objective 
cannot be achieved, according to Teubner‘s analysis, by regulation which 
prescribes the process that an employer must follow if it wishes to legally 
dismiss an employee.  Such a prescriptive approach is likely, as we have 
explained, to have a negative effect on the employment relation because it 
refuses the parties an opportunity to reflect on how best to apply the legal 
direction in a manner that is reflexive.  Instead this form of regulation is likely 
to lead to strict adherence to process without any regard for the policy 
objective.  In other words, the process cannot be the means to the end, but is 
rather the end in itself.  The result is frequent adherence to process but a 
cynicism on the part of employees in particular that the process has any value 
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other than as a means for the employer to insulate themselves from a judicial 
assessment that they (the employer) has been unfair in dismissing the 
employee.  In that case, and in Teubner‘s terms, the limits of ‗structural 
coupling‘ have been overstepped and the potential damage to the social 
relationship is clear: the employee group does not trust their employer to treat 
them fairly in relation to disciplinary matters (it perceives that their employer 
will go through the motions of ‗fair‘ process for its own pure self-interested 
reasons and nothing more) and the potential for greater OCB and the 
achievement of the policy objective becomes unlikely.   
 
8.3 Finding a solution to the limits of juridification in the context of EDG 
– the „proceduralisation‟ of law 
 
This brings us to the point of trying to understand what, if any, solutions exist 
to the challenge of juridification in the context of regulating EDG to achieve 
partnership and OCB.  Put another way; is it possible to regulate EDG to 
match the stated policy objective without exceeding the limits of structural 
coupling and running headlong in to the negative impacts of the regulatory 
trilemma?  Such strategies have in the past tended to focus on the abstract 
conception of law as a vehicle for the indirect regulation of social structures; 
in this sense law is relieved of its task of regulating social areas and is instead 
charged with the objective of effectively controlling the self-regulating 
processes that are triggered by regulation.
329
  Teubner describes the obstacles 
that stand in the way of this objective in the following terms: 
 
The crisis of regulatory law is here diagnosed as a social immune reaction to legal 
interventions.  The problems of juridification show that different social systems operate 
according to their own inner logic, which cannot easily be harmonised with the logic of other 
systems.  Material legal programs have at their disposal modes of functioning, criteria of 
rationality and organisational patterns which are not necessarily adequate to the regulated 
areas.  The background theories on which such ideas are based are frequently macro-theories 
of society and law, usually variants of system functionality or critical theory or manifold 
attempts to combine the two... Normatively, these approaches have highly different 
perspectives, from the emancipation of man to smoothly functioning system technology, 
depending on the theoretical context and normative preferences.  Yet they all have one 
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problem in common.  Is normative integration still possible in a society characterised by inner 
contradictions, by disintegrating, indeed disruptive conflicts between the specific logic of 
highly specialised sub-systems?  They all assume that neither the state nor law is capable of 
achieving this integration... However, politics and law have to bring about important structural 
preconditions for a new type of decentralised integration of society.
330    
 
The proposed solution to the problem as stated is to move to what Teubner 
calls ‗constitutive strategies of law‘, by which he means to introduce structural 
legal frameworks for social self-regulation.  Teubner continues: 
 
The term ‗proceduralisation‘, for instance, is used as an overall heading for this function of 
law, which is to encourage ‗social systems capable of learning‘.  Essentially three matters are 
concerned here: 1) the safeguarding of social autonomy by an ‗external constitution‘, a legal 
guarantee for ‗semi-autonomous social fields‘; 2) structural frameworks for effective self-
regulation, for instance along the lines of ‗external decentralisation‘ of public tasks or in terms 
of internal reflection of social effects; 3) the canalisation of conflicts between systems by 
‗relational programmes‘ or neo-corporatist mediation mechanisms of ‗procedural regulation‘, 
by ‗negotiated regulations‘, by semi formal modes of procedure in the so-called ‗discovery 
process of practice‘, or by legal coordination of different systems rationalities‘.  In short: 
instead of directly regulating social behaviour, law confines itself to the regulation of 
organisation, procedures and the redistribution of competences.
331   
 
Teubner goes on to explore what this concept of indirect regulation of social 
behaviour means in more concrete terms.  Referring to the work of Harter in 
particular
332
, Teubner identifies the notion of ―Negotiated Regulation‖ or 
―Bargaining in the shadow of the law‖ as two headings under which indirect 
regulation is often discussed.
333
  Taking as an example US antitrust regulation, 
it is possible to identify in that area of law a considerable amount of material 
which highlights regulation through negotiation; where solutions are achieved 
through negotiation under the threat of legal sanctions.
334
  Teubner points to 
the control of company mergers as one clear instance of where antitrust law 
can indirectly drive negotiated regulation.  In that case the threat of a ban on 
the contemplated merger looms in the background and encourages the parties 
to collaboratively modify the merger proposals such that the merger is legally 
able to proceed.
335
  Teubner continues with reference to the notion of 
‗bargaining in the shadow of the law‘, which he identifies as a mechanism that 
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has been demonstrated in many areas of law (labour law being one).  The law 
in this sense, with its sanctions for non-compliance, lends itself to the creation 
of negotiating positions which in turn influence the outcome of those 
negotiations.  But for the law, such negotiated outcomes would not result.  
This method of legal regulation is, in Teubner‘s view, more likely to lead to 
flexible, co-operative solutions that are geared to specific situations as 
opposed to rigid, approximate and authoritative solutions.  In this way the 
challenge of structural coupling is addressed by relegating to the bench the 
‗official function of law‘, which is to decree changes of behaviour, while 
promoting to centre stage law‘s ‗latent function‘, which is to regulate systems 
of negotiation.
336
  He continues: 
 
Numerous studies have analysed how widespread this phenomenon has become.  Events 
regularly take the following course.  First, law is primarily used to bring about a certain kind 
of behaviour by the threat of negative sanctions.  However, enforcement deficits appear which 
oblige the parties concerned to transform the enforcement system into negotiation systems. 
One can interpret this by arguing that in this case regulatory law is subject to a latent change 
of function.  As direct regulation of human behaviour it soon reaches its limits and is tacitly 
interpreted as a kind of procedural law.  The threat potential of legal sanctions is not used.  It 
is not so to say ‗liquidated‘, but in fact survives as a legally guaranteed power of negotiation 
within the self-regulating system of negotiation.  Indeed there are even interpretations of 
regulatory law which warn against taking the implementation of law too seriously.  ‗Strict 
interpretation by the book‘ often appears unreasonable and endangers the precarious 
regulatory situation.  A critical point is reached when not only the parties concerned 
reinterpret regulatory law more or less openly and more or less legitimately as negotiation 
regulating law, but law itself abandons direct regulation to concentrate instead on structuring 
negotiation systems.
337  
 
Of course this concept of law as indirectly structuring negotiation systems 
resonates with labour lawyers in particular.  Health and safety legislation and 
the regulation of free collective bargaining are but two examples.  In many 
jurisdictions, including in Britain, indirect regulation of free collective 
bargaining has been preferred to substantive regulation.  In this way the parties 
have been left to devise their own substantive rights within a legal framework 
which includes formulas for the achievement of union recognition, procedural 
norms for the system of negotiation and for disputes, and by extending or 
restricting the competencies of the collective parties.  As Teubner points out, 
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‗the attempt here is merely to control indirectly the quality of the negotiation 
results though a balancing of negotiating power‘.338   
 
8.4 The importance of avoiding pre-occupation with process 
 
The challenge is of course how to devise such a form of regulation in relation 
to EDG.  It is tempting to articulate a regulatory approach which devises 
norms of procedure according to which the parties will engage.  It is tempting 
to do because, we submit, it is possible to devise processes that are generally 
applicable and to do so with a degree of certainty.  Moreover, the solutions to 
structural coupling and the challenges of juridification that are articulated by 
Teubner in particular, place a degree of emphasis on the law creating a legal 
framework for self regulation which Teubner characterises as the 
―proceduralisation‖ of  law.  In this regard Teubner articulates the legal 
framework as setting norms of procedure or involving ―procedural 
regulation‖.339  But this thesis argues that it is a risk in the context of 
regulating EDG to create higher levels of fairness perceptions, to focus the 
self-regulatory framework on the creation of legislated procedural norms.  The 
possible dangers of focusing regulation of EDG on process have been 
discussed in the preceding chapters (particularly in relation to unfair 
dismissal).  It is worth repeating some of those arguments in the current 
context and with reference to the techniques applied to the previous statutory 
disciplinary and grievance procedures. 
 
We recall that the statutory procedures involved a mandatory minimum and 
prescribed process that employers and employees were required to follow 
(subject to agreed enhancements) in the context of grievances and disciplinary 
action.  A failure to follow the procedure had certain defined consequences.  
For example, a failure on the part of the employer to follow the process 
leading to a dismissal resulted in the dismissal being deemed automatically 
unfair.  Further, any subsequent award of compensation would be increased 
based on the employer‘s non-compliance with the minimum procedure.  But 
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such norms of procedure and their associated incentives to comply are 
unlikely to drive higher levels of fairness perceptions.    First, the mandatory 
procedures and the compliance incentives tend to sharpen the employer‘s 
focus on what is already the primary concern of employers that are anxious to 
insulate themselves from claims of Unfair Dismissal – dismissal process.  
Regulation which penalises employers for failing to follow a preferred 
procedure is likely to cause preoccupation with that procedure as employers 
correctly view compliance with the prescribed procedure  as a vital ingredient 
in the recipe for avoiding successful Unfair Dismissal claims.  This 
preoccupation with procedure will almost certainly lead to the purpose of the 
process (which must be to achieve better and fairer decision making in relation 
to potential dismissals) being neglected.  This is unsatisfactory given our 
policy aims because employees judge fairness with reference to substantive or 
distributive outcomes and interactional justice, as well as procedural 
fairness.
340
  Further and as already discussed in some detail, the focus on 
process and the resulting practice of employers trying to insulate themselves 
from successful Unfair Dismissal claims, will impact negatively on employee 
perceptions of the disciplinary process and, consequentially, their employer.  
That is in a large part because employees will in such circumstances view their 
employer as ―going through the motions‖ of a process without any real 
concern for the employee‘s interests. 
 
Secondly, and focusing specifically on the compliance incentives, those 
incentives were unlikely to impact the behaviour of the employer (or the 
employee for that matter) until the employer had reached a conclusion that 
dismissal was the likely or inevitable outcome.  That is because the incentive 
was only worth serious concern if an Unfair Dismissal claim was possible, and 
an Unfair Dismissal claim was only possible if the employee was likely to be 
and eventually was dismissed.  In other words the incentive was unlikely to 
have any meaningful impact on dispute prevention or resolution during the 
early stages of the dispute spectrum (assuming the dispute or EDG issue has 
evolved over time, because we accept that not all instances of EDG will have a 
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complex genesis).  The incentives in the statutory procedure were not likely 
therefore to help achieve greater levels of fairness perception and OCB.  That 
is because to achieve such an objective it is vital that the employer does 
everything they can reasonably do to prevent disputes evolving beyond the 
point where salvaging trust in the relationship and the potential for fairness 
perceptions is not possible.  It is doubtful that the relationship of trust and 
fairness perceptions can be retained and maintained as between the parties in 
dispute, if a concern on the part of the employer to achieve fairness (albeit 
procedural fairness) only arises at a point in time when the drastic step of 
dismissal is being seriously contemplated.   
 
Thirdly, the statutory procedure and the incentives to comply with the 
procedure were unlikely to aid fairness perceptions given that the prescriptive 
nature of the procedure would tend to dissuade the parties from seriously 
reflecting on the following question: what is the best approach for us to 
prevent and resolve disciplinary issues in our workplace?  Further, the 
statutory procedure and the incentive would discourage the next level down of 
assessment which is that undertaken on a case by case, dismissal by dismissal 
basis, where the approach to disciplinary action should be flexible and 
adaptable to reflect that, potentially, each instance of disciplinary action or 
circumstance has its own unique features, which may require an adjustment of 
the employer‘s usual disciplinary process if fairness perceptions are to have a 
chance.  
 
The discussion to this point regarding the statutory procedure brings us back to 
Teubner, and the earlier suggestion that the procedure resembled the kind of 
indirect regulation of social relations that might breed negotiation systems 
which, in turn, have the potential to overcome the challenges of structural 
coupling and, in the current context, achieve greater fairness perceptions.  Any 
such resemblance is, however, and for the reasons explored above, superficial, 
and this perhaps points to a gap in Teubner‘s notion of procedural law.  As has 
been described, Teubner suggests that the threat of legal sanctions presented 
by direct regulation like the law of Unfair Dismissal present enforcement 
deficits which can transform the enforcement system into a negotiation 
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system.  Where this occurs the legal sanction is rarely if ever invoked, but 
rather it lurks in the background to the social relationship as a legally 
guaranteed power of negotiation within the self-regulating system of 
negotiation.
341
   This conception of regulatory law can even warn against 
taking the implementation of law too seriously and recognises that ‗strict 
enforcement by the book‘ often appears unreasonable and can be 
detrimental.
342
   
 
Our concern with Teubner‘s argument is perhaps only a matter of semantics, 
which points to the term ‗procedural law‘ being an inappropriate label for the 
type of regulation Teubner is describing, because, as we have seen, regulation 
which attempts to create norms of procedure which are supported by sanctions 
for non-compliance, do not necessarily invite negotiations between the parties 
to the employment relation.  Rather they can, because they are process-based, 
encourage strict adherence to the procedures as if there was some inherent 
value in process for process sake.  This is almost certainly a semantic (as 
opposed to a substantive) gap in Teubner‘s argument, at least as it applies to 
this thesis, given that it is possible to glean from Teubner‘s wider discussion a 
concern not so much with the regulation of procedure, but rather with law 
creating the correct structural conditions that will allow for effective reflexive 
self-regulation to take root.  The appropriate ‗structural conditions‘ will not 
necessarily include the creation of procedural norms; the appropriate structural 
conditions will depend on the particular social objective which the law has 
been tasked to help achieve.  In this case the objective is greater fairness 
perceptions and OCB leading to enhanced business competitiveness.  That 
particular objective will not, for the reasons discussed, be achieved by laws 
which encourage the parties to the employment relation to follow a process for 
fear of being stung by what are predominantly financial sanctions in each 
instance of non-compliance with the process.  
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This concern with the law creating legal norms of procedure does not 
contradict the earlier acknowledgement that procedural fairness is an 
important factor, along with distributive and interactional justice, in achieving 
greater fairness perceptions at work.  Procedural fairness is vitally important to 
achieving this objective but the perception that a process is fair will depend, 
perhaps more than any other factor, on employees being convinced that the 
procedure followed is genuine and likely to drive fair substantive outcomes.  
As we have seen during our discussions of fairness theory and OCB, fairness 
perceptions can be achieved where an employee has not obtained the 
distributive outcome they hoped for, provided they believe that the process 
which led to the outcome was fair.  This re-emphasises the importance of 
creating an environment where process is not viewed by the parties purely as a 
means of avoiding legal sanctions.  But how to achieve this is the question?  
The answer to that question causes us to look again at the reasons why 
employers in particular become acutely focused on process over substance 
when it comes to matters concerning EDG.  The answer to that question 
inevitably points to the fear of legal sanctions, or the cost of defending legal 
actions, being the driving forces behind strict and blinkered compliance with 
processes which the law (including the Courts) suggests are the appropriate 
means of dealing with EDG.   
 
8.5 Creating a regulatory framework for self regulation - negotiating 
systems and the enforcement deficit 
 
The previous sections suggest that regulation which promotes adherence to a 
disciplinary process, that is prescribed by law, as a means of avoiding Unfair 
Dismissal liability, will not promote greater levels of fairness at work.  In 
other words, such a regulatory model will not create the negotiation systems 
which drive the parties to create an approach to the management of EDG 
which is reflective of both parties‘ respective and mutual interests and which 
is more likely to generate fairness perceptions.  So what does the ‗correct‘ 
regulatory model look like?  In other words, how can the law influence the 
parties to come together to create an approach to EDG that will maximise 
fairness perceptions?  This brings us back again to Teubner.   
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8.5.1 Defining negotiating systems and the enforcement deficit 
 
First, what do we mean by a ‗negotiation system‘ in the current context of 
EDG?  The negotiation system in relation to EDG exists at two levels.  At one 
level it concerns a willingness and ability on the part of the employer and its 
employees to formulate their own methods and standards for the prevention 
and resolution of EDG related disputes.  These methods and standards will 
reflect the unique characteristics of the particular workplace and the workforce 
to whom they will apply.  At another level the negotiation system allows for a 
departure from the internally created methods and standards to reflect the 
peculiarities and complexities of each particular instance of EDG.   
 
Secondly, you will recall Teubner‘s prediction that a negotiation system will 
arise where there is an enforcement deficit and that, in certain instances, strict 
enforcement of regulation can be detrimental to the social system which the 
regulation is intended to benefit.  This thesis argues that Teubner is correct, 
but it is important to define what we mean by ‗enforcement deficit‘, 
particularly in relation to private law and regulation.  We argue that an 
enforcement deficit arises where: a) neither party is able to ascertain with 
certainty the circumstances which must exist and the action they must take (or 
not take) if they are to avoid non-compliance and sanctions; and, b) the 
sanctions or other non-legal effects of non-compliance (e.g. costs) on the 
parties concerned are such that they are driven to settle or resolve the 
uncertainty by negotiating a desirable outcome.   
 
We submit that there are certain instances of regulation where an enforcement 
deficit is desirable; there are others where it is not.  Which case applies will 
depend upon the objective of the regulation in question, but it is rarely 
desirable for the law to strictly define the behaviour that will avoid non-
compliance and sanctions, unless that behaviour is certain, or highly likely, to 
result in the realisation of the overriding objective that the regulation was 
enacted to achieve.  That is because a rational individual will tend to take the 
clearly defined actions irrespective of whether those actions are aligned with 
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the policy objective, given that the individual‘s primary interest is likely to be 
avoiding the sanctions or other negative consequences that can flow from non-
compliance, and that interest will be served by following the legally defined 
course.  In other words, where compliance can be achieved by actions that do 
not match the policy objective, those actions will be taken, the objective will 
almost certainly fail, and the benefits that society might hope to achieve from 
the realisation of the objective will be dashed.   
 
8.5.2 Achieving effective negotiation systems for EDG – removing escalation 
paths to the tribunal and creating compliance incentives  
 
It is argued that regulation of EDG to maximise fairness perceptions requires 
the creation and maintenance of an enforcement deficit in the terms defined 
above.  Without that deficit the parties cannot be expected to come together in 
a negotiation system that is likely to result in greater fairness perceptions and 
OCB.  That must be the case given the complexity and variety of 
circumstances that attach to each instance of EDG.  In other words, as we have 
argued on several occasions in this thesis, it is not possible to prescribe in law 
the behaviour that is permissible and impermissible in relation to disciplinary 
and grievance matters, while taking into account the associated complexity 
and variety of circumstance that attach to each.  Any attempt to do so will 
create a level of rigidity that will defeat the objective of achieving fairness 
perceptions via effective reflexive self-regulation.   But to create the desirable 
enforcement deficit is it necessary to move away from the practice followed 
by the tribunals and Courts of focusing attention on a defined set of 
procedures.   
 
If maximising fairness perceptions is the goal, it is necessary to create a 
regulatory structure which encourages employers and employees to believe 
that the enforcement mechanism (e.g. the tribunals and Courts) will challenge 
managerial prerogative and rigorously assess the substantive fairness of a 
dismissal, or other instance of EDG, including issues of distributive and 
interactional fairness.  Moreover, that willingness of the tribunals and Courts 
to effectively investigate substantive liability in relation to EDG must be 
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reinforced by targeted sanctions and remedies for non-compliance which 
directly address the issue in dispute, coupled with a preparedness to apply 
those sanctions and remedies.  But is this possible or practicable?  No, appears 
to be the answer.   
 
First, the tribunals and Courts will tend to resist any attempt to effectively 
legislate for their intrusion into the realm of managerial prerogative.  For 
reasons that we have explored, the common law Courts and tribunals are 
reluctant to address issues of substance in relation to EDG because, according 
to Collins, their traditions encourage abnegation rather than intervention in the 
realm of managerial freedom of action.
343
  Secondly, this resistance on the part 
of the tribunals to robustly challenge managerial prerogative will be extremely 
difficult to overcome because, we argue, the tribunals and judges are simply 
not equipped to undertake the complex inquiry that would be necessary if they 
are to convince the parties to the employment relationship that, as third party 
adjudicators, they can and will effectively assess all aspects of fairness..  The 
complexity and challenge that would inevitably confront the tribunals, should 
they be asked to judge EDG disputes with a view to encouraging fairness 
perceptions, is apparent from the following real life example.   
 
An employee is dismissed for poor performance.  The genesis of the dismissal 
is complex to say the least.  When the employee started with the employer 
they were told that they would be promoted within 6 months, once they had 
obtained some practical experience of their role.  It transpired that the 
employee and her manager did not get-on for personal reasons, and the 
manager lobbied senior management not to promote the employee.  The 
employee was not promoted, although the reasons given to support that 
decision were unrelated to the efforts of the manager.  The employee was 
bitter and de-motivated and her performance suffered to such an extent that 
she was placed on a performance management programme.  Eighteen months 
later she was dismissed for ongoing poor performance.  She did not bring a 
claim for Unfair Dismissal, but let us assume that she did.  A tribunal 
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concerned with promoting fairness perceptions and OCB would have to 
concern itself with the complex background to the dismissal.  The tribunal 
would have to ask whether the employer had done enough to prevent the 
circumstances leading to the dismissal and whether, having done so, the 
decision was fair or unfair.  The tribunal would have to consider the promise 
made to the employee and whether that caused the poor performance and, if it 
did, should that render the dismissal unfair?  But this level of inquiry and 
supervision by the Courts and tribunals is not possible or advisable.  There is 
so much that the employer might have done or not done to prevent and then 
resolve the circumstances leading to the dismissal.  Also, the reasons for the 
poor performance may have been considerably more complex and involve 
more than just the promised promotion and the actions of the manager.  The 
employee may have been having difficulties in her private life or she may 
have simply decided that the job was not satisfying enough for her, but she 
was not motivated or confident enough to search out a new position.  A 
tribunal, with very little insight to these complex issues, cannot be expected to 
judge the fairness of a dismissal with reference to such factors.     
 
But if the tribunals and the Courts cannot effectively assess substantive 
fairness, they are likely to revert to focusing their assessment on what they can 
assess - procedural fairness.  Such a reversion will undermine the enforcement 
deficit and render it less likely that the regulation of dismissal (or, more 
broadly, EDG) will effectively drive the employer to negotiate methods of 
dealing with disputes, and resolutions of actual disputes, that employees in 
particular will consider are fair.  
 
There is a further complexity to consider.  The existence of an enforcement 
deficit will not lead perfectly to effective negotiating systems that always 
result in fair outcomes, and the avoidance of relationship damaging disputes 
that would otherwise be escalated to the tribunals.  In-spite of the enforcement 
deficit, there will be cases (particularly dismissal cases) where the employer‘s 
behaviour will be challenged by the employee.  While their former colleagues 
may believe that dismissal was fair, it will be difficult for employees to accept 
that it was fair for their employer to take the action of dismissing them from 
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service.  Few people are likely to accept that their behaviour or performance 
was so poor as to warrant the drastic action of dismissal.  In those 
circumstances there is every chance that the dismissed employee will bring a 
claim for Unfair Dismissal.  This assessment is given added weight when we 
apply escalation theory to the discussion.   
 
This thesis discusses escalation theory in more detail in the following chapter, 
but for now it is worth understanding that the theory predicts that people who 
feel aggrieved, and whose grievances are not resolved to their satisfaction, will 
tend to escalate their grievances where they are presented with an opportunity 
to do so.  But that opportunity will tend to be taken without rational reflection 
on the merits of their grievance and the likelihood that it will eventually be 
determined in their favour.
344
  This creates a dilemma for a regulatory 
approach which aims to create effective negotiating systems.  There will 
always be a risk that the adoption of a negotiation system will not prevent 
escalation of the dispute, which in turn compromises the perceived value of 
such a system, and reduces the likelihood of its adoption.  In other words, the 
employer will be less likely to adopt and genuinely apply the system in a way 
that is likely to increase fairness perceptions, if they believe that their 
employee may still file a claim in the tribunals if the outcome of the 
negotiation is contrary to the employee‘s wishes.  There is, therefore, a case to 
be made that the tribunals and the Courts should have limited oversight of 
matters relating to EDG so as to encourage the employer in particular that 
genuine adherence to the negotiation system can resolve the employee‘s 
grievance once and for all.  The challenge is of course creating an incentive 
for the employer to genuinely adopt the system, and to avoid the employer 
taking advantage of the fact that their actions are no longer subject to 
oversight by the tribunals.  Addressing these challenges is the central focus of 
the next chapter.  
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8.6 Summarising the appropriate regulatory model 
 
The preceding discussion suggests the boundaries of a new regulatory model 
for EDG.  It is argued that all the law can hope to achieve is a framework of 
indirect regulation that encourages the parties to self-regulate EDG in a 
manner which is reflexive and flexible enough to adequately account for the 
particular circumstances that attach to each instance of EDG.  Any such 
indirect regulation must encourage a reflexive approach to EDG which focuses 
on the total concept of fairness (i.e. procedural, distributive and interactional) 
and does not limit its regulatory interest to procedural fairness only.  Further, 
and perhaps most significantly, we suggest that it may not be prudent to 
enforce any indirect regulatory framework via the traditional mechanism 
presented by the tribunals and the Courts.  That is because, we argue, the 
tribunals and the Courts do not want to, and are not able to, effectively assess 
fairness in a manner that is likely to be perceived as fair by both parties.      
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CHAPTER 9: A NEW REGULATORY MODEL TO ACHIEVE 
FAIRNESS AT WORK AND OCB 
 
This chapter suggests a new model for the regulation of EDG.  It draws upon 
the arguments made in earlier chapters about the shortcomings of current 
regulation as a vehicle for greater fairness perceptions, and the suggestions 
made about a suitable regulatory approach.  The proposed model adapts the 
―safe-harbour‖ approach to regulation which applies in other areas of law.  In 
short we suggest an approach to the regulation of EDG which reduces or 
eliminates the employer‘s liability in relation to EDG if they can acquire 
accreditation from an agency based on set criteria.  An employer will only 
gain accreditation if they can in essence demonstrate that they have certain 
methods and practices in place for managing EDG; methods and practices that 
accord with established substantive requirements and principles which, if 
followed, are likely to lead to fairness at work, and therefore a higher degree 
of fairness perceptions.  These requirements and principles will permit the 
parties considerable scope to comply with the accreditation criteria in a way 
that best suits them.  If the employer achieves accreditation it will not 
thereafter be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals and the Courts in 
relation to potential claims concerning the broad issue of EDG.  That is the 
carrot of the regulation.  If they do not achieve the requirements of 
accreditation they will be subject to a more stringent set of employment rights 
that are more rigorously enforced by the employment tribunals.  That is the 
stick of the regulation. 
 
9.1 A radical new model which creates a “safe harbour” for employers 
 
The new regulatory model must be radical.  It must provide a degree of 
freedom of action for the parties to the employment relation, but within a legal 
framework which directs the employer in particular to take action that is 
concerned to achieve fair outcomes in the context of EDG.  The radical aspect 
of the regulatory model is that it will prevent the tribunals and the Courts from 
being able to rule on the legality of the employer‘s actions in every instance of 
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behaviour that would presently give rise to a potential claim.  For example, the 
employer will be able to dismiss an employee who has been in service for 3 
continuous years, and the dismissed employee will not be permitted to bring a 
claim for Unfair Dismissal.  Once they have exhausted their internal options, 
the Employee will have no further recourse to challenge the dismissal.  In 
short, employers will be immune from certain claims relating to EDG, 
including dismissal.     We should also say at this point that the model would 
apply equally to issues of redundancy.  We have not discussed economic 
dismissals directly, but the issues, challenges and principles we have explored 
apply equally to circumstances where an employee is being dismissed for 
economic or business reasons.  
 
This regulatory model adopts and adapts the safe harbour approach to 
regulation.  Broadly stated a safe harbour is a form of regulation that reduces 
or eliminates a party‘s liability under law, providing that party has achieved 
compliance with certain principles or standards set down in the regulation.  
Regulators may include safe harbour provisions in regulation to insulate 
organisations or individuals from excusable violations of the regulation, or to 
incentivise the adoption of desirable practices.  As suggested above, it is the 
latter explanation or justification for a safe harbour approach that has been 
adopted in this thesis.   
 
An example of the safe harbour approach in practice is the EU Directive 
95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.  The Directive, inter-alia, 
prohibits European organisations from transferring personal data to overseas 
jurisdictions with weaker privacy laws.  There is, however, a safe harbour 
agreement between the European Commission and the US Department of 
Commerce which enables US organisations to join a safe harbour list to 
demonstrate their compliance with the Directive.  These organisations are 
thereafter able to receive personal data from the EU in circumstances where 
the transfer of information would otherwise contravene the European 
adequacy test for privacy protection.  To legitimately gain a position on the 
safe harbour list each organisation must voluntarily commit to comply with 
certain principles contained in the Directive, including that: individuals must 
 225 
be informed that their data is being collected and how it will be used; 
individuals must have the ability to opt out of the collection and transfer of 
their personal data; transfer of data to third parties may only be made to other 
organisations that also follow the data protection principles; reasonable efforts 
must be made to prevent loss of collected information; data must be relevant 
and reliable for the purpose of its collection; individuals must be able to access 
the information held about them and correct any inaccuracies in the 
information; there must be effective means of enforcing these rules.  
Organisations must be certified to enter the safe harbour and must re-certify 
every 12 months.  Each organisation can perform a self assessment to verify 
that it complies with the safe harbour principles, or it can engage a third party 
to perform that assessment.  
 
Some of the apparent strengths and weaknesses of the safe harbour approach 
taken in relation to the Directive are instructive as we attempt to build a new 
regulatory model for EDG.  The obvious strength of the approach in the 
context of our discussion is its reliance on principles as opposed to strict 
procedures.  In this way the parties moored in the safe harbour are free to 
devise their own methods and systems for achieving adherence to the data 
protection principles.  This provides an opportunity for the organisations in 
question to, for example, adapt existing processes and internal ways of 
working to meet the requirements of the safe harbour, thereby avoiding the 
time, effort and possible cost that would flow from building new ways of 
working to ensure compliance with a prescription qualifying procedure.  In 
other words the organisations concerned are able to be reflexive to a point in 
devising an approach to comply with the requirements of the safe harbour.  
Further, the use of principles as opposed to prescribed processes focuses the 
parties‘ attention on achieving substantive outcomes rather than just process 
adherence.  The organisations are required, for example, to find a way of 
ensuring that personal information is not lost.  Whatever is the method 
adopted to achieve adherence to that principle, such adherence must be 
achieved.  It is not enough to follow a process unless the process achieves 
substantive compliance with the principle.  Further, provided the organisations 
are set up to comply with the data protection principles, in the safe harbour 
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they are able to transfer and store personal information free from the risk and 
uncertainty associated with the trans-Atlantic transfer of information that may 
or may or may not be protected information.     
 
There are, however, several weaknesses in the set up and functioning of the 
safe harbour agreement.  Studies have shown that there are a number of 
organisations within the safe harbour that are not compliant with the 
principles.  For example, a number of organisations did not, according to one 
study, appear to comply with principle 7 which requires those organisations to 
engage an independent dispute resolution provider for the purpose of handling 
disputes relating to the other principles.
345
  Further, the same study indicates 
that of the 1,597 organisations on the safe harbour list at the time of the study 
in 2008, only 348 of them meet even the most basic requirements of the safe 
harbour framework.  For example, many of the organisations did not have a 
public privacy policy, or the policy failed to make mention of the safe 
harbour.
346
  A key cause of these weaknesses appears to be the failure of the 
administrative bodies that have responsibility for the safe harbour to establish 
mechanisms to enforce the requirements of entry and to monitor compliance.  
Aligned with this weakness is the right of the organisations to self-certify and 
self-re-certify that they are qualified to enter the safe harbour.  That right, 
coupled with an absence of compliance monitoring and robust enforcement, is 
likely to lead to organisations taking advantage of the benefits of the safe 
harbour when they are not qualified to do so.   
 
9.2 A requirement to be accredited for fairness in return for immunity  
 
The protection for employees in the new regulatory model proposed in this 
chapter will come from the requirement that all employers must qualify to 
benefit from the safe harbour or immunity contained in the regulation.  All 
employers will be permitted to apply to an appropriate agency for 
accreditation as an immune employer; they will not be entitled to self-certify 
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their right to enter the safe harbour.  Whether or not the employer is able to 
achieve accreditation will depend on whether they meet certain criteria 
concerning the methods, practices and systems that the employer has in place 
to achieve fairness in relation to EDG.  Where an employer is unable to meet 
the criteria they will continue to be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals 
and Courts, but the laws relating to EDG which the tribunals and Courts are 
required to enforce will be more stringent than current regulation.  All 
employers who fail the test for immunity will be entitled to resubmit for 
accreditation.  Further, all employers who are accredited only obtain 
accreditation for a limited period of time (perhaps 2 years) following which 
time they must resubmit an application to have their accredited status renewed.   
 
In short this regulatory model will work to incentivise employers to put in 
place an approach to EDG that is likely to maximise fairness perceptions, by 
removing the risk that their behaviour in each instance of EDG will be subject 
to scrutiny by the tribunals.  Providing employers meet the accreditation 
criteria they will need not worry that, for example, their decision to dismiss an 
employee will be judged as unfair and that they will have to incur the cost 
(financial and non-financial) of defending a tribunal claim.  That is the carrot 
to comply with the accreditation requirements.  The stick is the more rigorous 
regulatory approach to enforcing stringent direct employment protection 
regulation, which will include harsher sanctions for non-compliance.   The key 
to the success of the model will be the criteria and the effective measurement 
and application of the criteria by the agency which is established to undertake 
this task.  The criteria must, of course, provide the potential to drive the 
employer to focus attention on achieving a workplace that is more attuned to 
the prevention of unfair treatment and to the effective resolution of disputes 
when they arise.   
 
What are the criteria likely to include?  We have already suggested a number 
of possible elements throughout this thesis and it is appropriate at this stage to 
discuss those and others in an effort to build a picture of the proposed 
regulatory model.  The accreditation criteria will not attempt to direct specific 
behaviour or processes that an employer must follow in relation to EDG.  
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Rather the model will establish certain principles of behaviour that are 
intended to help guide the employer and its employees to develop practices 
that will in turn result in fair treatment.  Also, the model will require the 
employer to establish certain internal structures and a forum that will support, 
apply and enforce the principles of fair treatment and the approach that the 
employer has adopted to align itself with the fairness principles.  This 
conception of the new regulatory model will gather practical meaning as our 
discussion progresses. 
 
9.3 The accreditation criteria – principles over process and the challenge 
of escalation 
 
The preceding discussion has taught us some important lessons to take 
forward as we build the accreditation criteria.  Several of those lessons are 
worth emphasising at this stage.  First, to repeat, the criteria should not 
become process obsessed but must encourage adherence to certain principles 
that are likely to lead to fairness perceptions.  As with current regulation of 
EDG, an internal approach to EDG that leads managers to go through a 
checklist of steps when responding to employee grievances for example, is in 
danger of dissuading managers from exploring the substance of the grievance.  
Such an approach is likely to result in an approach to EDG which views 
process as an end in itself, and this is inconsistent with achieving the true 
objective which is greater levels of fairness perception and the benefits that 
flow from realising that objective.  Which is not to say that the employer will 
not, in the end, and to comply with the principles contained in the criteria, 
develop a process or series of processes to handle instances of EDG?  A 
number of studies have identified that the existence of and access to EDG 
processes can have beneficial consequences for employers that desire to 
indicate to their employees that the employer is fair.  Literature from the US 
predicts that the presence of EDG processes can result in lower quit rates and 
higher levels of productivity (although such studies do not suggest that such 
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processes by themselves, and without genuine and meaningful application, can 
realise these benefits).
347
    
 
The second lesson learned concerns the importance of devising an approach to 
EDG which aims to prevent disputes or, where prevention is not possible, to 
resolve disputes early before they irreparably damage the relationship.  This 
vital requirement or principle may, yet again, point to the importance of 
avoiding process obsession when developing the accreditation criteria.  
Achieving early resolution of EDG related disputes might be made more 
difficult if the employer has in place a rigid and extensive EDG process 
involving multiple meetings, hearings and appeals.  That is because the 
employee may, where an extensive process exists, be inclined to rigorously 
pursue their grievance in accordance with the process, in a manner that tends 
to lead the dispute further and further along the dispute continuum.  This is 
contrary to the desirable policy objective of fairness at work which, as we 
have discussed, prefers a quick resolution of grievances, albeit one that may 
substantively go against the employee.  Support for this analysis can be found 
in the application to EGD of the psychological theory of escalating 
commitment.   
 
The theory of escalating commitment predicts that when individuals invest 
resources in a course of action and receive feedback that the course of action is 
not succeeding, they become more committed to that course of action, and 
more likely to invest additional resources in its pursuit.
348
  Psychologists have 
explained escalation behaviour with reference to self-justification and 
cognitive dissonance.
349
  Cognitive dissonance research suggests that people 
suffer mental discomfort when they act in a manner that is contrary to their 
publically held beliefs.  In such circumstances individuals will tend to alter 
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their behaviour or express beliefs as a remedy for the mental discomfort.
350
  If 
we apply this thinking to EDG it is arguable that when a grievant invests time 
and, more importantly, personal credibility in filing a grievance that is rejected 
in the first instance, they will predictably respond to the rejection by utilising 
the opportunities at their disposal to further the grievance as a means of self 
justification.  Such an opportunity is likely to come in the form of an appeal.  
Further, if the appeal is unsuccessful the employee will tend to escalate the 
grievance to any additional point of appeal if one exists (e.g. the employment 
tribunals).
351
  This practice of escalation can also be understood as a way of 
employees saving face in front of their managers and colleagues by attempting 
to prove the correctness of their position.
352
   
 
This notion that employees tend to escalate rejected grievances where the 
opportunity exists to do so, gains further support from anecdotal evidence and 
decision dilemma theory.  Studies relying on anecdotal evidence warn that the 
formal grievance procedure tends to result in employees repeatedly discussing 
and arguing their case.  This rehashing of the argument can have the effect of 
intensifying the employee‘s sense of grievance which can, in turn, make the 
grievance more difficult to resolve.
353
  In short, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that grievance rejection tends to increase employee commitment to their 
grievances and ―general wisdom holds that grievances become more difficult 
to settle as they progress from lower levels of the grievance procedure, and 
grievants are more likely to believe that the outcome of grievances settled at 
the upper levels are inequitable.‖354  Decision dilemma theory also explains 
why formal grievance procedures are particularly conducive to escalation.  
Formulated by Michael Bowen, decision dilemma theory suggests that people 
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escalate, not in response to negative feedback, but in response to equivocal 
feedback.
355
  As Polster argues
356
: 
 
Grievance denials can be conceptualised as equivocal feedback because when a grievance is 
denied, the grievant can appeal to a higher level official who is likely more removed from the 
controversy.  Grievants may therefore attribute the initial feedback – the denial of the 
grievance – not to the grievance‘s lack of merit, but to the information level or partiality of the 
decision maker.  Grievants may therefore become more committed to their grievances and 
choose to invest additional resources in appeals. 
 
The writer‘s personal experience of representing employees during internal 
grievance and disciplinary proceedings suggests that extensive and rigid 
procedures can present a further barrier to early resolution of disputes, beyond 
employee escalation concerns.  That barrier results from the reluctance of 
some managers and HR advisers to halt procedures where the opportunity 
exists for them to do so, and where the circumstances of the dispute or 
grievance suggest that the opportunity to cease proceedings should be taken.  
In certain circumstances managers can be reluctant to take a decision which 
brings a process to a halt for fear of ―getting the decision wrong‖ or because 
they do not feel comfortable or empowered enough to accept the responsibility 
of preventing an employee from pursuing their concerns to the next level of 
the procedure. A real example helps to explain this point.  An administrative 
employee in a large public sector organisation accused her manager of 
inappropriately touching her during a work function.  The employee raised a 
complaint with the employer‘s HR department in accordance with the 
employer‘s grievance procedure.  This HR department conducted an informal 
discussion with the complainant pursuant to level 1 of what was a 5 stage 
grievance procedure.  At each stage of the process it was for the HR 
department, and the advisor appointed to manage the grievance, to make a 
decision about whether or not to advance the grievance.  If the decision was 
made not to advance the grievance at any stage, the employee had a right to 
appeal that decision.  It became evident very early in the process that the 
employee‘s complaint was false because the subject of the complaint was not 
present during the work function in question, but was in fact out of the 
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country.  Nevertheless, at every stage in the process, the decision was taken to 
escalate the grievance to the next level.  The final level was a formal 
disciplinary panel of senior management at which written evidence and cross 
examination was required and for which the parties had legal representation.  
In the end the employee charged was found innocent.  Despite this finding the 
subject of the complaint felt himself aggrieved by the process such that he 
brought a grievance of his own, which progressed to level 4 of the procedure 
at which stage he resigned.  During the level 5 hearing of the original 
grievance the HR manager responsible for the grievance said that she had 
advanced the grievance through the various levels because she ―thought that 
something new might come out‖ and she could not believe that someone 
would make such a complaint if it was not true.         
 
The preceding discussion of grievance and dispute escalation suggests that a 
model for the regulation of EDG which aims to encourage fairness at work 
and the preservation of relationships, should aim to minimise or eliminate the 
application of rigid disciplinary and grievance procedures that involve 
multiple levels and opportunities for escalation and appeal.  The regulation 
should encourage the use of flexible and informal methods of grievance and 
dispute resolution that are adaptable to the circumstances of the dispute or 
grievance (including the personalities involved).  This approach is also 
consistent with research which indicates that the resolution of grievances and 
disputes are more easily reached during informal oral discussions.
357
   
 
There is, however, one further point to consider.  It is all very well to ―de-
formalise‖ and simplify an approach to EDG, but not to the extent that doing 
so inhibits or discourages employees in particular from raising their grievances 
and concerns.  In other words the approach to dealing with EDG must provide 
a clear, if simple and informal or flexible, mechanism for raising concerns 
which employees are sufficiently confident in and aware of, and therefore 
willing to use. 
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9.4 Creating the accreditation criteria 
 
As suggested in the discussion above concerning the use of safe harbours, an 
approach to setting the criteria that is consistent with the policy objective of 
fairness perceptions, will focus on creating principles and a framework for the 
handling of EDG issues.  This includes the principle of putting in place the 
conditions that will encourage the early raising of concerns and will avoid 
damaging and unnecessary escalation of disputes and grievances.  A simple 
process or guidance regarding who to speak to and when may well suffice in 
terms of articulated procedure, but the essential success feature of any 
approach to handling EDG is, it is argued, fundamentally rooted in the need 
for people who are capable enough and informed sufficiently to deal with 
EDG in a manner which is consistent with the policy objective.  That is less 
about the process and the rhetoric surrounding the process, and more about 
having capable people to implement and administer the approach.  Those 
people should be able to apply the principles that make up the framework in a 
way which maximises the likelihood that the handling of each dispute will be 
quick and that each dispute will be resolved in a manner that the employee and 
their colleagues looking on consider to be fair.  For example, rather than 
providing managers with a process to follow, a central concern of the 
employer‘s approach to EDG should be to ensure that their managers are 
equipped with the ―soft‖ skills necessary to resolve employee concerns (or at 
least they should have access to people who have such skills).  This focus on 
creating the essential fundamental foundations for a successful approach to 
EDG that looks beyond the written policy and process documents, that are a 
feature of so many workplaces, is apparent in the accreditation criteria that are 
developed in what follows.           
 
9.4.1 The training and learning criteria 
 
The first set of criteria relates to training and awareness of principles, rights 
and obligations.  It is vitally important that employers and employees are 
aware of their rights and obligations under the new regulatory model.  It is 
also essential that managers and employees are adequately trained about the 
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meaning and application of those rights and obligations.  The rationale for this 
training is not difficult to comprehend.  An individual (a manager or an 
employee) or the employer‘s organisation as a whole, cannot expect or be 
expected to comply with an organisation‘s established practices and principles, 
rights and obligations, relating to EDG, if they do not fully understand those 
factors and their application.  If those factors are not followed the parties 
cannot hope to obtain the benefits that are expected to flow from their 
application (i.e. greater levels of fairness and OCB).  The training would seek 
to overcome two associated problems that appear in relation to employee and 
manager awareness of current legal rights and obligations.  First, a significant 
proportion of employees are not aware of their legal rights and obligations 
relating to EDG.  A 2005 study found that 10% of employees surveyed (a 
proportion of whom had managerial responsibilities) did not know that an 
employer must have a fair reason to dismiss an employee.
358
  Further, the 
same study discovered that 28% of the survey respondents did not know that 
employers were under a legal obligation to follow a grievance process (the 
survey was undertaken during the currency of the mandatory Statutory 
Grievance Procedure).
359
  The 2005 survey also uncovered that only 28% of 
respondents felt they knew the detail of the Unfair Dismissal law
360
, while a 
mere 22% of respondents were comfortable that they understood the detail 
behind the right to have a set of grievance procedures.
361
  Behind this lack of 
awareness is a further issue that was explored in the 2008 Fair Treatment at 
Work report.
362
  A number of employees are mistaken about their rights and 
their employer‘s obligations.  For example, the 2008 report highlighted areas 
where the employees surveyed believed that their employer had certain 
obligations when in fact they did not.  Those perceived obligations included 
not to discriminate due to appearance, to consider a request for flexible 
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working to care for an elderly relative, to permit the carrying over of unused 
holidays, to grant unlimited amounts of unpaid holiday each year.
363
  
 
The lack of understanding and misunderstanding of employment rights has 
important consequences for our policy objective of enhanced fairness 
perceptions.  For example, an employee who has a broad understanding that 
their employer has certain obligations not to discriminate against its staff, but 
does not understand the detail behind that right, may be inclined to fill the 
gaps in their understanding with certain false assumptions about the legal 
right.  This is consistent with the earlier explanation of Fairness Heuristic 
Theory (FHT)
364
 which focuses ―on the cognitive limitations involved in 
processing relational information and explains how fairness information serves 
as an aid in making sense of the plethora of interpersonal stimuli we must face 
in our daily lives.‖365  Fairness information would include information about 
each party‘s legal rights and obligations.  Where such information is not 
available or is unknown, studies in the area of FHT suggest that substituting 
one‘s own false assumptions about that information can result in fairness 
perceptions or judgements being inaccurate and unwarranted.  That inaccuracy 
may in turn cause an employee to form a negative view about their employer, 
or to behave in a manner that is not justified or that is contrary to how they 
would have behaved had they been accurately informed.
366
  Take for example 
an employee who mistakenly believes that their employer must not 
discriminate against them on the basis of their appearance.  The employee is 
given a warning for consistently wearing ear-rings at work when the wearing 
of ear-rings is against company policy.  The employee takes the warning and 
does not challenge it by bringing a tribunal claim.  He does not want to go 
through the aggravation of bringing a claim while he remains employed and he 
wrongly believes that it is necessary to pay for a lawyer to represent him in the 
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tribunal.  The employee suggests to their manager that he is being 
discriminated against, but his manager disagrees.  The employee is stead-fast 
in their belief because he has been given the information about his rights by a 
friend who he trusts.  The employee is upset and humiliated.  He feels de-
motivated and has lost trust and confidence in his manager and his employer.  
His work output declines and he eventually resigns to take up a new role.   
 
The training requirement or criteria extends beyond legal rights and 
obligations to the employer‘s internal policies and procedures relating to EDG 
(we talk more about the creation, and the principles behind the creation, of 
those policies and procedures below).  In particular, employees (including 
managers) must be trained on the meaning and interpretation that will be 
applied to the employer‘s policies and processes, including how they will 
function in practice, and the respective obligations of employees and managers 
and other functions within the business (e.g. HR).  This training would also 
include training for line managers regarding how to better manage their 
reports in a way that minimises the risk of grievances arising in the first place, 
or at least helps prevent their escalation beyond the early stages of the dispute 
spectrum.  This training requirement, and the need to achieve certain levels of 
competency in relation to the subjects taught, should be included in each 
manager‘s performance plan and part of their performance assessment should 
involve determining how well they measure up against the required 
competencies.  Indeed the extent to which all training is understood by the 
recipients of the training must be measured and where comprehension falls 
short of what is required, the training should be undergone again.  Further, all 
training must be refreshed and updated to reflect desired changes that are 
identified by managers and employees as part of an ongoing improvement 
programme which aims to enhance fairness at work.  The extent to which 
training programmes are adequate will be assessed as part of the accreditation 
process by the responsible agency. 
 
Training is in part about extending knowledge of all matters relevant to the 
prevention and resolution of EDG disputes.  The dissemination of knowledge 
and information about matters relevant to EDG must be consistent and focused 
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on the principles that have been agreed by the parties as the guiding principles 
of EDG prevention and resolution in their workplace.  That will be a 
requirement of accreditation.  In this regard that information must be 
communicated regularly via various media and forum (e.g. team and 
department meetings, handbooks, email communications from senior 
management, intranet etc).  Further, employees and managers must be 
encouraged to seek out advice when they are not clear about their rights and 
obligations in relation to EDG.  To this end each organisation must have a 
central point of knowledge and advice concerning such matters - a guardian or 
owner of the EDG related principles, policies and processes that apply in the 
organisation.  For larger organisations that guardian may well be the HR 
function.  Further, the existence and role of this guardian must be 
communicated effectively (which partly means regularly) throughout the 
organisation.  The aim is that questions or concerns regarding EDG related 
issues are raised internally in the first instance, to ensure they are dealt with 
consistently and in a manner which is in keeping with the organisation‘s 
specific principles of fairness.  Success will be measured in part by the extent 
to which employees use this internal function, and it will be a significant 
departure from the current practice of many employees.  For instance, the 
2005 Employment Rights at Work survey discussed above found that a large 
proportion of employees go outside of the employer organisation to obtain 
information about their legal rights and obligations.  In fact 58% of 
respondents to the survey said that they went in the first instance to an external 
source (including the CAB, the internet, a friend or relative).
367
 
 
9.4.2 The representation and governance criteria 
 
Where the employee is not comfortable raising their issues with the 
employer‘s guardian, they must have available to them a representative to 
whom they can appeal for advice.  The provision of representation is a further 
requirement of accreditation.  Employees must have access to representation 
for knowledge and advice, representation at grievance and disciplinary 
                                                  
367
 Supra at note 358, 134. 
 238 
meetings and discussions, as an advocate for their interests during the 
negotiation and implementation of policies and processes relating to disputes, 
and in relation to the updating and monitoring of compliance with those 
policies and processes.  The rationale behind the importance of representation 
is in part to encourage the accurate dissemination of information about rights 
and obligations (legal and internal).  It is also aimed at encouraging employees 
to raise their concerns as early as possible.  If concerns are raised to the 
representative, that body can assist the employee with how best to deal with 
the concern.  It may be that sound advice will resolve the matter without the 
need to pursue it further.  In different circumstances the representative may be 
able to raise the concern with the internal guardian on behalf of the employee 
in an effort to find a resolution.  An alternative resolution may be that the 
guardian encourages the employee to raise the matter directly with their line 
manager.  That may be enough to resolve the issue.   It is interesting to note in 
this context that empirical evidence suggests strongly that employees who 
seek advice from a manager or a trade union representative are more likely to 
find what the employee perceived to be a positive outcome to their problem.  
Specifically, employees who consulted a manager or a trade union were twice 
as likely to find what they considered to be a fair outcome, than those that did 
not.
368
   
 
Further, the 2008 Fair Treatment at Work Report suggests that those 
employees who discuss their issue with their employer (either face to face or 
over the phone) were approximately 80% more likely to reach what the 
employee considered was a successful outcome than those that did not have 
such a conversation.
369
  Of additional relevance is the 2004 report on 
employment representation in grievance and disciplinary matters.  This report 
found that disciplinary sanctions and dismissals were less likely to occur at 
workplaces with higher levels of trade union density.  This was bolstered by 
the presence of specialist HR managers and was particularly evident where 
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employee representatives trusted their management counterparts.
370
   By 
contrast, those employees who did not resolve their problems internally, but 
instead made an application to the tribunal, where around 25% less likely to 
resolve their problem in what they considered to be a positive way.
371
  This 
conclusion compares with the outcome of the 2008 Survey of Tribunal 
Applications, which found that 21% of claimants who were successful at 
tribunal were not or not at all satisfied with their case outcome, while 92% 
who were unsuccessful were not satisfied.
372
  These findings emphasise the 
importance of encouraging employees to raise their concerns with their 
representative or their manager.  If this is achieved, we can anticipate a 
resulting increase in the number of grievances that are resolved early and in a 
manner that the employee considers to be fair.  The guarantee of a 
representative will help achieve this objective.  These findings also support the 
need for effective training of managers and representatives to ensure that they 
are adequately able to deal with employee concerns when they are raised.  One 
might reasonably predict that the percentage of positive outcomes discussed 
above will increase where there is a constant representative who is effectively 
trained. 
 
The role of the representatives will also include formulating the principles, 
policies and procedures that will apply in the particular workplace (including 
roles and responsibilities and guidance on flexibility and options for 
resolution).  This is a vital component of the new regulatory approach.  It is 
essential that employees have an effective and persistent voice in the creation 
and ongoing development and improvement of an organisation‘s approach to 
preventing and resolving workplace disputes.  This thinking is reflected in the 
current ACAS Code which requires the involvement of employees in the 
building of disciplinary and grievances processes.  The importance of 
employee involvement in this sense stems from the notion that employees are 
far more likely to perceive their employer‘s approach to EDG as being fair, if 
that approach amounts to the faithful following of policies and processes that 
                                                  
370
 R. Saundry and V. Antcliff, Employee representation in grievance and disciplinary matters 
– making a difference? (Employment Relations Research Series no. 69) 12, 30-39. 
371
 Supra at note 312, 122. 
372
 Supra at note 294, 87.    
 240 
the employees were intimately and meaningfully involved in developing.  This 
reasoning makes sense if we revisit earlier discussions regarding how 
employees make fairness judgements.  In particular, the proponents of fairness 
theory suggest that perceptions of unfairness occur when an individual is able 
to hold another person responsible for a situation which threatens their 
psychological of material wellbeing.  The employee will be able to make that 
judgement when they imagine that there are other possible outcomes that 
would have caused them less damage, and the person responsible for making 
the decision could have and should have acted differently.
373
  It is the ‗should 
have‘ component of this model which is particularly relevant in the current 
context.  It will be increasingly difficult to make an unfavourable should have 
judgement if the employer‘s actions reflect an approach to resolving EDG 
disputes which the employee (or their authorised representatives) have been 
instrumental in developing.  That is in part because the meaningful 
involvement of employees in the creation of EDG principles, policies and 
processes will go some way to ensuring that those policies and procedures are 
more likely to reflect what the employees‘ believe is a fair approach to 
handling employee grievances and disciplinary issues.  Provided those policies 
and processes are faithfully adhered to, perceptions of unfairness should be 
minimised and positive perceptions of fair treatment should increase. 
 
This leads to another role for the representative.  They will play an important 
function as the monitor or gatherer of information relating to compliance and 
non-compliance with the agreed principles, policies and practices.  This is a 
significant function for the obvious reason that it is all very well to have 
agreed policies etc, but the value of those policies as an agent for fairness is 
very much dependent on the employer‘s adherence to the standards of 
behaviour and practice contained therein.  In fact, failure to adhere to agreed 
policies and practices may well result in a higher level of unfairness 
judgements than might apply following non-adherence to employer imposed 
standards given that, using the language of fairness theory, such non-
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compliance emphasises the employee‘s focus on the should have assessment 
(i.e. the employer absolutely should have complied with the practices that we 
mutually agreed).  The representative must therefore be tasked with tracking 
and recording instances of actual and alleged non-adherence to the agreed 
policies.  They should raise those non-compliances with the employer for 
resolution.  The representative will encourage employees to raise concerns 
regarding the employer‘s (including managers‘) failure to follow the agreed 
approach.  That encouragement will also form part of the training and 
obligation of managers.  These allegations of non-compliance will be 
submitted for audit by the accreditation agency when the employer‘s 
accreditation is up for review.  This point leads to the next requirement of 
accreditation. 
 
The employer must establish a governance mechanism for EDG which 
includes a joint committee of employer and employee representatives.  The 
committee will meet regularly to discuss alleged non-compliances with agreed 
practice and to explore improvements to the organisation‘s approach to 
managing EDG.  The committee must include suitably senior individuals from 
the employer‘s organisation; individuals who are able to make decisions about 
important issues relating to the management of EDG.  Exactly who those 
individuals are might depend on the size of the organisation.  A small 
employer may be expected to include its Managing Director on the committee 
while a large multi-national corporate employer may run several committees 
which govern local workplaces in different geographies (this would reflect the 
potential variability of the issues that are important to different locations and 
different groups of workers).  Each local committee might include the local 
head of operations.  The employee representatives might include individuals 
that represent different parts of the business and levels of the organisation‘s 
structure.  For example, the committee of a medium size manufacturing 
business might include employee representatives from production, sales, 
procurement, and head office.  This reflects one of the principles relevant to 
selecting employee representatives, which is that the committee as a whole 
must be able to effectively represent the varying interests of the employer‘s 
employees. 
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The final point above begins to address the question of who is able and 
capable to represent employees.  Recognised unions would potentially play a 
role, as would non-recognised unions where the employees concerned 
conclude that union representation is appropriate and desirable.  The various 
reports that we refer to above clearly indicate the value of unions in the 
effective and early resolution of employee grievances and disciplinary 
matters.
374
  But given the lack of union coverage in modern British 
workplaces, it will be necessary to look beyond trade unions to find suitable 
employee representatives.  Those representatives may come from within the 
employer‘s workforce and where they do, they will be elected by their 
colleagues.  An alternative source of representatives may be a state funded 
body of employee representatives.  The rules relating to the process and 
handling of representative elections will be provided by regulation.  Further 
practical support for employees and employers concerning the holding of 
elections will be provided by an external agency.  Further, employee 
representatives must be fully trained in the requirements of their role (as must 
employer representatives).  Such training may also be supported or provided 
by an external body (e.g. the accreditation agency or ACAS).  Again, the size 
and membership of the committee will be dictated by the size and 
geographical spread of the employer, and the need to ensure that the 
committee fairly represents the spread of different groups of employees that 
the employer employs.  For a very small business, it may be appropriate that 
the entire workforce sits on the committee. 
 
9.4.3 The negotiated approach to managing EDG 
 
The governing committee, once established, will agree a ―principles of 
working‖ document that will govern how the committee will co-operate to, in 
the first instance, agree the organisation‘s approach to managing EDG.  
Beyond the initial development of the approach, the document will set out the 
timing of committee meetings and any standing agenda items, and it will 
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provide mechanisms for the ongoing improvement of the organisation‘s 
approach to managing EDG.  The committee will go on to develop the initial 
principles, policies and processes that will govern the organisation‘s 
management of EDG.  A failure to agree the processes and policies for the 
handling of EDG will result in the employer being unable to gain 
accreditation.   
 
Those policies etc must be submitted for accreditation, along with a record of 
the election process and outcome (endorsed by the committee, but subject to 
audit by the accreditation agency).  The precise nature of the agreed approach 
and its specific terms will be left to the committee to agree, but they must 
align with certain key principles and objectives.  Those principles and 
objectives may include the following.  
 
The parties to the employment relationship are committed to:  
 
1. Achieving an approach to managing EDG that employees and 
employers believe is fair; 
 
2. Faithfully following the approach in relation to all instances of EDG; 
 
3. Proactively encouraging managers and employees to raise their 
concerns and problems early with their reports or manager or 
representative (as the case may be); 
 
4. Ensuring that problems and concerns are dealt with promptly, bearing 
in mind the specific nature of the issue and the individuals concerned; 
 
5. Ensuring that all policies, rules and processes relating to EDG are 
clearly communicated to all concerned; 
 
6. Ensuring that any process relating to EDG is simple and flexible and 
avoids the risk of unnecessary escalation; 
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7. Ensuring that all managers are appropriately trained in the handling of 
EDG; 
 
8. Ensuring that all concerned are appropriately trained about their rights 
and responsibilities as they apply to EDG; 
 
9. Ensuring that compliance with the agreed approach to the management 
of EDG is adequately monitored and that records are kept regarding 
allegations of non-compliance; 
 
10. Ensuring that all representatives represent their respective 
constituencies in good faith and to the best of their ability; 
 
11. Ensuring that the procedures for the handling of grievances and 
disciplinary matters should be agreed by the committee; 
 
12. Ensuring that all policies and procedure relevant to EDG are reviewed 
and updated by agreement of the committee, in keeping with the 
objective of continuous improvement; 
 
13. Ensuring that the committee members must work in good faith to agree 
the procedures and must use their best endeavours to reach an 
agreement;  
 
14. Ensuring that the procedures for the handling of EDG must be written 
and should reflect the following principles: 
 
a. The desire to resolve matters informally by discussion where 
possible; 
 
b. All decisions about the outcome of disciplinary and grievance 
matters will be taken by agreement with the employee if 
possible, otherwise those decisions will be for the employer to 
make; 
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c. The employer‘s decision must not be taken until they have 
gathered the relevant information; 
 
d. The allegations or concerns at issue must be clearly articulated 
to the employee (in the case of disciplinary action), or to the 
employer (in the case of a grievance); 
 
e. The employee must be given a full and real opportunity to 
respond to any allegations against him or her; 
 
f. The employee should be entitled to have a support person of 
their choice at all meetings to discuss grievances or disciplinary 
matters; 
 
g. The decision-maker must keep an open mind to the outcome; 
 
h. The employer must always genuinely and in good faith provide 
an explanation of why they have reached their decision 
(including why they have not decided to take any alternative 
action that is suggested by the employee); 
 
i. Employers should always explore options other than dismissal 
and dismissal should be the last resort and any disciplinary or 
other action taken should be proportionate; 
 
j. The procedures and policies applicable from time to time must 
be in writing and easily accessible and available for all 
employees and managers to review;  
 
k. The parties to any instance of EDG should be prepared to 
explore and agreed departures from the written procedures 
where they feel that is appropriate; 
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l. A written record should be kept of all EDG matters that extend 
beyond informal discussions; 
 
m. All records must be stored by the employer and made available 
to employees and the agency auditor upon request. 
 
15. Ensuring that they develop a set of behaviour and performance 
standards that are applicable to their particular workplace, including an 
indication of which of those standards are particularly important for the 
organisation and the employment relationship and why; 
 
16. Ensuring that they explore in good faith engaging an external provider 
of mediation or conciliation services where the parties cannot reach 
agreement on matters relating to EDG (such mediation may be 
provided by the tribunals or ACAS or some other body established by 
the state). 
 
9.5 Measuring the employer‟s approach for accreditation and the issue of 
small employers 
 
Generally speaking this list of principles, and the preceding criteria, address 
many of the essential aspects of EDG dispute prevention that we have 
suggested are missing under the current regulatory regime (e.g. the early 
raising of grievances, flexibility of process, third party intervention is 
inappropriate, solutions to problems should directly address the problem etc).  
The accreditation agency will review the employer‘s adherence to these 
principles and the other criteria discussed above when determining whether 
the employer should be immune from certain potential liabilities under 
common law and statute that apply to EDG.  When undertaking a review or 
audit of the employer‘s adherence to the fairness principles, the agency will 
consider the records kept of compliance or non-compliance with the criteria, 
interviews with members of the committee, records of disciplinary and 
grievance matters, training records, and any other information that the agency 
considers is relevant (this may include interviews with employees and 
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managers who were involved in certain grievance or disciplinary matters).  
The review will involve the agency comparing the specific performance of the 
employer and its managers against a number of performance levels and key 
performance indicators that will be developed for that purpose.  The 
assessment will take into account key dependencies, including, most 
significantly, the extent to which employees and their representatives have 
complied with their obligations on which the employer‘s compliance is 
dependent.  The assessment will also take into account the employer‘s history 
of performance against the criteria (in the early days this may involve 
assessing the employer‘s past record of tribunal claims).   
 
Where the employer does not pass the accreditation assessment, they will 
remain subject to the current law relating to Unfair Dismissal and grievances, 
but with certain changes made to bolster the impact of the law, and to increase 
the incentive for employers to meet the accreditation criteria.  In particular, the 
current law will be altered to address many of the shortcomings that we have 
addressed in the preceding chapters.  They include: a greater willingness on 
the part of the tribunals to challenge the employer‘s substantive reasons for 
dismissal, an increase in the frequency of re-instatement orders, an escalation 
in the level of financial remedies (including awards for non-pecuniary loss), 
the introduction of an award similar to the New Zealand compliance order.      
 
It is possible that small employers will find the demands of accreditation 
beyond them because of the effort involved in meeting the criteria and the 
limited internal resources they have available to achieve compliance.  It may 
be possible to overstate any such difficulty, but it is important to acknowledge.  
This is particularly so given that a large number of the claims brought to the 
tribunals involve small employees, who represent a large proportion of 
workplaces in Britain.
375
  It may be possible to relax the accreditation criteria 
for small employees in-so-far as that criteria demands considerable internal 
effort to achieve, while at the same time bolstering aspects of the criteria that 
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make use of external resources.  For example, it may be possible to relax for 
small employers some of the training requirements contained in the criteria, 
while at the same time increasing ease of access for small employers and their 
employees to external support agencies, such as a mediation service (we 
discuss the significance of mediation as part of this process below).  In doing 
so the State helps to overcome the small employer‘s lack of internal resource, 
thereby avoiding or mitigating any risk that the effectiveness of the new 
regulatory model will be compromised because its requirements are relaxed 
for small employers.   
 
9.6 The role of mediation 
 
The discussion above considers the potential risk associated with dispute 
escalation and emphasises the importance of quick and informal resolution of 
EDG issues and disputes where possible.  This principle is reflected in the 
example criteria listed above (e.g. there is no principle insisting on a right of 
appeal but there is an emphasis on simple and quick procedures for dispute 
resolution).  This desire for informal and speedy dispute resolution requires 
further examination.  This principle must not result in an approach to EDG 
that appears to be or is dismissive of EDG issues.  The settled approach to 
resolution must provide an effective means of resolving disputes which 
promotes the policy objective of fairness, fairness perceptions and OCB.  
Importantly, the approach must encourage employees to present their concerns 
to a person within the organisation who can set in motion a simple approach to 
resolving each dispute; an approach in which the employees have confidence.  
In this regard early access to third party mediation support is likely to be an 
important feature of the accreditation criteria.  In other words, state funded 
mediation should be available in appropriate cases (particularly for small 
employers and their employees) where the initial informal attempt at 
resolution has been tried but has failed.   
 
It is possible to make a case for mediation on the basis that it can, by reducing 
the conditions that tend to cause escalation, promote the maintenance of 
relationships, which is an essential characteristic of OCB and, therefore, a 
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desirable feature of the new regulatory model that is proposed in this thesis.  
In this way mediation contrasts with adversarial type dispute processes which 
tend to focus on the right and wrong of a claim or complaint, and the 
apportionment of blame or culpability.  Polster makes the point that legal 
literature, while not explicitly referring to escalation theory, does nevertheless 
recognise that adversarial dispute processes (e.g. litigation or internal 
tribunals) applied to ongoing relationships, such as an employment 
relationship, tend to intensify conflict and are counterproductive.
376
  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, scholars of dispute resolution frequently advocate the 
use of mediation for a variety of situations in which the parties in dispute are 
likely to desire that their relationship be maintained, including ongoing 
employment relationships.
377
  Specifically, mediation can mitigate the risk of 
―face loss‖ or loss of credibility that tend to associate with escalation.  For 
example, the resolution of a dispute is likely to involve concessions which 
might be perceived by the grievant as a ―sign of weakness‖ which the 
employee for example will be psychologically inclined to avoid.  During 
mediation the mediator can indicate that compromises are appropriate and the 
parties can, as a result, attribute responsibility for concessions to the mediator, 
thereby avoiding the perception of face-loss and minimising the danger of 
escalation.
378
  Transformation mediation in particular may be a desirable 
feature of any adopted approach to resolving EDG disputes.  In transformation 
mediation, mediators avoid any assessment of the merits of the parties‘ 
respective claims, focusing instead on fostering interaction and 
communication and encouraging each party to conceptualise the dispute from 
the other party‘s perspective.379  By doing so, transformation mediation may, 
according to Polster, prevent escalation in the following way
380
: 
 
The self justification explanation for escalation posits that people invest additional resources 
to reverse a failing course of action in order to reduce the mental discomfort that comes from 
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having chosen such a course.  Because this discomfort comes from a threat to peoples‘ self-
conceptions as capable decision makers, the discomfort can also be reduced by boosting 
peoples‘ self-conceptions.  Research suggests that when decision makers have the opportunity 
to affirm values that they hold important, their self-conceptions can be boosted and escalation 
reduced.  Transformation mediation can offer an opportunity for affirmation through its twin 
goals of empowerment and recognition.  When they are empowered in transformation 
mediation, parties appreciate their own skill and resources.  This appreciation is heightened 
when their situations and perspectives are recognised by the opposing party... Transformation 
mediation aims to ―shift [parties] back to a restored sense of strength/confidence in self‖. 
 
Polster also highlights field research which positively points to the 
effectiveness of mediation as a means of reducing the escalation of employee 
grievances.  He refers specifically to a program of transformation mediation, 
implemented by the United States Postal Service, which had the effect of 
decreasing formal employee Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
complaints by 40%.
381
     
 
It is also arguable that the availability and willingness of the employer to use 
mediation will signal to employees a desire on the employer‘s part to be fair, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of fairness perceptions in relation to EDG.  
As Polster explains
382
:     
 
In both mediation and traditional grievance procedures, employees are able to challenge 
employer actions.  In mediation, employees may not have the benefit of multiple levels of 
appeal as they would in a grievance procedure; however, they are able to take a more active 
role in the reconciliation process.  This is especially true in transformation mediation, where 
employees, along with employers, control the structure of mediation.  Research has suggested 
that employees find these procedures fair.  For instance, researchers evaluating the Postal 
Service transformational mediation program found that on a five point Likert scale – with five 
being ―highly satisfied‖ – employees rated the mediation process with a mean that exceeded 
four and one half. 
 
Of course mediation is not the absolute solution to the problem of regulating 
for fairness and OCB.  Concerns have been expressed that mediation can 
restrict the autonomy of the parties and that the mediator‘s own assumptions 
about an appropriate settlement can disproportionately reflect in the outcome 
of the mediation.
383
  This is contrary to the policy objective of enhanced 
fairness perceptions because such a result will depend upon the employee 
feeling that their interests and their input to the resolution process has 
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substantively influenced the process and the outcome.  In a similar sense 
Neale and Smart highlight the danger that mediation might function in practice 
as a form of social control, especially in asymmetrical relationship such as the 
employment relationship: 
 
Mediation is not value-free.  It operates (at present) only marginally in the shadow of the law 
but centrally in the shadow of social welfare ideology.  Indeed it may operate as ‗a cover for 
value laden tampering with family life‘ with mediators exerting subtle pressure on clients to 
conform to current welfare notions.
384
 
 
A further concern regarding the role of mediation in the resolution of 
employment disputes relates to the perceived imbalance of bargaining power 
between employers and employees.  Several studies have suggested that the 
mediator must understand and respond to any power imbalance between the 
parties if the mediation is to be effective.
385
  A failure on the part of the 
mediator to address the power imbalance between the parties can, or so the 
story goes, result in the stronger party taking unfair control over the mediation 
to the detriment (real or perceived) of the weaker party.
386
  For example, 
Hunter and Leonard have suggested that in sexual harassment cases, which 
often arise in situations where there is purported to be a power imbalance, the 
opportunity may exist for intimidation or influence.
387
  This power imbalance 
presents a dilemma for the mediator who may be tempted to intervene in 
favour of the weaker party, but who is at the same time concerned to maintain 
their unbiased role in the process.  Yet doing noting and remaining passive 
may make fair outcomes (including outcomes that the employee considers to 
be fair) all the more difficult.  That is because passivity on the part of the 
mediator may have the effect of perpetuating or bolstering the power disparity.   
 
It is, therefore, possible to be critical of mediation as a solution to workplace 
disputes and the challenge associated with achieving higher levels of fairness 
                                                  
384
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perceptions, however, we should recall the point made in chapter 4: the goal of 
the regulatory model proposed is to maximise the likelihood of dispute 
resolution which the parties (employees in particular) perceive as being fair.  
In other words this is not a search for perfection; it is a calculated endeavour 
to evolve an approach to EDG that is significantly more likely than the current 
regulatory approach to grow partnerships at work and enhance competitive 
performance.  Mediation, with its non-adversarial focus and capacity in theory 
and practice to maintain relationships rather than damage them, appears 
attractive as one element of the proposed regulatory model.  Further, the 
positive experience of mediation in organisations such as the United Postal 
Service, where mediation has resulted in an increased level of early conflict 
resolution, suggests that dismissing mediation as being an inappropriate, or 
risky element of the new regulatory model, is an overly cynical stance to 
adopt.
388
  Which is not to say that the mediation approach adopted by the new 
regulatory model should not seek to address some of the potential 
shortcomings of mediation as a mechanism for achieving fair and speedy 
dispute resolution?  For instance, the writer‘s experience of the New Zealand 
Mediation Service suggests that there is a difference between good mediators 
and not so good mediators.  Understanding a model of mediation that is best 
suited to the objective of fairness perceptions and early resolution, and 
deploying mediators who are capable of delivering that model, will be 
important.  Also, acknowledging the importance of representatives at 
mediation, and ensuring effective representation, is likely to be another 
significant feature of the new regulatory model.  Effective representative will 
help overcome the challenges associated with the imbalance of power between 
the parties that is discussed above, including the mediator‘s dilemma 
concerning whether or not to address any power imbalance thereby threatening 
their neutrality.  The existence and effectiveness of representation in relation 
to EDG is, as outlined above in some detail, an important aspect of the overall 
regulatory model. 
 
                                                  
388
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 253 
There are also valuable lessons to be learned from the use of mediation as a 
central component of employment dispute resolution in other jurisdictions.  In 
New Zealand, for example, the State run and funded Mediation Service exists 
to provide mediation support in relation to all ―employment relationship 
problems‖.389  Employers and employees are free to seek mediation assistance 
from the Mediation Service to resolve any and all differences arising between 
them that relate to the employment relationship; it is not necessary that the 
dispute must also give rise to a potentially actionable legal claim (e.g. breach 
of contract or unjustifiable disadvantage) before mediation assistance can be 
sought.  Statistics from the New Zealand Department of Labour concerning 
the effectiveness of employment mediation suggest that is has been successful 
as a mechanism for resolving EDG and other employment claims and 
disagreements in New Zealand.  Susan Corby, writing before the instigation of 
the Mediation Service when mediation was one function performed by the 
New Zealand Employment Tribunal, quoted that from 1996-97, 59% of cases 
lodged in the Tribunal were settled through mediation.
390
  Such statistics are, 
however, for our purposes, of marginal value.  They do not educate us about 
the impact of the mediation process on the employment relationship and 
fairness perceptions.   
 
Dolder suggests that the approach to mediation in New Zealand might be in 
danger of losing focus on the peculiarities of each dispute and the parties 
involved, preferring instead to apply a ―one size fits all‖ approach to 
mediation that is concerned about doing a deal and moving on to the next 
case.
391
  If Dolder is correct the New Zealand approach might represent a 
lesson in how not to apply mediation in the context of a new regulatory model.  
However, this might be overstating matters because, from the writer‘s own 
experience of the Mediation Service and many of its mediators, the Mediation 
Service can and does function as a vital facilitator of positive, and often 
inventive, outcomes for both parties in a large number of cases; outcomes that 
are very much tailored to the peculiarities of a particular dispute.  
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Nevertheless, it is the case that the Mediation Service has become, in a large 
number of disputes, little more than a forum for achieving a settlement 
(usually financial) of a complaint which releases the employer from potential 
litigation risk and liability.  But, it is argued, this should not detract from the 
potential value of mediation per-se.  Rather this perception of the Mediation 
Service as a ―dealmaker‖ may reflect that a large number of disputes are 
reaching the Mediation Service at a point on the dispute spectrum when 
maintenance of the relationship is unlikely and not desired by the parties.  In 
such circumstances it is inevitable that mediation becomes about how to end 
the relationship as soon as possible.  The writer‘s experience of representing 
parties in more than 100 mediations is that, where the Mediation Service is 
engaged early, it has a positive impact on devising solutions that focus on 
protecting or repairing the relationship and that are sustainable.  It is also the 
writer‘s experience that early engagement of the Mediation Service is the 
result of the employee in particular being encouraged to try mediation by their 
representative.  Perhaps, therefore, a vital lesson from the New Zealand 
experience is the importance of encouraging early consideration of mediation 
as a dispute resolution option and, again, the importance of the representative 
in encouraging and supporting the employee to use mediation.           
 
9.7 Should certain claims be excluded from the immunity and 
consequences? 
 
While this thesis argues that the new regulatory model should apply in respect 
of all types of EDG related claim, it accepts that some readers may object to a 
blanket application, preferring instead that certain complaints be excluded 
from the safe-harbour.  Those critics may argue that certain kinds of claim 
should not be removed from the jurisdiction of the Courts for reasons of public 
policy.  Such claims may include those involving alleged breaches of certain 
fundamental human rights, including all claims under the Equality Act 2010 
and other claims which can be viewed through the lens of ―strict liability‖.  An 
example of this strict liability type claim might be a failure to pay wages 
where the question of fault does not arise and where the employer should not, 
or so the argument goes, be presented with the opportunity to refuse payment, 
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because they know the employee is prevented from bringing a claim to recover 
the unpaid wages.
392
.  A regulatory model which does not encompass certain 
employment rights may, in the end, apply to Unfair Dismissal claims, breach 
of contract claims, and all other claims relating to allegations of unfair 
treatment.  This will capture a very significant proportion of the claims that 
would otherwise be brought to the tribunal (this is apparent for the tribunals‘ 
statistics on the types of claims submitted for acceptance in the past three 
years).
393
  The reduction in the number of Unfair Dismissal and breach of 
contract claims in particularly should have the added benefit of reducing the 
costs of the tribunals‘ service and ACAS.  That saved expense could be 
channelled to support the new model (including the cost of the accreditation 
agency and a mediation service).  But the point to make is that any decision to 
remove certain claims from the scope of the safe harbour is unlikely to 
negatively impact on the capacity of the regulation to achieve its policy 
objectives. 
 
It is anticipated that the introduction of the new regulatory model would have 
the effect of reducing the number of claims that are not subject to the 
immunity.  That is because the employer‘s approach to managing EDG should 
not distinguish between EDG issues that might lead to a potential tribunal 
claim because they relate to a legal right that is excluded from the immunity, 
and those that cannot result in a claim because their subject matter would 
cause the employer to be immune from such a claim.  In other words, the 
benefit of the new system and approach to EDG should extend to limit the 
number of claims brought against accredited employers, irrespective of the 
nature or legal classification of that potential claim.  That is, it is argued, the 
inevitable and necessary outcome of an internal practice that focuses on the 
requirement to be ―fair‖ in general terms.  There is simply no practical reason 
for the employer to try and treat potentially non-immune EDG issues with 
reduced concern for fairness.  And, in any event, the accreditation requirement 
would not distinguish between immune and non-immune disputes and issues.  
                                                  
392
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The parties will be required to comply with the new regulatory model and 
their internally agreed approach to EDG in relation to all matters concerning 
EDG in the broadest sense of the term.  For instance, the accreditation agency 
will not disregard claims of sex-discrimination when assessing whether an 
organisation should be accredited; such claims will be factored-in to the 
assessment.  This will inevitably encourage fairness in relation to the 
immunity exceptions because the immunity incentive applies equally to the 
excluded claims and claims to which the immunity does apply (e.g. Unfair 
Dismissal).  
 
The flip side of the employer‘s response to the immunity is of course the 
employees‘ reactions.  There may be a risk that employees will attempt to by-
pass the immunity in relation to certain complaints, by formulating claims 
under different legal headings.  For example, an employee may claim sex 
discrimination because they are unable to bring a general claim for Unfair 
Dismissal.  The employer will, in that case, be forced to pay the cost of having 
to defend that claim, which in turn compromises the value of the effort and 
expenditure that went into achieving accreditation.  But this thesis argues that 
it is possible to overstate the risk of employees bringing false claims for a 
number of reasons.  First, as we suggest above, the number of non-immune 
claims should reduce because the accredited employer is following a better 
and fairer approach to the handling of all EDG matters.   
 
Secondly, formulating a claim in, for example, sex-discrimination when that 
claim is in reality one of Unfair Dismissal, will not be simple.  It is not a 
straightforward exercise to build a claim under the Equality Act when the 
evidence and circumstances do not support that claim.  The tribunals will be 
alert to that fact and they should be able to weed-out such cases in the 
preliminary stages of proceedings.  Claimants who pursue such claims should 
also be put on notice that they may be subject to a costs award, and generally 
the tribunals should be encouraged to be more robust in their approach to 
claims that have no apparent merit.  Where on the other hand the case 
proceeds because of an exclusion and because there is prima-facie evidence to 
support the claim, there can be no argument from the employer, because that is 
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consistent with the scheme of the new regulatory model.  Again, the employer 
should be working hard to avoid circumstances that might give rise to claims 
of, for example, unlawful discrimination, because they want to avoid the risk 
of losing their immunity.   
 
Thirdly, if there are to be exclusions from the immunity, many of those 
exclusions will be either narrowly defined in terms of the circumstances that 
may give rise to a cause of action, or they will be clear in their application to 
the extent that there is very little chance of the claim substituting for 
something that it is not.  For example, some current grounds for automatic 
Unfair Dismissal claims may be excluded from the immunity, but they arise in 
very particular circumstances.  Those circumstances would have to be present 
if the employee is to have any chance of pursuing (let alone successfully 
pursuing) a claim for Unfair Dismissal on an excluded ground.   Take for 
instance a claim of automatic Unfair Dismissal under TUPE.  An employee is 
unlikely to pursue such a claim unless the surrounding circumstances include a 
business transfer as defined in the Regulations.  Further, consider claims for 
non-payment of wages, or a failure to provide an entitlement to annual leave.  
It is not conceivable that an employee would get any distance in the tribunals 
if they bring a claim for non-payment of wages, without what should be 
straight-forward evidence of non-payment to support such a claim.  Finally, 
well trained employee representatives or other legal advisors are likely to 
persuade employees about the merits of their potential claims and the extent to 
which a claim is subject to the immunity.  This should lower the rate of 
spurious claims.  Moreover, recall the earlier discussion that indicated the lack 
of evidence to support suggestion that the ‗vexatious‘ litigant is a common 
creature.           
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis argues that the regulation of EDG should be refocused on 
encouraging reflexive self-regulation as the preferred approach to preventing 
and resolving disputes concerning grievances and disciplinary issues.  In other 
words, the parties should be encouraged to come together and negotiate 
outcomes to EDG related issues and disputes without recourse to adversarial 
internal or external dispute procedures.  Moreover, such resolution should take 
place early and use a method that is quick, flexible and likely to avoid the 
relationship damaging consequences of grievance and dispute escalation that 
are discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Such a refocusing of current regulation has the potential to drive higher levels 
of trust and fairness perceptions amongst employees, reduce poor performance 
and misconduct, and increase employee productivity.  These positive 
outcomes have in turn the potential to drive improved business 
competitiveness in Britain.  This is a bold and optimistic objective which 
would cause regulators to shift from the traditional view of labour law as a 
mechanism first and foremost aimed at protecting employees against 
exploitation by the economically more powerful employer.  This does not 
mean, however, that the new law would not protect employees from unfair 
treatment and subject them to increased levels of exploitation.  Such an 
outcome would of course defeat the purpose of the regulation.  The new model 
for EDG regulation should in fact have the potential to provide more effective 
protection of employees than current regulation.  In particular the new 
regulatory model should improve the likelihood that employment disputes will 
not escalate beyond the point of no return, leaving the employee with the 
undesirable option of bringing legal action against their employer, in the 
uncomfortable surroundings of an employment tribunal.  The new regulatory 
model should protect employment relationships in a manner that the current 
model does not, although the primary objective of the model is not 
employment protection, but is instead enhanced business competitiveness.   
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Regulating in a way that increases the employee‘s perception that their 
employer is fair should encourage the benefits of partnership and OCB leading 
to greater business competitiveness, but such an approach requires an 
understanding of how employees judge fairness.  This thesis argues that it is 
vital in this regard for any regulatory model to recognise and account for the 
complexity of fairness judgements and, in particular, that employees make 
such judgements by weighing issues of distributive, interactional and 
procedural fairness in different measure depending on the circumstances of the 
dispute.  Any regulation of EDG that hopes to promote fairness perceptions 
must be prepared therefore to facilitate, in the context of resolving EDG 
issues, a balancing of all aspects of fairness.   
 
One of the main shortcomings of current regulation is the failure of law and 
the Courts (e.g. the law of Unfair Dismissal) to effectively address all 
elements of fairness.  Current law and the application of that law tends to 
focus on procedural fairness which is unlikely to encourage fairness 
perceptions, and may in fact have the opposite effect as employees assess that 
their employer is following a process for process sake or to avoid legal 
liability, without any real concern for the employee‘s interests.  A further 
shortcoming of current regulation is its focus at the end of the dispute 
spectrum.  And, presently the law tends to prohibit extreme or narrowly 
defined behaviour (e.g. Unfair Dismissal, extreme behaviour that breaches the 
implied term of trust and confidence, discrimination etc).  The law does not 
provide a general duty on the employer to be fair.  As such, the employee can 
be genuinely aggrieved concerning matters about which the law has nothing to 
say, but which, nevertheless, have a negative impact on the employee‘s 
perception of their employer, and which can lead to the type of negative 
outcomes that are discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis (e.g. poor and 
unproductive job performance).      
 
This narrow application of regulation might be addressed by new rules 
directing the tribunals and the Courts to take a more holistic approach to 
judging fairness, but such regulation is unlikely to drive greater levels of 
fairness perception.  This thesis argues that greater levels of fairness 
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perception are more likely to be achieved by discarding direct regulation of 
EDG (i.e. telling the parties what they can and cannot do in particular 
circumstances) in favour of indirect regulation which establishes a framework 
or set of conditions which, if adopted by the employer, are likely to encourage 
the kind of behaviour which will spawn greater levels of fairness.  That 
framework should encourage the parties to negotiate and agree outcomes to 
EDG disputes that reflect the peculiarities of their particular workplace, and 
the specific instance of EDG.  Further, provided the employer is adhering to 
the regulatory framework by adopting the methods and principles set out in the 
regulation, they will be immune from the jurisdiction of the tribunals.  That is 
the carrot of adherence and such a regulatory approach reflects a practical 
assessment about the capacity of the Courts and the tribunals to encourage 
fairness perceptions.   
 
The limitation of the Courts and tribunals to encourage fairness perceptions 
rests in part with their inability to make effective judgements about 
substantive fairness that the parties to the employment relationship are likely 
to assess as being fair (i.e. even if tribunals and the Courts were willing to 
more holistically judge fairness, this thesis argues that they are not capable of 
doing so).   Moreover, providing a potential adversarial route to the tribunals 
gives rise to the dangers of escalation and the refusal of the employee to 
compromise their grievance.  Removing that route is more likely to encourage 
effective use of the internal and reflexive approach to resolution that is 
encouraged by the new regulatory framework.   
 
In the final analysis regulating to achieve greater levels of fairness perceptions 
is not an exact science.  All that can be hoped for is the creation of conditions 
in which the parties are likely to deal with EDG related issues in a manner 
which employees will perceive as being fair.  If these conditions can be 
established and maintained there is strong academic support, discussed in this 
thesis, for the view that greater levels of employee productivity and OCB will 
follow.  At the very least the negative consequences of perceived unfairness 
will be avoided.  In the current challenging economic climate, and bearing in 
mind the interdependent and competitive global market in which all nations do 
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business, it is argued that such an objective is a legitimate and desirable 
objective of regulation.   
 
     
 262 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
A. Statutes, regulations, codes and white papers (UK unless otherwise 
stated) 
 
ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures. 
Contracts of Employment Act 1963. 
Disability Discrimination Act 2005. 
Employment Act 1989. 
Employment Act 2002 
Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004. 
Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993. 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 (New Zealand). 
Employment Relations Act 1999. 
Employment Relations Act 2000 (New Zealand). 
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998. 
Employment Rights Act 1996. 
Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 
2004. 
Employment Tribunals Act 1996. 
Equality Act 2010. 
Fairness at Work (London: HMSO, 1998). 
Industrial Relations Act 1971. 
Labour Relations Act 1987 (New Zealand). 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. 
Race Relations Act 1976. 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
Working Time Regulations 1998. 
 
 
 263 
 
B. Cases 
 
Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488.  
Alliance Freezing Co (Southland) Ltd v NZ Engineering Union [1989] 3 
NZILR 785. 
Bateman v British Leyland UK Ltd [1974] ICR 403. 
Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v Buckland [2010] 
ICR 908. 
British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91.  
Canterbury Rubber Workers IUW v Dunlop (NZ) Ltd [1983] ACJ 367. 
CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307. 
Charles Robertson (Developments) Ltd v White [1995] ICR 349. 
Chelsea Football Club & Athletic Co Ltd v Heath [1981] IRLR 371. 
Coutts Cars Ltd v Baguley [2002] 2 NZLR 533. 
Dunnachie v Kingston-upon-Hull City Council [2005] IRLR 727. 
Enessy Co SA v Minopriro [1978] IRLR 489. 
French v Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646. 
Gardiner-Hill v Roland Berger Technics Ltd [1992] IRLR 498. 
Gilham v Kent County Council (No. 2) [1985] ICR 233. 
Gogay v Hertfordshire CC [2000] IRLR 703. 
Hadjioannou v Coral Casinos Ltd [1981] IRLR 352. 
Honeyford v Bradford Metropolitan City Council [1986] IRLR 32.      
Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 589. 
Irani v Southampton and South West Hampshire Health Authority [1985] 
IRLR 203. 
Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13. 
Jones v Lee [1980] ICR 310. 
Lewis v Motorworld Garages Ltd [1986] ICR 157. 
Mabrizi v National Hospital for Nervous Diseases [1990] IRLR 193. 
Mahmoud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. [1998] AC 20. 
Marriott v Oxford & District Co-op Society Ltd (No. 2) [1970] 1 QB 186. 
Matthes v NZ Post Ltd [1994] 2 ERNZ 994. 
McLaren v Home Office [1990] IRLR 338. 
 264 
National Distribution Unions Inc v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd [2001] ERNZ 822. 
Northern Distribution Union v Newman’s Coachlines Ltd [1989] 2 NZILR 
677. 
NZ Air Line Pilots Association v Air NZ Ltd [1992] 3 ERNZ 73. 
NZ Amalgamated Engineering etc Union Inc v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd [2002] 
1 ERNZ 597. 
NZ Baking Trades Employees IUW v Cormack [1990] 1 NZILR 906. 
NZ Bank Officers Union v BNZ [1980] ACJ 155. 
NZ Electrical Union v Bonds (NZ) Ltd [1984] ACJ 353. 
NZ Food Processing Union v Unilever NZ Ltd [1990] 1 NZILR 35.   
NZ Professional Firefighters Union v NZ Fire Service Commission [1988] 
NZILR 992. 
O’Laoire v Jackel International Ltd [1990] ICR 197. 
Ogilvy & Mather (NZ) Ltd v Turner [1993] 2 ERNZ 799. 
 Polkey v A. E. Dayton Services Ltd [1988] ICR 142. 
Post Office v Foley; HSBC v Madden [2000] ICR 1283. 
Rao v Civil Aviation Authority [1992] IRLR 203. 
Robb v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1991] IRLR 7. 
RS Components Ltd v Irwin [1973] ICR 535. 
Ryan v Mutual Tontine Association [1893] 1 Ch 116. 
Sainsbury plc v Hitt [2003] ICR 111. 
Sillifant v Powell Duffryn Timber Ltd [1983] IRLR 91. 
Stacey v Babcock Power Ltd [1986] QB 308. 
Telecom New Zealand Ltd v Nutter (2004) 7 NZELC 97,563. 
Telecom South Ltd v Post Office Union [1992] 1 NZLR 275. 
Thompson v GEC Avionics Ltd [1991] IRLR 488. 
United Bank v Akhtar [1989] IRLR 507. 
United Food and Chemical Workers Union of NZ v Talley [1992] 1 ERNZ 
756.  
W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram [2000] 2 ERNZ 448. 
W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] IRLR 314. 
W.A. Goold (Pearmark) Ltd v McConnell [1995] IRLR 516.   
Weathersfield Ltd v Sargent [1999] IRLR 94. 
Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharpe [1978] ICR 693. 
 265 
White v Auckland District Health Board [2007] ERNZ 66. 
Wood Group Heavy Industrial Turbines Ltd v Crossan [1998] IRLR 680. 
Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1982] ICR 693. 
 
C. Books, articles and reports 
 
ACAS, ACAS Arbitration Scheme for the Resolution of Unfair Dismissal 
Disputes (London: ACAS, 1998). 
ACAS, Conciliation in Tribunal Cases (London: ACAS, 1998). 
Ackers, P., and J. Payne, ‗British Trade Unions and Social Partnership: 
Rhetoric, Reality and Strategy‘ (1998) 9 International Journal of Human 
Resources Management 529. 
Adams, G., Canadian Labour Law: a Comprehensive Text (Aurora, Ont.: 
Canada Law Book Inc., 1985 as updated). 
Adams, J. S. ‗Inequity in social exchange‘, in L. Berkowitz (ed) Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology (Academic Press: New York, 1965) 267. 
Adams, J. S. and S. Freedman, ‗Equity Theory revisited: Comments and 
annotated bibliography‘, in L. Berkowitz and E. Walster (eds) Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology (Academic Press: New York, 1975) 43. 
Adams, J. S., ‗Toward and understanding of inequity‘, (1963) 67 Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology 422.  
Anderman, S., ‗The Interpretation of Protective Employment Statutes and 
Contracts of Employment‘ (2000) 29 ILJ 223. 
Anderson, G., ‗The Employment Contracts Act 1991: An Employer‘s 
Charter?‘ (1991) 16 New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations 147. 
Atkinson, J., ‗Flexibility: Planning for an Uncertain Future‘ [1985] Manpower 
Policy and Practice 26. 
Atkinson, J., and N. Meager, Changing Working Patterns: How Companies 
Achieve Flexibility to Meet New Needs (London: National Economic 
Development Office, 1986). 
Auer, P., and S. Gazes, Employment Stability in an Age of Flexibility 
(International Labour Organisation, 2002). 
Auerbach, J., Justice Without Law? Resolving Disputes Without Lawyers 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
 266 
Austin, W. and W. Walster, ‗Participants‘ reactions to ―equity with the 
world‖‘ (1974) 10 Journal of Experimental Psychology 528. 
Ayres, L. and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
Bamber, G., ‗Flexibility and Reform of Work Organisation – International 
Perspectives‘, in P. Boxall (ed), Function in Search of a Future (Auckland: 
Longman Paul, 1990). 
Bardach, E. and R. Kagan, Going by the Book – the Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1982). 
Barenberg, M., ‗The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, 
and Workplace Cooperation‘ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1412. 
Baron R. A., ‗Countering the effects of destructive criticism: The relative 
efficacy of four potential interventions‘ (1990) 75 Journal of Applied 
Psychology 235. 
Beaumont, P., Change in Industrial Relations (London: Routledge, 1991). 
Beer, M., B. Spector, P. Lawrence, D. Quinn Mills and R. Walton, Human 
resources Management: A General Manager’s Perspective (New York: Free 
Press, 1985). 
Beer, M., B. Spector, P. Lawrence, Q. Mills and R. Walton, Managing Human 
Assets (New York: Free Press, 1984). 
Bevan, A., Alternative Dispute Resolution (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1992). 
Biers, R. J. and D. L. Shapiro, ‗Voice and Justification: Their influence on 
procedural and fairness judgements‘ (1988) 31 Academy of Management 
Journal 676. 
Biers, R. J., ‗Interactional (in)justice: The sacred and the profane‘, in J. 
Greenburg and R. Cropanzo (eds) Advances in Organizational Justice 
(Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2001) 89. 
Biers, R. J., ‗The predicament of injustice: The management of moral 
outrage‘, in L. L. Cummings and B. M. Staw (eds) Research in Organizational 
Behavior (JAI Press: Greenwich, CT, 1987) Vol. 9, 289. 
Bies, R. J. and J. S. Moag, ‗Interactional justice: Communication criteria of 
fairness‘, in R. J. Lewicki, B. H. Sheppard, T. and M. Bazerman (eds) 
Research on Negotiation in Organizations (JAI Press: Greenwich, CT, 1986). 
 267 
Bingham, L. and D. Pitts ―Highlights of Mediation at Work: Studies of the 
National REDRESS Evaluation Project‖ (2002) 18 Negotiation Journal 135. 
Birecree, A., S. Konzelmann and F. Wilkinson, ‗Productive systems, 
competitive pressures, strategic choices and work organisation: an 
introduction‘ (1997) 7 International Contributions to Labour Studies 3. 
Blades, L., ‗Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power‘ (1967) 67 Columbia Law Review 1404. 
Blair, T., The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century (London: Fabian 
Society Pamphlet 588, 1998). 
Blankenburg, E., R. Rogowski, ‗German Labour Courts and the British 
Industrial Tribunal System: A Socio-Legal Comparison of Degrees of 
Judicialisation‘ (1986) 13 Journal of Law and Society 67. 
Blatt, R and E. Applebaum, Workers Participation in Diverse Settings: Does 
Form Effect the Outcome, and if so, Who Benefits?‘ (1995) 33 British Journal 
of Industrial Relations 353. 
Blau, P., Exchange and Power in social life (Wiley: New York, 1964). 
Blomgren Bingham, L. et al ―Dispute System Design and Justice in 
Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace‖ (2009) 14 
Harvard Negotiation Law Review 1. 
Bogg, A. L., ―Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v 
Buckland: Re-establishing Orthodoxy at the expense of Coherence‖ (2010) 39 
ILJ 408. 
Bohnert, W. and W. Kitzsch, ‗Gesellschaftliche Selbstregulierung und 
Staatliche Implementation politischer Programme‘ in R Mayntz (ed.) 
Implementation politischer Programme (I. Konigserin, Athenaum, 1980). 
Bowen, M., ―The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsisdered: Decision Dilemmas 
or Decision Errors?‖ (1987) 12 Academy of Management Review 52. 
Brett, J. M. ‗Commentary on procedural justice papers‘, in R. Lewicki, M. 
Bazerman and B. Sheppard (eds) Research on Negotiation in Organiszations 
(JAI Press: Greenwich CT, 1986) Vol. I, 81. 
Brockner, J. and B. M. Weisenfeld, ‗An integrative framework for explaining 
reactions to decisions: Interactive effects of outcomes and procedures‘ (1996) 
120 Psychological Bulletin 189. 
 268 
Brockner, J., ‗The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: 
Toward Theoretical Progress‘ (1992) 17Acadamey of Management Review 39. 
Brodie, D., ―Recent cases, Commentary, The Heart of the Matter: Mutual 
Trust and Confidence‖ (1996) 25 ILJ 121. 
Burgess, S., C. Propper and D. Wilson, Explaining the growth in the number 
of applications to Industrial Tribunals 1972-1997 (London: DTI Employment 
Relations Research Series No. 19, 2001).   
Carrington, P., ‗Self-deregulation, the ‗National Policy‘ of the Supreme Court‘ 
(2003) 3 Nevada Law Journal 259. 
Casebourne, J., J Regan, F Neathey and S Tuohy, Employment Rights at Work 
– Survey of Employees 2005 (Employment Relations Research Series No. 51). 
Chornenki, G., ‗Mediating Commercial Disputes: Exchanging ‗power over‘ 
for ‗power with‘‘, in J. Macfarlane (ed) Rethinking Disputes: The Mediation 
Alternative (London: Cavendish, 1997). 
Cockburn, D., ‗Changes to the Industrial Tribunal System‘ (1995) 24 ILJ 285. 
Cohen-Charash, Y. and P. E. Spector, ‗The Role of Justice in Organizations: A 
Meta-Analysis‘ (2001) 86 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 278. 
Collins, H., ‗Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness‘ 
(2001) 30 ILJ 15. 
Collins, H., ‗ A Third Way in Labour Law?‘, in J. Conaghan, R. Fischl and K. 
Klare (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalisation: Transformation, Practices 
and Possibilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
Collins, H., ‗Against Abstentionism in Labour Law‘, in J. Bell and J. Eekelaar 
(eds), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (3
rd
 Series) (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987). 
Collins, H., ‗Justifications and Techniques of legal regulation of the 
employment relation‘, in H. Collins, P. Davies and R. Rideout (eds), Legal 
Regulation of the Employment Relation (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000). 
Collins, H., ‗The Just and Equitable Compensatory Award‘ (1991) 20 ILJ 201. 
Collins, H., Employment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 10. 
Collins, H., Justice in Dismissal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
 269 
Collins, H., K. Ewing and A. McColgan, Labour Law: Text and Materials 
(Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001). 
Collins, H., Nine Proposals for the Reform of the Law of Unfair Dismissal 
(London: The Institute of Employment Rights, 2004). 
Collins, H., Regulating Dismissals: possibilities for self-regulation (London: 
unpublished paper, LSE, 2003) 8. 
Connolly, C., The US Safe Harbor – Fact or Fiction? 
Conte, M., and J. Svejnar , ‗The Performance Effects of Employee Share 
Ownership‘, in A. Blinder (ed), Paying for Productiviy: a Look at the 
Evidence (Washington D. C.: Brookings Institute, 1990) 143. 
Corby, S., Resolving Employment Rights Disputes through Mediation: The 
New Zealand Experience (IER, 1999). 
Corby, S., Resolving Employment Rights Through Mediation: The New 
Zealand Experience (London: Institute of Employment Rights, 1999). 
Cox, A., ‗Reflections on Labor Arbitration‘ (1959) 72 Harvard Law Review 
1482. 
Cropanzano, R. and M. L. Randall, ‗Injustice and work behaviour: A historical 
review‘, in R. Cropanzo (ed) Justice in the Workplace: Approaching Fairness 
in Human Resources Management (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, 
1993) 3. 
Cropanzano, R., Z. S. Byrne, D. Ramona Bobocel and D. E. Rupp, ‗Moral 
Virtues, Fairness Heuristics, Social Entities, and other denizens of 
organizational justice‘ (2001) 58 Journal of Vocational Behavior 164. 
Cropanzao, R and D. E. Rupp, ‗An Overview of Organizational Justice: 
Implications for Work Motivation‘, in Porter, L. W., G. A. Bigley and R. M. 
Steers (eds) Motivation and Work Behaviour (McGraw Hill: London, 2003) 
82. 
Cropanzo, R. and M. L. Randall, ‗Injustice and work behaviour: A historical 
review‘, in R. Cropanzo (ed) Justice in the Workplace: Approaching Fairness 
in Human Resources Management (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, 
1993) 3. 
Crouch, C ‗The Globalized Economy: An End to the Age of Industrial 
Citizenship?‖ in T. Wilthagen (ed) Advancing Theory in Labour Law and 
 270 
Industrial Relations in a Global Context (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1998) 
151. 
Cully, M. et al (eds), Britain at Work (London: Routledge, 1999). 
Cully, M., S. Woodland, A. O‘Reilly and G. Dix, Britain at Work, as depicted 
by the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (London: Routledge, 
1999). 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J and A. Verma, ‗Joint Governance in North American 
Workplaces‘ (1994) 5 International Journal of Human Resources 
Management 547. 
Dailey, R. C. and J. K. Delaney, ‗Distributive and procedural justice as 
antecedents of job dissatisfaction and intent to turnover‘ (1992) 45 Human 
Relations 305. 
Davies, A. C. L., Perspectives on Labour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; 2004) 158. 
Davies, P., and M. Freedland, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law 3rd edn 
(London: Stevens, 1983). 
Davies, P., and M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). 
Deakin, S. and F. Wilkinson, ‗Labour law and economic theory: A 
reappraisal‘, in H. Collins, P. Davies and R. Rideout (eds), Legal Regulation 
of the Employment Relation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 29. 
Deakin, S., and F. Wilkinson, ‗Rights vs Efficiency?  The Economic Case for 
Transnational Labour Standards‘ (1994) 23 ILJ 289. 
Deakin, S., and G. S. Morris, Labour Law 2
nd
 ed  (London: Butterworths, 
1998).   
Deeks, J., J. Parker and R. Ryan, Labour and Employment Relations in New 
Zealand (Auckland: Longman Paul, 1994). 
Department of Trade and Industry, Findings from the 1998 Survey of 
Employment Tribunal Applications (Surveys of Applicants and Employers) 
(London: Employment Relations Research Series No. 13, 2002). 
Department of Trade and Industry, Our Competitive Future: Building the 
Knowledge-driven Economy (London: HMSO, 1998). 
Deutsch, M. Distributive Justice (Yale University Press; New Haven, 1985). 
 271 
Dickens, L., M. Hart, M. Jones and B. Weekes, ‗Re-employment of Unfairly 
Dismissed Workers: the Lost Remedy‘ (1981) 10 ILJ 160. 
Dickens, L., M. Hart, M. Jones and B. Weekes, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair 
Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).  
Dingwall, R. and D. Greatbatch ―Who is in Charge?  Rhetoric and Evidence in 
the Study of  Mediation‖ (1993) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 
367. 
Dolder, C., ―The Contribution of Mediation to Workplace Justice‖ (2004) 33 
ILJ 320. 
Dose-Digenopoulos, A., and A. Holland, ‗Dismissal of Employees in the 
Federal Republic of Germany‘ (1985) 48 Modern Law Review 539. 
Earnshaw, J., J. Goodman, R. Harrison and M. Marchington, Industrial 
Tribunals, Workplace Disciplinary Procedures and Employment Practices 
(London: DTI Employment Relations Research Series No.2, 1998). 
Edelman, L., ‗Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The 
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace‘ (1990) 95 American 
Journal of Society 1401. 
Edelman, L., H. Erlanger and J. Lande, ‗Internal Dispute Resolution: The 
Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace‘ (1993) 27 Law and Society 
Review 497. 
Edwards, H., ‗Employment Tribunals and Workplace Discipline: the 
Inevitable Survival of Informality?‘ (1998) 27 ILJ 362. 
Employment Tribunal Service, Employment Tribunal and EAT Statistics (GB) 
1 April 2007 – 31 March 2008. 
Epstein, R. A., ―In defense of the contract at will‖ (1984) 51University of 
Chicago Law Review 947. 
Evans, S., J. Goodman and L. Hargreaves, Unfair Dismissal Law and 
Employment Practice in the 1980’s (London: Department of Employment 
Research Paper No. 53).  
Ewing, D., Justice on the Job (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989). 
Ewing, K., (ed), Working Life – a New Perspective on Labour Law (London: 
Institute of Employment Rights, 1996). 
Ewing, K., ‗Democratic Socialism and Labour Law‘ (1995) 24 ILJ 103. 
 272 
Fehr, E., and S. Gachter, ‗Fairness and Retaliation: the Economics of 
Reciprocity‘ (2000) 14 Journal of Economic Perspectives 159. 
Fevre, R., et al, The Fair Treatment at Work Report: Findings from the 2008 
survey (Employment Relations Research Series No. 103, Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills). 
Folger, R. ‗Rethinking equity theory: A referent cognitions model‘, in H. W. 
Beirhoff, R. L. Cohen and J. Greenberg (eds) Justice in Social Relations 
(Plenum Press: New York, 1986) 145. 
Folger, R. and R. Cropanzano, ‗Fairness theory: Justice as Accountability‘, in 
J. Greenberg and R. Folger (eds) Advances in Organizational Justice (New 
Lexington Press: Lexington, 2001) 1. 
Folger, R. and R. Cropanzano, Organizational Justice and Human Resources 
Management (Sage: Beverly Hills, 1998). 
Fomburn, C., N. Tichy and M. Devanna, Strategic Human Resources 
Management (New York: John Wiley, 1984).   
Forrest, H., ―Political Values in Individual Employment Law‖ (1994) 43 
Modern Law Review 361. 
Fox, A., Beyond Contract Work, Power and Trust Relations (London: Faber, 
1974). 
Freedland, M, ‗High Trust, Pensions and the Contract of Employment‘ (1984) 
13 ILJ 25. 
Freedland, M., The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 
Freeman, R., ‗A Hard-headed look at Labour Standards‘, in W. Sengenberger 
and D. Campbell (eds), International Labour Standards and Economic 
Interdependence (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, ILO, 
1994). 
Fuller, L., ‗The Forms and Limits of Adjudication‘ (1978) 92 Harvard Law 
Review 353. 
Galanter, M., and M. Cahill ‗Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and the 
Regulation of Settlements‘ (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 1339. 
Garlock, J., ‗The Knights of Labor Courts: A Case Study of Popular Justice‘, 
in R. Abel (ed) The Politics of Informal Justice, Volume 1: The American 
Experience (New York: Academic Press, 1982). 
 273 
Genn, H., and R. Sainsbury, ‗Access to Justice: Lessons From Tribunals‘, in 
A. Zuckerman and R. Cranston (eds) Reform of Civil Procedure: Essays on 
Access to Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think About Going to Law (Hart, 
Oxford, 1999). 
Gibbons, M., A Review of Employment Dispute Resolution in Great Britain 
(DTI, London, 2007).  
Giddens, A., The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998). 
Gladstone, A., ‗Settlement of Disputes Over Rights‘, R. Blanpain (ed) 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialised Market 
Economies (9
th
 edn) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2007). 
Gleason, S., (ed), Workplace Dispute Resolution: Directions for the Twenty-
First Century (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997). 
Graham, H. and B. Heshizer (1979) 30 Labour Law Journal 427. 
Green, M., ‗Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using 
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims‘ (2000) 31 Rutgers Law 
Journal 399. 
Greenberg, J. and S. Ornstein, ‗High status job titles as compensation for 
underpayment: A test of equity theory‘ (1983) 68 Journal of Applied 
Psychology 285. 
Greenberg, J., ‗Equity and workplace status: A field experiment‘ (1988) 73 
Journal of Applied Psychology 606. 
Greenberg, J., ‗The social side of fairness: Interpersonal and informational 
classes of organizational justice‘, in Cropanzo, R. (ed) Justice in the 
Workplace: Approaching Fairness in Human Resources Management 
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, 1993). 
Gregory, J., ‗Conciliating Individual Employment Disputes: A Shabby 
Compromise?‘ (1986) 8 Employee Relations 27. 
Guest, D and R. Peccei, ‗Partnership at Work: Mutuality and the Balance of 
Advantage‘ (2001) 39 British Journal of Industrial Relations 207. 
Guest, D. and R. Peccei, The Partnership Company: Benchmarks for the 
Future (London: Involvement and Participation Association, 1998). 
 274 
Harter, P., ‗Negotiating Regulation: A Cure for Malaise‘ (1982) 71 
Georgetown law Journal 1. 
Harvey, Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law (London: 
Butterworths, 1972 as updated). 
Hayward, B., M. Peters, N. Rousseau and K. Seeds, Findings from the Survey 
of Employment Tribunal Applications 2003 (London: DTI, 2004). 
Heery, E., ‗Partnerships verses organising: alternative futures for British trade 
unionism‘ (2002) 33 Industrial Relations Journal 20. 
Hendrix, W., T. Robbins, J. Miller and T. P Summers, Procedural and 
distributive justice effects on turnover (paper presented to the Annual Meeting 
of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology in Atlanta, April 
1999). 
Hepple, B., and G. Morris, ‗The Employment Act 2002 and the Crisis of 
Individual Employment Rights‘ (2002) 31 Industrial Law Journal 245. 
Hill, S., ‗How Do You Manage a Flexible Firm?  The Total Quality Model‘ 
(1991) 5 Work, Employment and Society 397. 
Hiltrop, J., ‗Mediator Behaviour and the Settlement of Collective Bargaining 
Disputes in Britain‘ (1985) 41 Journal of Social Issues 83. 
Holmes, J. G., ‗The exchange process in close relationships: microbehavior 
and macromotives‘, in M. J. Lerner and S. C. Lerner (eds) The justice motive 
in social behavior (Plenum: New York, 1981).  
Holmes, J. G., ‗The exchange process in close relationships: Microbehaviour 
and macromotives‘, in M. J. Lerner and S. C. Lerner (eds) The Justice Motive 
in Social Behavior (Plenum: New York, 1981). 
Holt, J., Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand: The First Forty Years 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1986). 
Hopt, K. and G. Teubner (eds) Corporate Governance and Directors’ Liability 
(De Gruyter, Berlin, 1985). 
Hough, B., and A. Spowart-Taylor, ‗Liability, Compensation and Justice in 
Unfair Dismissal (1996) 25 ILJ 308. 
http://www.galexia.com/public/research/assets/safe_harbor_fact_or_fiction_2
008 (14) 
 275 
Hunter, R. and A. Leonard Sex Discrimination and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: British Proposals in the Light of International Experience 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997). 
Ichniowski, C. and D. Lewin, ‗Grievance Procedures and Firm Performance‘ 
in M Kleiner et al (eds) Human Resources and Performance of the Firm (159, 
177-79); and, C Ichniowski ‗The Effects of Grievance Activity on 
Productivity‘ (1986) 40 Industrial and Labour Relations Review 75.   
Income Data Services Ltd, Statutory disciplinary and grievance procedures: 
employment law supplement (London, 2004). 
Industrial Democracy in Europe Group, Industrial Democracy in Europe 
Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
Involvement and Participation Association, Towards Industrial Partnership 
(London: IPA, 1992). 
Jacobs, A., ‗Collective Self-Regulation‘, in B. Hepple (ed), The Making of 
Labour Law in Europe (London: Mansell, 1986). 
Katz, D., ‗The Motivational Basis of Organisational Behavior‘ (1964) 9 
Behavioural Science 131. 
Kelleher, S., Canada Labour Relations Board: a Study Paper (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services, 1980). 
Kersley, B., C. Alpin, J. Forth, A. Bryson, H. Bewley, G. Dix and S. 
Oxenbridge, Inside the Workplace: Findings from the 2004 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (London: Routledge, 2006). 
Knell, J. ‗Partnership at Work‘, Employment Relations Research Series No. 7 
(London: DTI, 1999) 11. 
Knight, G., and P. Latreille, ‗Discipline, Dismissals and Complaints to 
Employment Tribunals‘ (2000) 38 British Journal of Industrial Relations 533. 
Knight, K. G. and P. L. Latreille, ―Discipline, Dismissals and Complaints to 
Employment Tribunals‖ (2000) 38 BJIR 533. 
Kochan, T and P. Osterman, Mutual Gains Bargaining (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press). 
Kochan, T. and M. Weinstein, ‗Recent Developments in US Industrial 
Relations‘ (1994) 32 British Journal of Industrial Relations 483. 
Kochan, T., and P. Osterman, Mutual Gains Bargaining (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press). 
 276 
Konovsky, A. and S. D. Pugh, ‗Citizenship behaviour and social exchange‘ 
(1994) 37 Academy of Management Journal 656. 
Konovsky, M. A., and R. Cropanzano, ‗Perceived fairness of employee drug 
testing as a predictor of employee attitudes and job performance‘ (1991) 76 
Journal of Applied Psychology 698. 
Kulik, C. T. and M. L. Ambrose, ‗Personal and situational determinants of 
referent choice‘ (1992) 17 Academy of Management Review 212. 
Leventhal, G. S., ‗What should be done with equity theory?  New Approaches 
to the study of fairness in social relationships‘, in K. J. Gergen, M.S. 
Greenberg and R. H. Willis (eds) Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and 
Research (Plenum: New York, 1980) 27. 
Lewis, J., ACAS Conciliation at Industrial Tribunals: an Evaluation of an 
Experimental Scheme (London: DTI, 1996). 
Lewis, J., and R. Legard, ACAS Individual Conciliation: a Qualitive 
Evaluation of the Service Provided by Industrial Tribunal Cases (London: 
ACAS, 1999). 
Lewis, R., ‗The Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998‘ (1998) 27 
ILJ 214. 
Lewis, R., and J. Clark, Employment Rights, Industrial Tribunals and 
Arbitration: The Case for Alternative Dispute Resolution (London: Institute of 
Employment Rights, 1993). 
Lind, E. A. and T. R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 
(Plenum Press: New York, 1988). 
Lind, E. A., ‗Fairness heuristic theory: Justice judgements as pivotal 
cognitions in organizational relations‘, in J. Greenberg and R. Cropanzano 
(eds) Advances in Organizational Justice (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 
2001). 
Linder, D., J. Cooper and E. Jones ‗Decision Freedom as a Determinant of the 
Role of Incentive Magnitude in Attitude Change‖ (1967) 6 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 245. 
Lowry, P., Employment Disputes and the Third Party (London: Macmillan, 
1990). 
Luchak, A., ‗What Kind Of Voice Do Loyal Employees Use?‘ (2003) 41 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 115. 
 277 
Mackay, R., (ed), Butterworths Employment Law Guide 5
th
 edition 
(Wellington: Butterworths, 2001). 
MacMillan J. K., ‗Employment Tribunals: Philosophies and Practicalities‘ 
(1999) 1 ILJ 33. 
Martin, C. L. and N. Bennett, ‗The role of justice judgements in explaining the 
relationship between job satisfaction and organization commitment‘ (1996) 21 
Group and Organization Management 84. 
Martin, J., P. Brickman, and A. Murray, ‗Moral outrage and pragmatism: 
Explanations for collective action‘ (1984) 20 Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 484. 
Masterton, S. S. K. Lewis-Mcclear, B. M. Goldman and S. M. Taylor, 
‗Intergrating justice and social exchange: The differing effects of fair 
procedures and treatment on work relationships‘ (2000) 43 Academy of 
Management Journal 738. 
McCabe, D., Corporate Non-union Complaint Procedures and Systems (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1988). 
Mitchell, R., (ed), Redefining Labour Law: New Perspectives on the Future of 
Teaching and Research (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 
University of Melbourne, 1995). 
Moorman, R.H., ‗Relationship between organizational justice and 
organizational citizenship behaviour: Do fairness perceptions influence 
employee citizenship?‘ (1991) 76 Journal of Applied Psychology 845. 
Moving Forward: the Report of the Employment Tribunal System Taskforce 
(available at www.dti.gov.uk/er/ ). 
Mowday R. T. and K. A. Colwell, ‗Employee reactions to unfair outcomes in 
the workplace: The contributions of Adam‘s Equity Theory to understanding 
work motivation‘, in L. W. Porter, G. A. Bigley and R. M. Steers (eds) 
Motivation and Work Behaviour (McGraw Hill: London, 2003) 65. 
Mundlak, G., ‗Information-forcing and Cooperation-inducing Rules: 
Rethinking the Building Blocks of Labour Law‘, in G, de Geest, J. Siegers and 
R. Van den Bergh, Law and Economics and the Labour Market (Cheltenham: 
Elgar, 1999). 
Munro, A., ‗Working together – involving staff: partnership working in the 
NHS‘ (2002) 24 Employee Relations 277. 
 278 
Neale, B. and  C. Smart ― Good and Bad Lawyers?  Struggling in the Shadow 
of the New Law‖ (1997) 19 JSW & FL 383 in A Diduck and F Kagnanas, 
Family Law, Gender and the State: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: 
Portland, 1999) 354. 
Nolan, P. and J. Walsh, ‗The Structure of the Economy and the Labour 
Market‘, in P. Edwards (ed) Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in 
Britain (England: Blackwell, 1995). 
Note, ―Employer opportunism and the need for a just cause standard‖ (1989) 
103 Harvard Law Review 510. 
Novitz, T., and P. Skidmore, Fairness at Work: A Critical Analysis of the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 and its Treatment of Collective Rights 
(Oxford; Portland: Hart, 2001). 
Organ, D. W., ‗The motivational basis of organizational citizenship behavior‘, 
in L. L. Cummings and B. M. Straw (eds) Research in Organizational 
Behavior (JAI Press: Greenwich CT, 1990) 43. 
Organ, D. W., Organizational Citizenship Behavior: The Good Soldier 
Syndrome (Lexington Books: Lexington, 1988). 
Oxenbridge, S., and W. Brown, ‗The two faces of partnership? An assessment 
of partnership and cooperative employer/trade union relationships‘ (2002) 24 
Employee Relations 262. 
Palmer, M., and S. Roberts, Dispute Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms 
of Decision Making (London: Butterworths, 1998). 
Parker, Wall and Jackson, ―That‘s Not my Job: Developing Flexible Employee 
Work Orientations‖ (1996) 40 Academy of Management Journal 899. 
Peel, E., Treitel: The law of Contract (12
th
 ed., London, 2009). 
Peters, M., K. Seeds, C. Harding and E. Garnett, Findings from the Survey of 
Employment Tribunal Applications 2008 (Employment Relations Research 
Series no. 107, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010).   
Pfeffer, J., The Human Equation (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 
1998). 
Polster, J., ‗Workplace Grievance Procedures: Signalling Fairness but 
Escalating Commitment‘ (2011) 86 New York University Law Review 638. 
Pruitt, D. and D. Johnson, ―Mediation as an Aid to Face Saving in 
Negotiation‖ (1970) 14 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 239. 
 279 
Pruitt, D., and J. Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict (London: Open 
University Press, 1993). 
Richardson, R. and S. Wood, ―Productivity Change in the Coal Industry and 
the New Industrial Relations‖ (1988) 27 British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 33. 
Rideout, R., ‗Alternative Employment Remedies: the ACAS Arbitration 
Alternative‘ (1999) 49 Federation News 54. 
Rogers, J., and W. Streek (eds), Works Councils: Consultation, Representation 
and Cooperation in Industrial Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995).  
Rollinson, D., J. Handley, C. Hook and M. Foot, ―The Disciplinary 
Experience and its Effects on Subsequent Behaviour: An Exploratory Study‖ 
(1997) 4 Work, Employment and Society 232. 
Romeyn, J., ‗The Role of Specialist Tribunals‘ (1986) 28 New Zealand 
Journal of Industrial Relations 3. 
Sako, Prices, Quality and Trust: Inter-firm relations in Britain and Japan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
Saundry, R. and V. Antcliff, Employee representation in grievance and 
disciplinary matters – making a difference? (Employment Relations Research 
Series no. 69). 
Schiek, D ‗Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in 
European Economic Law‘ (unpublished draft of paper completed at LSE, 
2004).   
Settoon, R. P., N. Bennett and R. C. Liden, ‗Social exchange in organizations: 
Perceived organisational support, leader-member exchange, and employee 
reciprocity‘ (1996) 81 Journal of Applied Psychology 219. 
Shaffer, M., ―Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective‖ (1988) 46 Toronto 
Faculty of Law Review 162. 
Shapiro, D. L., ‗Reconciling theoretical differences among procedural justice 
researchers by re-evaluating what it means to have one‘s views ―considered‖: 
Implications for third-party managers‘, in R. Cropanzano (ed) Justice in the 
Workplace: Approaching Fairness in Human Resources Management 
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, 1993) 51. 
 280 
Simitis, S., ‗The Juridification of Labor Relations‘ (1985) 7 Comparative 
Labor Law 93. 
Simon, H., and Y. Sochynsky, ‗In-House Mediation of Employment Disputes: 
ADR for the 1990‘s‘ (1995) 21 Employee Relations Law Journal 29. 
Sissons, K., Closing the Gap – Ideas and Practices: Direct Participation in 
Organisational Change (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, 1996). 
Smith, C.A., D. W. Organ and J. P. Near, ‗Organisational citizenship 
behaviour:  Its nature and antecedents‘ (1983) 68 Journal of Applied 
Psychology 653-663.   
Smith, J., P. Edwards and M. Hall, Redundancy Consultation: A Study of 
Current Practice and the Effects of the 1995 Regulations (London: DTI 
Employment Relations Research Series No. 5, 1999). 
Stiglitz, J ‗Globalisation and Development‘, in D. Held and M. Koenig-
Archibugi (eds), Taming Globalisation, Frontiers of Governance (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2003) 47-67. 
Storey, R., New Perspectives on Human Resources Management (London: 
Routledge, 1987). 
Streeck, W., ‗On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality 
Production‘, in E. Matzner and W. Streeck (eds), Beyond Keynesianism.  The 
Socio-Economics of Production and Full Employment (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1991).   
Stuff, R. and S. Williams, ‗The myth of mutuality?  Employee perceptions of 
partnership at Borg Warner‘ (2004) 26 Employee Relations 30. 
Summers, C., ‗The Individual Employee‘s Rights Under the Collective 
Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?‘ (1977) 126 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 251. 
Summers, T. P. and A. S. De Nisi, ‗In search of Adam‘s other: Re-
examination of referents used in the evaluation of pay‘ (1990) 43 Human 
Relations 497. 
Swann, J., ―Formal Grievance Procedures in Non-union Plants‖ (1981) 26 
Personnel Administration 66. 
Sweeney, P. D, and D. B. McFarlin, ‗Workers‘ evaluations of the ―ends‖ and 
the ―means‖: An examination of four models of distributive and procedural 
 281 
justice‘ (1993) 55 Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 
23. 
Taylor, P., and H. Ramsay, ‗Unions, Partnership and HRM: Sleeping with the 
Enemy?‘ (1998) 6 International Journal of Employment Studies 117.  
Terry, M., ‗Systems of Collective Employee Representation in Non-Union 
Firms in the UK‘ (1999) 30 Industrial Relations Journal 16. 
Teubner, G., ‗Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions‘, G Teubner 
et al (ed) Juridification of Social Spheres (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1987) 3.  
Towers, B., The Representation Gap: Change and Reform in the British 
American Workplace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
Trade Union Congress, Partners for Progress (London: TUC, 1999). 
Tremlett, N., and N. Banerji, The 1992 Survey of Industrial Tribunal 
Applications (London: DTI Employment Relations Research Series No. 22, 
1994). 
Teubner, G., Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
Tyler, T. R., ‗Conditions leading to value-expressive effects in judgements of 
procedural justice: A test of four models‘ (1987) 52 Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 333. 
Tyler, T. R., and S. L. Blader, Co-operation in groups: procedural justice, 
social identity and behavioural engagement (Psychology Press: Philadelphia, 
2000).   
Undy, R., ‗Annual Review Article: New Labour‘s Industrial Relations 
Settlement: the Third Way?‘ (1999) 37 British Journal of Industrial Relations 
315. 
Van den Bos, K., E. A. Lind and H. A. M. Wilke, ‗The psychology of 
procedural and distributive justice viewed from the perspective of fairness 
heuristic theory‘, in R. Cropanzano (ed) Justice in the Workplace, Vol. 2 From 
Theory to Practice (Erlbaum: Mahwah, 2001). 
Van den Bos, K., R. Vermunt and H. A. M. Wilke, ‗Procedural and 
distributive justice: What is fair depends more on what comes first then on 
what comes next‘ (1997) 77 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95. 
Van Wezel Stone, K., ‗Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment 
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990‘s‘ (1996) 73 Denver University 
Law Review 1017. 
 282 
Von Prondzynski, F., ‗Labour Law as business facilitator‘, in H. Collins, P. 
Davies and R. Rideout (eds), Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 99. 
Wedderburn, W., The Worker and the Law 3
rd
 ed (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 
1986). 
White, J., ‗Unfair Dismissal: How Much Will the Employment Tribunal 
Award?‘ Solicitors’ Journal, 25 April 1997. 
Williams, K., and D. Lewis, The Aftermath of Tribunal Reinstatement and Re-
engagement (London: Department of Employment, 1981). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
